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Abstract
Information security is one of the most critical issues in wireless networks as the signals
transmitted through wireless medium are more vulnerable for interception. Although the
existing conventional security techniques are proven to be safe, the broadcast nature of wireless
communications introduces different challenges in terms of key exchange and distributions.
As a result, information theoretic physical layer security has been proposed to complement
the conventional security techniques for enhancing security in wireless transmissions. On the
other hand, the rapid growth of data rates introduces different challenges on power limited
mobile devices in terms of energy requirements. Recently, research work on wireless power
transfer claimed that it has been considered as a potential technique to extend the battery
lifetime of wireless networks. However, the algorithms developed based on the conventional
optimization approaches often require iterative techniques, which poses challenges for real-
time processing. To meet the demanding requirements of future ultra-low latency and reliable
networks, neural network (NN) based approach can be employed to determine the resource
allocations in wireless communications.
This thesis developed different transmission strategies for secure transmission in wireless
communications. Firstly, transmitter designs are focused in a multiple-input single-output
simultaneous wireless information and power transfer system with unknown eavesdroppers.
To improve the performance of physical layer security and the harvested energy, artificial
noise is incorporated into the network to mask the secret information between the legitimate
terminals. Then, different secrecy energy efficiency designs are considered for a MISO
underlay cognitive radio network, in the presence of an energy harvesting receiver. In
particular, these designs are developed with different channel state information assumptions at
the transmitter. Finally, two different power allocation designs are investigated for a cognitive
radio network to maximize the secrecy rate of the secondary receiver: conventional convex
optimization framework and NN based algorithm.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivations
Mobile devices and wireless technologies have become an indispensable part of daily
activities of people and they continue to underpin the lives of people and the infrastructures
of modern networked society that people live in today [1, 2]. In 1870s, the existence of
electromagnetic waves was proved by James Clerk Maxwell [3]. Based on the continued
development of micro-electronic circuits, the first generation (1G) commercial cellular
network was introduced in the late 1970s and fully established in 1980s, which used analogue
radio signals to provide voice services [1]. Then, in 1990s 1G networks were replaced by the
second generation (2G) cellular networks. The 2G networks were developed based on digital
technologies, and it provided both voice and data services and allowed users to experience
roaming facilities for the first time [4]. The third generation (3G) wireless cellular network
was introduced in 1998 and commercially started operating in 2001 [4]. In contrast to the
2G networks, the 3G networks provided high speed wireless Internet access, which made
the multimedia applications feasible on mobile devices, i.e., video chats, live TV, navigation
services, email, online games, and music. Then the fourth generation (4G) cellular networks
commercially deployed in 2010, where 4G users could receive higher speed, high quality and
capacity mobile services with improved security and lower cost than the services offered by
the 3G networks [5]. The fifth generation (5G) is the next generation commercial mobile
network, which is expected to roll-out by 2020 [6] with unleashing enormous potential
opportunities for information communication technologies - driven vertical industries. The
key requirements for 5G and beyond wireless networks include unprecedented higher data
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Fig. 1.1 The functions involved in a symmetric encryption system. The secret key cryptology
operates in both senders and recipients.
rates with higher energy efficiency (EE), lower cost, ultra reliability and low latency as well
as massive connectivity to support proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT).
Over the past decade, many state-of-the-art techniques have been developed to provide a
better quality of experience (QoE) to the end users, for example, Wireless Fidelity (WiFi),
the Global Positioning System (GPS), wireless sensor networks (WSN), mobile payments,
etc. However, the explosive growth of mobile data traffic and newly emerging high data
rate applications and services introduce an ever-growing demand for much higher capacity
and lower end-to-end latency [7], which poses different challenges on the available wireless
resources and wireless network infrastructures. As the current wireless communication
technologies do not have the capabilities to meet the unprecedented requirements of future
wireless networks, novel disruptive technologies and intelligent radio resource management
techniques need to be developed for 5G and beyond wireless networks. Based on the diverse
set of requirements, researchers have defined the most relevant performance targets of 5G
networks which include security and energy saving [8].
On the other hand, information security has become one of the major issues in
wireless networks when people completely rely on wireless transmissions for exchanging
and authenticating their confidential informations, such as Internet mobile banking, card
transactions and mobile payments. Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless transmissions,
the signals transmitted through wireless medium are more vulnerable for interception.
Therefore, the ability to share confidential information reliably in the presence of adversaries
is extremely important in future wireless networks.
1.1 Background and Motivations 3
Fig. 1.2 The RSA algorithm.
Conventionally, crypto-based encryption schemes are most widely used to establish
secure communications through avoiding intercepting or eavesdropping. The fundamental
idea of these methods is to employ different types of secret keys at the application layer to
encrypt or decrypt confidential messages [9]. The transmitter encrypts the plain text into
cipher text by exploiting the secret key and then sends the cipher text to the authorized
receiver. When the authorized receiver receives the message from the transmitter, it cannot
read the information directly due to the cipher text format of the message. The receiver
has to use the secret key to decrypt the message and transform the message into plain text.
If the receiver is not the intended destination of the transmitter, then its secret key cannot
decrypt the message. There are two types of conventional security methods: symmetric
encryption system and asymmetric encryption system. As shown in Fig 1.1, the symmetric
encryption system employs the same secret key at both senders and recipients. For example,
both data encryption standard (DES) and advanced encryption standard (AES) are symmetric
encryption standards. However, symmetric encryption system is considered vulnerable in
wireless communications as the broadcast nature of electromagnetic waves as well as the
characteristics of conventional security which completely rely on computation complexity of
some intractable mathematical problems. It is more and more vulnerable to be intercepted
due to the recent development of advanced processors with high computational capabilities.
The Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) is one of the most widely used asymmetric crypto-
systems. RSA is made of the initial letters of the surnames of Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and
Leonard Adleman, who first publicly described the algorithm in 1977. RSA is one of the first
practical public-key crypto-systems for confidential data transmission. In this asymmetric
crypto-system, the public key is utilized only for data encryption whereas the private key
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is used only for cipher text decryption. In RSA, this asymmetry is developed based on the
practical difficulty of factoring the product of two large prime numbers. As shown in Fig 1.2,
the sender exploits the public key to encrypt the information while the receiver employing the
private key to decrypt it. The receiver creates and then publishes a public key based on two
large prime numbers, along with an auxiliary value, which must be kept secret [10]. Anyone
can use the public key to encrypt a message, but the cipher text encrypted by the public key
can only be decrypted by the receiver [10].
Despite the existing conventional security techniques are being difficult to break or
intercept, the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions introduces different challenges in
terms of secret key exchange and distributions in these security techniques [11–18], which
are developed based on high complexity of some intractable mathematical problems. As a
result, information theoretic based physical layer security has been considered recently to
complement the conventional cryptographic methods while providing additional security
in wireless transmissions. Different from conventional methods, physical layer security is
not an independent part of communication systems. It utilizes the physical characteristics
of wireless channels to implement secure transmission in a communication system [19–24].
The theoretical foundation was proposed firstly by Shannon, termed as the perfect secrecy
[25], and then it was developed by Wyner [26]. In [26], Wyner introduced a wiretap channel
to accomplish secure transmission. The condition to realize confidential communication
is that the signal to noise ratio (SNR) or the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR)
of the legitimate channel is higher than that of the wiretap channel. The secrecy rate is the
only indicator to measure the performance of the physical layer security of a communication
system. It is the maximum data rate that the transmitter can communicate with the receiver at
which the eavesdropper (EVE) cannot intercept anything. The secrecy rate is equal to the
difference between the capacity of legitimate channel and the capacity of wiretap channel
[26].
Energy is also a critical resource in wireless communication systems. The unprecedented
requirements of future wireless networks bring different challenges on the aspects surrounding
the energy consumption. Furthermore, the energy consumption, regardless of the underpinning
technologies, has a knock-on effect on the environment, carbon footprint, global warming
and thus unanticipated financial consequences. On the other hand, the operation time of
energy-constrained wireless networks is limited by the life-time of the batteries, i.e., WSN
and IoT devices. Although the operation time of wireless devices could be extended through
charging or replacing the batteries, it may result in higher expenses and inconvenient, for
example, the sensors embedded in buildings and human bodies [27]. In general, conventional
energy harvesting (EH) methods collect energy from different external natural sources,
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Fig. 1.3 A communication network with separated ER and IR.
Fig. 1.4 Two practical designs for the co-located ER and IR.
including wind, solar as well as sea waves [28, 29]. However, these external energy resources
are always not reliable and unpredictable, and completely depend on the present nature of
the environments. Furthermore, it is difficult to incorporate these natural energy sources on
mobile devices, due to the size of harvesting devices and the geographical limitations. In
contrast to the other renewable energy sources, wireless power transfer (WPT) facilitates
practical design and implementation of EH especially in mobile devices [12]. Due to the fact
that radio frequency (RF) signals can carry both information and energy, WPT has become a
promising technology to address the power issue of wireless systems, which enables wireless
devices collecting energy from the information carrying RF signals [30, 31]. WPT has been
implemented in practical scenarios in terms of near-field electromagnetic induction and
far-field electromagnetic radiation. For example, passive RF identification is widely used in
short distance applications while transmitting energy from satellites to the ground or to other
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satellites through electromagnetic waves or lasers can be seen as long range implementations
[27].
Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) is one of the promising
techniques to implement WPT. Two types of SWIPT framework are investigated in the
literature [27, 32, 33], namely separated and co-located energy receiver (ER) and information
receiver (IR). A simple communication system with separated receivers is shown in Fig. 1.3,
where the transmitter simultaneously sends information and power to IR and ER, respectively.
For the case of co-located ER and IR, there exists two different practical designs: time
splitting (TS) and power splitting (PS) approaches. As shown in Fig. 1.4 (a), the receiving
antenna periodically switches between the energy and the IR in TS approach whereas for PS
approach shown in Fig. 1.4 (b), the received signal is split into two separate streams with
different power levels and sent to the ER and the IR, respectively.
Recently, artificial intelligence (AI) techniques have been recognized as the potential
solution approaches to solve different challenging problems for which the solutions are
difficult to determine due to complicated structure of the problems [34]. Furthermore, AI has
become as one of the fastest growing fields in many research topics [35] and the fundamental
idea of AI was first proposed by Alan Turing in his classic paper "Computing machinery and
intelligence" in 1950 [36]. In this seminal work, Turing raised a question "Can machines
think?" and proposed a test, namely Turing’s test, to answer it. In the following decades, the
research of AI went through ups and downs, since some problems were proved infeasible
to be implemented with the technical conditions available at that time [34]. Currently, both
the number and the performance of AI applications have been significantly improved, due to
two factors: (1) the availability of big data, which is significantly beneficial for improving
machine learning algorithms; (2) the increased processing capability of computers due to
recent advancements of processors, which made it possible for computers to process a huge
amount of data within a short time frame [34].
Machine learning is one of the key techniques to implement AI, which enables computers
to gather knowledge from its computations and make decisions according to the environment
[35, 37, 38]. The performance of machine learning tasks often heavily depends on the
available training data. In particular, training process is one of the key steps in machine
learning, as the computers learn how to provide a reasonable output results from its inputs
[39]. In other words, training is the process that significantly helps the computers to learn the
relationship between the inputs and the desired outputs. There are many machine learning
frameworks available in the literature [40, 35, 37, 38], including linear regression, logistic
regression, decision tree, neural network (NN), reinforcement learning and so on. In this
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Fig. 1.5 A biological neuron model.
Fig. 1.6 A simple mathematical neuron model.
thesis, only NN approach is exploited to solve resource allocation problems in wireless
communications, however, other machine learning techniques for wireless communications
will be explored in the future work.
NN is one of the most well-known and commonly used frameworks in machine learning
[41], as it is developed to imitate the structure and the function of biological brains. As shown
in Fig. 1.5, a biological neuron has a number of input wires and these are called dendrites.
which receive inputs from other neurons. Furthermore, a neuron also has an output wire
called the axon, which is used to send signals to other neurons. In other words, a neuron is a
computational unit that receives a number of input signals from dendrites, then performs some
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Fig. 1.7 A NN model.
computation and sends its computed results to all of its connected neurons through its axons
[39]. A simple mathematical neuron model is provided in Fig. 1.6, which mimics biological
neurons to provide an output to its connected neurons based on its inputs. In particular, a
NN consists of a number of simple, highly interconnected computation units called neurons,
which have the capability to represent this process of biological neuron systems [39].
A NNmodel is shown in Fig. 1.7, which consists of multiple layers and multiple neurons
in each layer. In particular, a NN should consist of the following basic elements [39]:
1. The input layer which is used to process the input data and forward the data to the
corresponding neurons. The size of input layer is related to the size of input data.
2. The input weight matrix that presents the weights between the connected neurons in
the input layer and that in the hidden layer.
3. The hidden layer(s) contain(s) single or multiple layers with a number of neurons to
mimic the procedure of biological brains.
4. The hidden weight matrix that presents the weights between the connected neurons in
the hidden layer(s).
5. The output layer contains some neurons to present the output data.
6. The output weight matrix that presents the weights between the connected neurons in
the hidden layer and that in the output layer.
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Several advantages of employing NN rather than other machine learning techniques are
summarized as follows:
1. NN has the potential capabilities to provide a solution within a short time frame with
reduced computational complexity [42], compared to that of the other machine learning
techniques such as support vector machine and Gaussian process which sometimes
require to store all the available data for their processing [42, 43]. However, employing
mini-batch gradient descent algorithm to train a NN requires only a sub-set of the
available large data set at each training step.
2. A single NNmodel can be trained to meet the objectives of multiple tasks [42], whereas
it is difficult for other machine learning techniques to achieve those multi-objectives
with the same model.
3. Furthermore, NN has the capability to automatically extract features from the data with
highly complicated structure and to establish the hidden internal relationships, which
could help to significantly reduce processing requirements of massive amount of data
set [44].
1.2 Thesis outline and Contributions
Motivated by the growing challenges of security, EE and low latency in 5G and beyond
wireless networks, the aim of this thesis is to develop different resource allocation techniques
to improve security and EE in future wireless networks. This thesis consists of seven chapters
and the main contributions of the remaining chapters are summarized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents the fundamental concepts and related literature review. Firstly, the
mathematical expression of secrecy rate is provided through illustrating a wiretap channel
model. Furthermore, the achievable secrecy rate in a single-input single-output (SISO)
system and a multiple-input single-output (MISO) system are presented, respectively. Then,
the fundamental concept and mathematical representations of SWIPT are presented. At
last, the recent work on physical layer security, SWIPT and machine learning techniques are
discussed.
In Chapter 3, the required mathematical background is provided. The fundamental
concepts of convex optimization are first presented. Then, various convex optimization prob-
lems, such as linear programming (LP), quadratic programming (QP), quadratic constrained
quadratic programming (QCQP), second-order cone programming (SOCP) and semidefinite
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programming (SDP), as well as duality and Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions are dis-
cussed. Furthermore, the mathematical expressions for several machine learning approaches
are also presented, including linear regression, logistic regression, NN and reinforcement
learning.
In Chapter 4, a MISO secure SWIPT system with PS is considered, where the transmitter
and legitimate users are equipped with multiple and single antennas, respectively. It is
assumed that all the legitimate users can simultaneously process information decoding and
EH. A non-linear EH model is adopted in the legitimate users to capture the characteristics of
practical EH circuits. Furthermore, it is assumed that all the EVEs are purely passive, hence
their channel state information (CSI) is not available at the transmitter, and artificial noise
(AN) is exploited to mask the signal intended to the legitimate users. In this work, the aim
is to maximize the power of AN to confuse the unknown EVEs while satisfying quality of
service (QoS) and EH requirements at the legitimate users. Two robust joint beamforming and
PS designs with the AN approach are developed: (1) For the bounded channel uncertainties,
the problem can be transformed as a SDP through semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and a linear
matrix inequality (LMI) representation; (2) For the statistical channel uncertainties, both
SDR and Bernstein-type inequality are exploited to reformulate the original problem into a
convex one.
Chapter 5 investigates different secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) optimization problems
in a MISO underlay cognitive radio (CR) network. Different SEE maximization problems for
an underlay MISO CR network with EH requirement are solved. In particular, a multi-antenna
secondary transmitter (SU-Tx) simultaneously sends confidential information and energy to a
secondary receiver (SU-Rx) and an ER, respectively. This secondary SWIPT communication
is established by sharing the spectrum that allocated for communication for primary user
terminals. Transmit beamforming design is considered to maximize the achievable SEE
under the constraints of secrecy rate on the SU-Rx, interference leakage on the primary
receiver (PU-Rx) as well as EH requirement on ER. Furthermore, the ER is considered to be
a potential passive EVE due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmission.
The main contributions of Chapter 5 are summarized as follows: (1) With the assumption
of perfect CSI at the SU-Tx, the transmit beamforming design is formulated as a SEE
maximization problem with the required set of constraints. The original SEE maximization
problem is not convex in nature due to its non-linear fractional objective function which
becomes challenging to realize an optimal solution. To circumvent this non-convex issue, the
original problem is reformulated into a tractable form by exploiting different mathematical
techniques including non-linear fractional programming [45] and difference of concave (DC)
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functions programming [46]. Furthermore, the optimality of the solution has been proven.
(2) Next, the SEE maximization with the statistical CSI available at the SU-Tx is studied.
In particular, the transmit beamforming vectors is designed to maximize the SEE, while
satisfying the constraints on interference leakage, outage probability on secrecy rate and
EH requirements. This problem appears to be challenging to solve due to the probabilistic
constraints, which are difficult to mathematically measure in the design. These outage
constraints are expressed into a set of closed-form expressions. Then, the original problem
is efficiently solved through an iterative approach by exploiting different mathematical
techniques including non-linear fractional and DC programming. Furthermore, the solution
obtained by the proposed method always yields rank-one and shows a similar performance of
the SDR approach. (3) Next, a robust design with an ellipsoidal based channel uncertainties
in all set of channels is considered. This robust SEE maximization problem is non-convex in
its original form and it is first reformulated into a series of SDP by employing the SDR and
non-linear fractional programming [45]. However, the reformulated problem still remains
non-convex due to the channels uncertainties. In order to overcome this non-convexity issue,
S-Procedure [47] is exploited to convert this problem into a convex one. Moreover, the
method to construct a rank-one optimal covariance matrix is proposed. This confirms the
optimality of the proposed robust SEE maximization based beamforming design.
In Chapter 6, a secure transmission in a CR network is considered. This secure network
consists of one primary transmitter (PU-Tx), one PU-Rx, one SU-Tx, one SU-Rx and one
EVE. All of these terminals are equipped with a single antenna. The aim is to enhance the
quality of secure communications between SU-Tx and SU-Rx in the presence of an EVE. In
particular, the optimal power allocation is determined to maximize the achievable secrecy
rate under the constraints of total transmit power of the SU-Tx and the interference leakage to
the PU-Rx. The contributions to this work are: (1) firstly, none of existing research work
considered of developing a NN framework to solve the secrecy rate maximization problems in
an underlay CR network; (2) secondly, a NN based algorithm is proposed to simultaneously
solve the secrecy rate maximization problem with perfect and imperfect CSI at the SU-Tx.
The key advantage of the developed approach is that the same NN based algorithm can be
employed to solve both the robust and the non-robust secrecy rate maximization problems with
imperfect and perfect CSI, respectively, whereas, in conventional optimization approaches,
these problems need to be formulated into two completely different optimization framework.
Furthermore, to avoid over-fitting, two regularization techniques are also embedded into the
proposed NN. To generate the required training set, the conventional optimization framework
is utilized and then train the NN with this training set to determine appropriate weights of the
connections. These weighted connections establish a mathematical relationship between the
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input and the corresponding output parameters. After completing the training process, the
performance of the proposed NN based approach is evaluated against the the conventional
optimization approaches; (3) finally, the performance of both schemes are compared in terms
of achieved secrecy rate and the required computation time to demonstrate the effectiveness
and superiority of the proposed NN scheme.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis and identifies interesting future research directions
on this topic.
1.3 Publication List
Journal papers:
L. Ni, X. Da, H. Hu, Y. Huang, R. Xu and M. Zhang, "Outage Constrained Robust
Transmit Design for Secure Cognitive Radio with Practical Energy Harvesting," IEEE Access,
vol. 6, pp. 71444-71454, Dec. 2018.
M. Zhang, K. Cumanan, J. Thiyagalingam, W. Wang, A. G. Burr, Z. Ding and O. A.
Dobre, "Energy Efficiency Optimization for Secure Transmission in MISO Cognitive Radio
Network with Energy Harvesting," IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 126234-126252, Sep. 2019.
L. Ni, X. Da, H. Hu, M. Zhang and K. Cumanan "Outage Constrained Robust Secrecy Energy
Efficiency Maximization for EH Cognitive Radio Networks", IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett.,
minor revision.
M. Zhang, K. Cumanan, J. Thiyagalingam, L. Ni, W. Wang, A. G. Burr, Z. Ding and
O. A. Dobre, "Exploiting Deep Learning for Secure Transmission in an Underlay Cognitive
Radio Network," to be submitted to IEEE Trans. Commun..
W. Wang, X. Li, M.Zhang, K. Cumanan and D. K. Ng, "Joint Transceiver Designs for
Energy-Constrainted UAV secure Communications with Imperfect Location of Eavesdrop-
pers", submitted to IEEE Trans. Commun..
Conference papers:
M. Zhang, K. Cumanan, and A. G. Burr, "Secrecy rate maximization for MISO multi-
1.3 Publication List 13
casting SWIPT system with power splitting scheme," in Proc. IEEE SPAWC, Edinburgh, Jul.
2016, pp. 1-5.
M. Zhang, K. Cumanan, and A. G. Burr, "Secure Energy Efficiency Optimization for
MISO Cognitive Radio Network with Energy Harvesting," in Proc. IEEE WCSP, Nanjing,
Oct. 2017, pp. 1-6.
M. Zhang, K. Cumanan, L. Ni, H. Hu, A. G. Burr and Z. Ding, "Robust Beamform-
ing for AN Aided MISO SWIPT System with Unknown Eavesdroppers and Non-linear EH
Model," in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM WORKSHOP, Abu Dahbi, Dec. 2018, pp. 1-7.
M. Xu, W. Wang, M. Zhang, K. Cumanan, G. Zhang and Z. Ding, "Joint Optimization of
Energy Consumption and Time Delay in Energy-Constrained Fog Computing Networks," in
Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, Hawaii, Dec. 2019, pp. 1-6.
M. Zhang, K. Cumanan, W. Wang, A. G. Burr, Z. Ding, S. Lambotharan and O. A.
Dobre, “Energy Efficiency Optimization for Secure Transmission in a MIMO NOMA Sys-
tem,” submitted to IEEE WCNC 2020.
Chapter 2
Fundamental Concepts and Literature
Review
In this chapter, the fundamental concepts of physical layer security and SWIPT are
presented. First, the basic concepts of information theoretic physical layer security is studied
and the secrecy capacity of different communication systems are defined. Then, the concept
of SWIPT is presented with different receiver architectures. Finally, the literature on physical
layer security, SWIPT, SEE and machine learning techniques for wireless communications
are reviewed which provide recent developments to address different challenges in future
wireless networks.
2.1 Fundamental Concepts
This section introduces the fundamental concepts and performance metric of information
theoretic physical layer security and SWIPT.
2.1.1 Physical Layer Security
Information security represents one of themajor issues inwireless networks, as the signals
transmitted through the wireless medium are more vulnerable for interception. Although the
existing traditional security techniques may remain non-contestable, the broadcast nature
of wireless communications introduces a number of challenges, particularly in terms of
secret key exchange and distributions [32, 22, 48, 11]. To further enhance the security of
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Fig. 2.1 The wiretap channel with confidential information.
wireless networks, information theoretic based physical layer security has been recently
proposed to complement the conventional security techniques in wireless transmissions. In
particular, this approach exploits the difference between the legitimate and wiretap channels
in establishing secure wireless transmission [49]. In other words, physical layer security
can only be implemented when the SNR or SINR of the legitimate channel is better than
that of the wiretap channel [25, 26, 50]. In contrast to the conventional security methods,
physical layer security provides a different paradigm, which is named as secrecy rate and it
can be implemented by exploiting the physical layer characteristics of wireless channels [51].
This approach was first theoretically proved by Shannon [25], and then secrecy capacity of
wiretap and related channels were developed by Wyner [26] and Csiszar [50]. In recent years,
physical layer security has been recognized as a promising technique to establish confidential
communications between transmitters and legitimate users [11, 22, 52–55, 18, 56–58].
To investigate information theoretic physical layer security, a basic model, namely, the
wiretap channel is illustrated in Fig. 2.1 [26]. This secrecy system was initially proposed in
the literature [26], and then developed in [50]. Three terminals are considered in this model:
one transmitter, one legitimate user and one EVE. The transmitter intends to send a private
message set S to the legitimate user at rate R, and wants the message to be confidential.
The message set is defined as S = {1, 2, ..., 2nR}, and the entropy is H(S) = nR, where R
is the rate of communication and n is the block length of communication. The encoding
function fn : S → Xn maps each message s ∈ S to a codeword xn ∈ Xn. It is assumed
that the transmitter communicates with the legitimate user through a discrete memoryless
channel, which outputs two discrete sequences Y n and Zn at the legitimate user and the
EVE, respectively. The transition probability is defined as pY Z|X . At the legitimate user, the
decoding function gn : Y n → S maps the observation Y n to an estimated message Sˆ. The
quality of security is measured by the entropy rate with respect to (w.r.t.) the observation of
EVE, which is also known as equivocation rate:
Re =
1
n
H(S|Zn). (2.1)
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The rate R can be called the secrecy rate, if and only if for any ϵ > 0, there exists the
code sequence (2nR, n) such that
Pr[Sˆ ̸= S] < ϵ, (2.2)
1
n
H(S|Zn) ≥ R− ϵ. (2.3)
The inequalities defined in (2.2) and (2.3) are the reliability and secrecy conditions for this
system, respectively. Let the symbol I(·; ·) denote the mutual information, one can have
1
n
I(S;Zn) =
1
n
H(S)− 1
n
H(S|Zn) = R−Re ≤ ϵ, (2.4)
which states that the EVE cannot decode anything. Hence, the expression for the secrecy rate
for a discrete memoryless channel can be written as [50]:
C = max
U→X→Y Z
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)], (2.5)
where U is an auxiliary variable that should meet the Markov chain condition, i.e., pY Z|UX =
pY Z|X . Note that the auxiliary variable U is introduced to represent the portion of source
message corresponding to certain decodability level at the legitimate user [58].
Consider a SISO network as shown in Fig. 2.2, with one transmitter, one legitimate user
and one EVE. All of these terminals are equipped with a single antenna. The transmitter
intends to send a confidential message to the legitimate user while the EVE attempting to
intercept the confidential message. The channels between the transmitter and the legitimate
user as well as the EVE are denoted by hs and he, respectively. The noise at the legitimate
user and the EVE are denoted by ns (E{|ns|2} = σ2s) and ne (E{|ne|2} = σ2e), respectively.
Furthermore, assume that P is the transmit power of the transmitter. The received signal at
the legitimate user and the EVE can be mathematically expressed respectively, as
ys =
√
Phsx+ ns, ye =
√
Phex+ ne, (2.6)
where x (E{|x|2} = 1) denotes signal sent from the transmitter. Based on these assumptions,
the achievable secrecy rate of the legitimate user is written as [59]
C =
[
log2
(
1 +
|hs|2P
σ2s
)
− log2
(
1 +
|he|2P
σ2e
)]+
, (2.7)
where [x]+ denotes max[0, x].
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Fig. 2.2 A SISO system with one transmitter, one legitimate user and one EVE.
Fig. 2.3 A MISO system with one multi-antenna transmitter, one legitimate user and one
EVE.
2.1 Fundamental Concepts 18
Next, the achievable secrecy rate of MISO system is investigated. A simplified MISO
system model is shown in Fig. 2.3, where a transmitter with NT antennas intends to send
a confidential message to the single antenna legitimate user. At the same time, a single
antenna EVE attempts to eavesdrop the information. The channels between the transmitter
and the legitimate user and EVE are denoted as hs ∈ CNT×1 and he ∈ CNT×1, respectively.
The parameters ns ∼ CN (0, σ2s) and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e) represent the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at the legitimate user and the EVE, respectively. The received signals at the
legitimate user and the EVE can be written respectively, as
ys = h
H
s qx+ ns, (2.8)
ye = h
H
e qx+ ne, (2.9)
where q ∈ CNT×1 denotes the signal vector transmitted from the transmitter and x (E{|x|2} =
1) denotes signal sent from the transmitter, respectively. Thus, the achievable secrecy rate of
the legitimate user is defined as [59]
C =
[
log2(1 +
1
σ2s
hHs qq
Hhs)− log2(1 +
1
σ2e
hHe qq
Hhe)
]+
. (2.10)
2.1.2 Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer
The power is extremely valuable resource and should be efficiently used in wireless
communication systems, especially for the batteries powered energy-constrained devices and
networks [27]. The slow improvement of battery technologies introduces a critical challenge
for designing mobile devices [32], for example, the basic requirement is to design mobile
devices much lighter and thinner, however, these designs require ultra high energy density
batteries, which are not possible under current technical conditions. Furthermore, these
increasing requirements in wireless devices violate one of the key demanding requirements
of the 5G networks which is to achieve green and low-carbon communications. WPT is an
emerging technology, which facilitates the mobile devices to collect energy from external
energy sources without any wired connections [30, 31, 60]. The energy source to enable this
technique can be the information carrying RF signals radiated by the transmitters [30, 31, 60].
As such, SWIPT facilitates practical design and implementation of this technique, especially
in mobile devices [12, 61].
Two types of receiver designs can be employed in practical SWIPT systems, namely,
separated and co-located IR and ER. A simplified MISO SWIPT network is shown in Fig.
2.4, where the IR receives the information whereas ER harvests energy from the transmitter.
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Fig. 2.4 The system model of a MISO SWIPT system with separated IR and ER.
It is assumed that the transmitter is equipped withNT antennas, while both the IR and ER are
equipped with a single antenna. The channels between the transmitter and the IR as well as
the ER are denoted as hi ∈ CNT×1 and he ∈ CNT×1, respectively. The received signal at the
ER can be written as
ye = h
H
e qx+ ne, (2.11)
where q ∈ CNT×1 denotes the transmit beamforming vector, x (E{|x|2} = 1) denotes signal
sent from the transmitter and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e) represents the noise at the ER. The received
RF power can be expressed as
Pe = h
H
e qq
Hhe + σ
2
e , (2.12)
Furthermore, the harvested energy at the ER can be written as
Ee = ζe(h
H
e qq
Hhe + σ
2
e), (2.13)
where ζe ∈ (0, 1] represents the EH efficiency of the ER.
Another simplified MISO SWIPT communication scenario is presented in Fig. 2.5,
where the same receiver can perform both information decoding and EH. The transmitter
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is equipped with NT antennas whereas the receiver consists of only a single antenna. The
channel between the transmitter and the receiver is denoted as hi ∈ CNT×1. In co-located
receiver structure, there are two types of designs available in the literature [27], namely, PS
and TS. In this thesis, the PS approach is considered, where a power splitter is embedded into
the receiver. The structure of a PS based receiver design is shown in Fig. 2.6. The functions
of a PS based receiver are demonstrated as follows: First, the received RF signal is corrupted
by an AWGN ni ∼ CN (0, σ2i ) at the RF band. This RF band signal is then forwarded to the
power splitter. Next, the power splitter separates the signal into two streams with the PS ratio
ρ ∈ (0, 1]. After the splitter, ρ part of the signal power is fed to the ER and the left 1 − ρ
part of the signal power is forwarded to the information decoder. Furthermore, the signal
split to the information decoder is first converted to a complex baseband signal and then
been sampled and digitalized by an analog-to-digital converter for further decoding [62, 63],
where an additional baseband noise is introduced by this conversion. This additional noise
can be modelled as np ∼ CN (0, σ2p). Hence, the received signal at the IR and the ER can be
expressed, respectively, as
yIR =
√
1− ρ(hHi qx+ ni) + np, (2.14)
yER =
√
ρ(hHi qx+ ni), (2.15)
where q ∈ CNT×1 denotes the transmit beamforming vector and where x (E{|x|2} = 1)
denotes signal sent from the transmitter. The received RF power at the ER can be written as
Pi = ρ(h
H
i qq
Hhe + σ
2
i ). (2.16)
On the other hand, the harvested energy can be written as
Ei = ζehρ(h
H
i qq
Hhe + σ
2
i ), (2.17)
where ζeh ∈ (0, 1] represents the EH efficiency.
Recently, more realistic and practical non-linear EH models have been considered in
the literature [64–66], which can take into account the non-linear characteristics in practical
RF-EH circuits. In linear EH models, the output power can be defined as the product of
the received RF power and the EH efficiency ratio. However, non-linear EH models take
into account more realistic parameters. The output power of a non-linear EH model can be
expressed as [64]
Eout =
Ψ−MΩ
1− Ω , (2.18)
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Fig. 2.5 The system model of MISO SWIPT system with co-located IR and ER.
Fig. 2.6 The structure of a PS receiver.
where Ω = 1
1+exp(ab) . TheM is a constant that denotes the maximum power that the ER can
harvest, this is due to the fact that the RF-EH circuit saturates if the received RF power is
exceedingly large. The parameter Ψ is defined as Ψ = M
1+exp(−a(Pin−b)) , where Pin is the input
RF power of the EH circuit which is defined in (2.12) for the case of separated IR and ER,
and in (2.16) for the scenario of co-located IR and ER with PS scheme. Furthermore, a is the
non-linear charging rate w.r.t. the input power and b is a minimum turn-on voltage of the EH
circuit [64].
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2.2 Literature Review
This section presents literature review on physical layer security, SWIPT, energy efficient
strategies and machine learning for wireless communications under each corresponding
subsection.
2.2.1 Physical Layer Security
Over the last decade, researchers developed several approaches to improve achievable
secrecy rate, for example, relay aided system, cooperative jamming, AN approach and device
to device (D2D) communication systems, etc [32, 52, 67–81]. Convex optimization and
multi-antenna techniques have been exploited to design the efficient transmit beamforming
by solving secrecy rate maximization or transmit power minimization problems. The
beamforming design for physical layer security over η − µ fading channels with and without
co-channel interference, has been investigated in [67]. Note that the η − µ fading channel
model was first proposed in[82], which is modelled as following the η − µ distribution. This
channel model can be used to better represent the the small-scale variations of the fading
signal in a non-line-of-sight condition [67]. The physical layer security performance of a
relay aided full duplex network is studied in [81]. In [68], the sum secrecy rate maximization
problem is studied in a relay assisted CR network. An optimal power allocation scheme in a
decode-and-forward scenario has been proposed to maximize the sum secrecy rate in [70].
The dual antenna selection has been studied to improve secrecy performance and transmission
capacity for a full duplex CR network in [72]. A SDP based transmission technique for MISO
secure channels has been proposed in [69]. In [71], a joint source and relay beamforming
design is proposed for an amplify-and-forward assisted relay multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) system to maximize the secrecy rate. Generalized singular value decomposition
(GSVD) has been utilized in [73] to determine the optimal power allocation.
Cooperative jamming has been considered as an alternative approach to further improve
quality of secure transmissions [32, 52, 74–76]. The aim of any types of jamming signals is
to generate more interference to the potential EVEs [52, 76], which in turn will improve the
available secrecy rate of the communication system. The optimal cooperative jamming design
is studied in [74] to enhance the secrecy performance of a relay assisted wireless network. The
secrecy rate maximization problem has been investigated in a MIMO wireless network with a
cooperative jammer in [75]. In [52], a novel cooperative jamming approach, namely harvest-
and-jam helper, is proposed for an amplify-and-forward relay assisted wireless network to
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maximize the secrecy rate, whereas a multi-antenna cooperative jammer is employed in a
MIMO network to improve the secrecy performance. Furthermore, a wireless powered D2D
secure transmission is studied in [76], where a cooperative jammer is employed to introduce
interference to the EVEs.
AN is another type of jamming signal that introduces more interference to EVEs by
embedding it in the transmit signal [78, 79]. An isotropic AN approach has been proposed
in [78] by exploiting orthogonal projection of the intended signal to the legitimate users,
whereas the secrecy rate maximization problem is investigated in [79] by jointly designing
transmit beamforming and AN covariance matrix. The joint signal and AN beaforming
design is considered to maximize the secrecy rate in a multicast MISO SWIPT system in
[11]. In [83], the AN power is maximized to interfere with purely unknown EVEs in a MISO
SWIPT network. In [84], the joint beamforming and PS design is studied to minimize the
total power in an AN aided secure MIMO SWIPT system. Furthermore, the harvested energy
is maximized in a secure MISO SWIPT system with the help of both AN and cooperative
jamming in [32].
Generally, the CSI of all the legitimate channels and wiretap channels are assumed to
be perfectly known at the transmitter [11, 85, 86]. However, there are practical difficulties
in having the perfect CSI at the transmitter due to the channel estimation and quantization
errors. Ignoring the effect of CSI uncertainties in the design for wireless networks can lead to
solutions that may violate critical constraints and results in a poor performance in realistic
channel conditions. Therefore, it is important to incorporate the channel uncertainties in the
beamforming designs. Furthermore, it is more challenging for the transmitter to design the
beamforming in different types of secrecy rate optimizations when the transmitter cannot
obtain the perfect knowledge of CSI.
To circumvent the inevitable channel uncertainties, robust design is a well-known
approach, which can be classified into two groups, the worst-case robust design [69, 87–94],
and the outage probability based design [95–98]. In the worst-case design, it is assumed
that the CSI errors belong to some known bounded uncertainty sets whereas in the outage
probability based design, the channel errors are random with a certain statistical distribution
and constraints can be satisfied with certain outage probabilities. In fact, the bounded robust
optimization is generally conservative owing to its worst-case criterion while probabilistic
SINR constrained beamforming provides a soft SINR control. The robust transmit covariance
matrix design for a MISO communication system with multiple antenna EVEs has been
investigated in [69], where SDR and S-Procedure are employed to solved this robust problem.
In [99], the robust transmit covariance matrix design has been proposed to minimize the
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EVE’s SINR in a MIMO system. The work in [100] considers the robust beaforming design
for maximizing the secrecy rate in a CR MISO network. The work in [22] solves a robust
optimization problem in a MIMO system at low SNRs in which the original problem is
formulated as a SDP by employing S-Procedure. AN aided robust optimization designs
have been investigated in [79, 99]. Furthermore, the outage probabilistic based robust
designs have been considered in the literature when the transmitter has only the statistical
knowledge of channel uncertainties. In this approach, the required quality of services are
satisfied at the users with a set of predefined outage probabilities [18, 101]. In [18], a robust
outage optimization problem for MIMO system has been studied, in which a Bernstein-type
inequality based conservative approximation approach has been utilized to formulate the
non-convex outage secrecy rate constraint. The work in [101] developed a robust design in a
MISO system, in which the outage probability of the secrecy rate is minimized by employing
a single-stream beamforming and transmitting AN in the null space of the legitimate channel.
2.2.2 Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer
Recently, SWIPT over wireless channels has been studied extensively in the literature
[30, 31, 27, 54, 53, 63, 102–106, 33]. Varshney first proposed the idea of transmitting
information and power at the same time in [30]. A capacity energy function is presented
to characterize the fundamental trade-off between the rates at which energy and reliable
information can be transmitted. In [31], Grover and Sahai extended the work in [30] to
frequency selective channels with AWGN. It was shown in [31] that a non-trivial trade-
off exists for information transfer versus energy transfer via power allocation. Wireless
information and power transfer subject to co-channel interference was studied in [102], in
which optimal designs to achieve different different outage energy trade-offs as well as
rate-energy trade-offs are derived. Different from the traditional view of taking interference
as an undesired factor that jeopardizes the wireless channel capacity, in [102] interference
was utilized as a source for EH. Unlike [30, 31, 102], which considered point to point single
antenna transmission, [27, 107] considered MIMO systems for SWIPT. In particular, the
work in [27] studied the performance limits of a three node MIMO broadcasting system,
where one receiver harvests the energy and another receiver decodes information from the
signals sent by a common transmitter. The work in [107] extended the scheme in [27] by
considering imperfect CSI at the transmitter.
In [53], a secure SWIPT transmission systemwith two type of EVEs (passive and potential
EVEs) coexist has been firstly proposed. The transmit beamforming, AN beamforming and
energy beamforming have been jointly designed to minimize the required total transmit power.
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The work in [103] considered resource allocation design for maximizing the harvested energy
in a MISO SWIPT system with multiple-antenna ERs. In addition, the authors presented
that there always exists a rank-one solution of the optimal transmit covariance matrix and
proposed an algorithm to construct an equivalent rank-one solution.
The CSI in [27, 103] was assumed to be perfectly known at the transmitter, however, it is
difficult to obtain the CSI in practical schemes due to the channel estimation and quantization
errors. The work in [54, 53, 104, 105] investigated the robust secure communication with
MISO SWIPT systems by incorporating all the channel uncertainties. SDR has been employed
to solve the secrecy rate maximization problems in [104, 105]. In [104], the authors proposed
a suboptimal method to guarantee the rank-one solution for the relaxed problem, whereas in
[105], the optimal solution of the proposed problem termed to be rank-two. Furthermore, a
MISO SWIPT system was studied in [33], a two step algorithm was proposed to circumvent
the rank-one issue, while SDR is exploited to obtain a rank-one solution in the AN added
scheme. In [106], the resource allocation in AN added orthogonal frequency division
multiple access (OFDMA) SWIPT system has been studied, in which a weighted sum secrecy
rate maximization problem is investigated for the IRs and to satisfy the harvested energy
requirements at the ERs. SWIPT for multi-user systems was studied in [108], where it
was shown in [108] that for multiple access channels with a received energy constraint,
time-sharing is necessary to achieve the maximum sum rate when the received energy
constraint is sufficiently large; while for the multi-hop channel with a harvesting relay, the
transmission strategy depends on the quality of the second link. In [109], a robust EE design
for a relay embedded MIMO system with SWIPT is studied. The secure beamforming design
for a cooperative MISO CR non-orthogonal multiple access network with SWIPT has been
investigated in [110].
Most existing works that adopt the linear EH model assume that the output direct current
power is independent of the input power. However, in practice, the EH circuit results in a
non-linear power conversion due to the rectifier in the RF-EH conversion circuit which is the
key element in WPT implementation [111]. Therefore, the assumption of a linear EH model
in the literature may not be able to incorporate the non-linear characteristics in practical EH
scenarios [112]. Recently, the practical parametric non-linear EH model has been considered
in [112]. In contrast to the linear EH model, the non-linear one includes the characteristics of
practical RF-EH conversion circuits. A power allocation strategy for a SWIPT system with
non-linear EH model is proposed in [112], whereas beamforming designs are investigated
with a non-linear EH model for multiple antenna systems in [64, 65, 113, 114].
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2.2.3 Energy Efficient Strategies
The unprecedented requirements of higher data rate, EE and information security
pose different challenges in the development of future wireless communication systems
and networks. Furthermore, the exponential growth of the number of wireless devices
with different newly emerging high data rate applications introduce major concerns on the
energy consumption with different impacts in terms of both environmental and economic
aspects [115–118, 117, 118]. Different statistics confirm that information communication
technologies based industries contribute to two percent of the world energy consumption
[119], and this will grow rapidly with the ever increasing number of wireless devices and the
emerging new communication technologies. This exponential growth in energy consumption
will result in different undesirable impacts on the natural green environments. Hence, energy
efficient communications have recently become as a demanding approach to address not only
these issues but also due to the limited battery life of mobile devices and slow development
of energy storage technologies. Furthermore, the energy efficient designs based on the EE
performance metric have been considered as one of the key requirements in the development
of future wireless systems. These designs take the EE performance metric into account rather
than achievable rate or transmission power metrics.
Most of existing work on physical layer security in the literature considers either secrecy
rate maximization with a total transmit power constraint [11, 120, 121] or power minimization
to meet the secrecy rate requirements [33, 18, 122]. However, these designs do not take into
account the SEE as the power consumptions and their impacts become as major concerns in
future secure communications. Therefore, from the energy efficient perspective in physical
layer security, the SEE is considered as a suitable performance metric to measure the
efficient utilization of the power consumption in a secure communication system. The SEE
is defined as the ratio between the achieved secrecy rate and the total power consumption
at the transmitter. Several research work on SEE has been investigated in the literature
[123–127, 12]. In [123], a transmitter design for maximizing SEE has been investigated in a
MISO system with imperfect CSI at the transmitter, whereas a SEE maximization design has
been considered for a MISO system under both statistical and imperfect CSI assumptions
in [124]. The transmit beamforming design has been proposed to maximize the SEE in a
MISO system with the assumption of having statistical CSI at the transmitter. The robust SEE
maximization for MIMO SWIPT system has been studied in [126]. Furthermore, in [127]
the SEE maximization problem with integrated services (one multicast and one confidential
message) in a MISO system has been considered. In [12], the transmit beamforming design
is studied to maximize the SEE for an underlay MISO CR SWIPT network.
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2.2.4 Machine Learning for Wireless Communications
The explosive growth of complexity and diversity of wireless communication systems
and related applications in recent years poses different challenges to mobile service providers
[128]. As an emerging solution to address these issues, machine learning embedded wireless
communications has drawn a great deal of research interest from both academia and relevant
industries due to their benefits of less computational complexity and lower computation
time [129–131]. Machine learning based approaches can be applied to solve a wide range
problems in wireless communications, form radio access technology selection [132] to
different resource optimization problems [61], as well as channel estimation and signal
detection problems [133]. In the following, literature review of machine learning for wireless
communications is provided.
In the literature, many research work have demonstrated that machine learning techniques
can be exploited to solve different types of complicated problems in different domains of
wireless communications. The possibility of employing machine learning in 5G networks
has been discussed in [129], including embedding machine learning to massive MIMO
and smart grid networks. In [134], the opportunities and challenges of combining AI and
future mobile networks have been reviewed. The NN based spectrum efficiency and EE
maximization techniques have been proposed for CR network in [61]. In [135], the advantages
and disadvantages of different learning algorithms have been discussed for self-organizing
networks (SONs). Deep learning based channel estimation and signal detection techniques
in orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) systems have been investigated in
[133]. The reinforcement learning based framework and several conventional techniques
have been investigated for traffic offloading problems in a stochastic heterogeneous cellular
network in [136]. A learning based approach for wireless resource management has been
presented in [137] whereas a reinforcement learning based resource allocation technique has
been developed for vehicle to vehicle communications in [138]. A big data driven mobile
network optimization and several techniques in analytics have been presented in [130]. The
authors have provided an overview on Apache Spark (an open-source platform for cluster
computing) based learning framework to analyze the mobile big data in [139], which has
exploited the real world dataset to validate their proposed approaches. In [140], a survey
on deep learning applications for network traffic control systems is provided. Furthermore,
this work also discusses several unsolved issues which may be potential avenues for future
research work.
The work in [141] introduces the trend in wireless networks to incorporate NN techniques
to cope with the challenges associated with different design problems. In this work, an
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overview on NN models, as well as the survey of NN applications in wireless networks have
been presented. An overview on exploiting different advanced deep learning techniques
for IoT data analytics is presented in [142]. Furthermore, this survey also highlights some
research challenges and potential directions for future work. The feasibility and advantages of
applying deep learning in mobile sensing is discussed in [143]. A comprehensive survey of
the applications of deep learning techniques for wireless networks is provided in [144]. Deep
learning applications in different layers in a communication system have been investigated,
including modulation, coding, resource allocation, path search, and so on. Furthermore,
some unsolved research issues are discussed in detail to highlight different avenues for future
research. A survey of deep learning applications in mobile and wireless networks is presented
in the literature [128], including mobile data analysis, user localization, network control,
signal processing and network security.
Recently, machine learning approaches based signal processing has drawn a significant
attention from relevant research communities [145–151]. In [145], a deep NN based
framework is proposed for signal detection problems in a MIMO system, where the simulation
results demonstrate that the proposed NN can offer high accuracy with low complexity.
The convolutional NN has been exploited to achieve higher accuracy of user positioning
in a massive MIMO system in [147]. The transmit power optimization and the inter-cell
interference cancellation problems have been solved by exploiting a non-iterative NN in [146].
Furthermore, deep learning algorithms embedded physical layer designs are investigated
in [148], in which unsupervised deep auto-encoder network is exploited to optimize the
encoding and decoding processes in a single user MIMO network over a Rayleigh fading
channel. In [149], deep learning has been utilized to recover the sparse signal with better
accuracy from noisy linear measurements in MIMO systems. A recurrent NN approach is
also exploited for a modulation recognition task in [150]. In [151], several deep learning
implementations have been presented for modulation classification problems in an end-to-end
communication system, where several challenges and avenues for future directions are also
identified.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, the fundamental concepts of information theoretic physical layer security
have been provided. Furthermore, the achievable secrecy rate of SISO and MISO secure
communication systems have been defined. Then, the underlying concepts and practical
designs of a SWIPT system have been presented. Finally, the literature review on physical
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layer security, SWIPT, energy efficient transmission designs and machine learning based
resource allocation techniques has been provided. Through reviewing the literature on
physical layer security and SWIPT, the research gaps in these areas were explored, which
motivates the work in Chapter 4. Next, the literature review on energy efficient transmission
designs arises research interests of combing physical layer security and energy efficient for
CR networks. Furthermore, recent work on machine learning based resource allocation
techniques pointed out a promising research direction for future wireless networks.
Chapter 3
Mathematical Background
In this Chapter, the fundamental concepts of convex optimization and machine learning
techniques are provided. In particular, the first section introduces the fundamentals of
convex optimization, including convex sets, cones, functions and different types of convex
optimization problems. In the second section, several machine learning approaches are
presented, such as linear regression, logistic regression, NN and reinforcement learning.
3.1 Convex Optimization
Convex optimization is a special set of mathematical optimization techniques [152],
which have been widely used to solve numerous problems in wireless communications
and signal processing [75, 22, 153, 152, 85, 54]. Most of these problems are formulated
into a constrained optimization framework, which can be either naturally convex or can
be reformulated into a convex form through some mathematical manipulations [154, 155].
Standard convex optimization problems can be solved efficiently to determine the optimal
solution through interior point methods [152, 156]. In particular, convex optimization
techniques have also influenced many practical engineering implementations, such as
computer designs, analysis tools, real-time and automatic control systems, as it validates the
optimality of the solution through examining KKT conditions and duality gaps [152]. It is
worthy to point out that determining whether the optimization problem is convex or not is
a crucial step that has to be carried out prior to use any convex optimization techniques to
solve the problem.
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3.1.1 Fundamental of Convex Optimization
This section provides the fundamentals of convex optimization.
3.1.1.1 Convex Sets
A set S ∈ Rn can be classified as a convex set if x,y ∈ S and ∀θ ∈ [0, 1], the following
relation holds [152]:
θx+ (1− θ)y ∈ S. (3.1)
In a convex set, the line segment between any two points from the set should be in the same
set.
3.1.1.2 Convex Cones
A set C is a convex cone, if C is convex and for every x ∈ C, θ1 ≥ 0, and θ2 ≥ 0 and
α ≥ 0, ax ∈ C holds [152]. This can be mathematically expressed as
θ1x+ θ2y ∈ C, x,y ∈ C. (3.2)
Convex cones result in various forms of engineering applications, in which the most common
convex cones are given as
1. Non-negative orthant: Rn+.
2. Second order cone (SOC): C = {(t,x) t ≥ ||x||}.
3. Positive semidefinite matrix cone: C = Sn+ = {Y|Y is symmetric and Y ≥ 0}.
3.1.1.3 Convex Functions
A function f(x) : Rn → R is convex if dom f(x) is a convex set and if for all
x1,x2 ∈ dom f(x) the following inequality holds [152]:
f(θx1 + (1− θ)x2) ≤ θf(x1) + (1− θ)f(x2), ∀θ ∈ [0, 1]. (3.3)
In other words, the line segment between (x1, f(x1)) and (x2, f(x2)) lies above the graph
of f(x). The function f(x) is concave if −f(x) is convex. Suppose f(x) : Rn → R is
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continuously differentiable, x,y ∈ dom f(x) and dom f(x) is convex. Then f(x) is convex
if the flowing inequality holds
f(y) ≥ f(x) +∇f(x)T (y − x), ∀x,y ∈ Rn. (3.4)
Furthermore, if f(x) : Rn → R is twice continuously differentiable, then f(x) is convex if
the flowing inequality holds
∇2f(x) ⪰ 0, ∀x ∈ Rn. (3.5)
The inequality in (3.5) indicates that the convexity of f(x) can be given by demonstrating its
Hessian is positive semidefinite on its domain [152]. Based on the above, a linear function is
always convex, while a quadratic function xTPx+ aTx+ b is convex if and only if P ⪰ 0.
3.1.2 Convex Optimization Problems
The standard mathematical formulation of a convex problem that finds an x through
minimizing f0(x) with all the conditions satisfied can be defined as the following form [152]:
minimize
x
f0(x)
s.t. fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m,
hi(x) = 0, i = 1, ..., p, (3.6)
where the vector x ∈ Rn contains the optimization variables of the problem, and the function
f0 is the objective function or cost function. The inequalities fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m
are called the inequality constraints, and hi(x) = 0, i = 1, ..., p are called the equality
constraints. Furthermore, the problem is known as an unconstrained problem if there is no
constraints. The domain of the problem (3.6) is a set of points, for which the objective and
the constraints are defined and is denoted as
D =
m⋂
i=0
domfi ∩
p⋂
i=0
domhi. (3.7)
In other words, if a point x ∈ D satisfies all the constraints fi(x) ≤ 0 i = 1, ...,m and
hi(x) = 0 i = 1, ..., p, then it is a feasible point. Thus, the problem (3.6) is said to be
feasible if there exists a feasible point, and otherwise it is infeasible. The x∗ is optimal if and
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only if
f0(x
∗) ≤ f0(x), ∀x ∈ D. (3.8)
A problem can be classified as a convex optimization problem if the following conditions
are satisfied: (1) the objective function must be convex; (2) the inequality and the equality
constraint functions must be convex and affine, respectively [152]. Note that an affine function
is a function that composed of a linear function and a constant, i.e., aTx = b. In the following,
general forms of the canonical optimization problem formulations are provided.
3.1.2.1 Linear Programming
When the objective and constraint functions are all affine, then the convex optimization
problem is known as a LP [152]. A standard form of LP can be defined as follows:
minimize
x
cTx+ d
s.t. Gx ⪯ h,
Ax = b, (3.9)
whereG ∈ Rm×n andA ∈ Rp×n.
3.1.2.2 Quadratic Programming
The convex optimization problem is called a QP, when the objective function is quadratic
and the constraint functions are affine. A QP takes the following form [152]:
minimize
x
xTPx+ qTx+ r
s.t. Gx ⪯ h,
Ax = b, (3.10)
where P ∈ Sn+,G ∈ Rm×n andA ∈ Rp×n. In QP, a convex quadratic function is minimized
over a polyhedron. LP is a special case of QP, which can be obtained by setting P = 0 in the
objective function of (3.10).
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3.1.2.3 Quadratically Constrained Quadratic Programming
When both objective and constraint functions are quadratic, then the convex optimization
problem is called QCQP. A QCQP can be expressed as follows [152]:
minimize
x
xTP0x+ q
T
0 x+ r0
s.t. xTPix+ q
T
i x+ ri ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m,
Ax = b, (3.11)
where Pi ∈ Sn+, i = 1, ...,m. In a QCQP, a quadratic convex function is minimized over a
feasible region that is the intersection of ellipsoids. It is easily observed that a LP can be
obtained through setting Pi = 0, i = 0, 1, ...,m in (3.11).
3.1.2.4 Second Order Cone Programming
A SOCP is defined in the following form [152]:
minimize
x
fTx
s.t. ||Aix+ bi||2 ≤ cTi x+ di, i = 1, ...,m,
Fx = g, (3.12)
where Ai ∈ Rni×n and F ∈ Rp×n. The constraint ∥Ax + b∥2 ≤ cTx + d, where
A ∈ Rk×n, is called a second order cone constraint. A QCQP can be obtained by setting
ci = 0, i = 0, 1, ...,m and squaring both sides of the constraints. Similarly, a LP can be
obtained ifAi = 0, i = 1, ...,m.
3.1.2.5 Semidefinite Programming
The standard form of SDP can be expressed as [152]
minimize
x
cTx
s.t. x1F1 + x2F2 + ...+ xnFn +G ⪯ 0,
Ax = b, (3.13)
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whereG,F1, ...,Fn ∈ Sk×k are symmetric matrices andA ∈ Rp×n. The first constraint in
(3.13) is called LMI. A LP can be obtained if the matricesG,F1, ...,Fn are all diagonal.
3.1.3 Duality and KKT Conditions
The fundamental of duality is to take the constraints in (3.6) into account by augmenting
the objective function with a weighted sum of the constraint functions. The Lagrangian
L : Rn × Rm × Rp → R for the original problem in (3.6) can be defined as [152]
L(x,λ,υ) = f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
p∑
i=1
υihi(x), (3.14)
where λi and υi are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the i-th inequality fi(x) ≤ 0
and the equality hi(x) = 0 constraints, respectively. The objective function in (3.6), i.e.,
f0(x) is called the primal objective and the optimization variable x is the primal variable,
whereas Lagrange multipliers λ and υ associated with (3.14) are known as the dual variables.
The Lagrange dual objective or the Lagrange dual function g : Rm × Rn → R is defined as
the minimum value of the Lagrangian over x: for λ ∈ Rm,υ ∈ R, and it is given as
g(λ,υ) = inf
x∈D
(
f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
p∑
i=1
υihi(x)
)
. (3.15)
The dual function is always concave regardless of the convexity of the original problem,
which is due to the fact that the dual function is the pointwise infimum of a family of affine
functions of (λ,υ) [152]. The dual function g(λ,υ) yields a lower bound on the optimal
value of f0(x∗) of the problem (3.6) [152], which can be equivalently written as
g(λ,υ) ≤ f0(x∗), (3.16)
which indicates that for any feasible set (x,λ,υ), the following inequality holds:
f0(x) ≥ f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
p∑
i=1
υihi(x)
≥ inf
x∈D
(
f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
p∑
i=1
υihi(x)
)
= g(λ,υ). (3.17)
3.2 Machine Learning 36
Duality gap is defined as the the difference between the primal objective f0(x) and the dual
objective g(λ,υ). A weak duality holds if g(λ,υ) < f0(x∗), while a strong duality holds if
g(λ,υ) = f0(x
∗). To obtain the best lower bound of the original problem, the dual problem
defined as follows should be solved:
maximize
λ,υ
g(λ,υ)
s.t. λ ⪰ 0. (3.18)
The Lagrange dual problem is always a convex problem, since the objective function in (3.18)
is always a concave function and the constraints are convex. The KKT conditions listed
below, which confirm the optimality of the solutions, are written as follows [152]:
1. Primal constraints: fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m, hi(x) = 0, i = 1, ..., p.
2. Dual constraints: λ ⪰ 0.
3. Complementary slackness: λifi(x) = 0, i = 1, ...,m.
4. Gradient of Lagrangian w.r.t. x vanishes:
∇f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λi∇fi(x) +
p∑
i=1
υi∇hi(x) = 0. (3.19)
For general optimization, these KKT conditions are necessary but not sufficient conditions for
optimality. The KKT conditions hold if strong duality holds for any optimization problems.
However, for convex optimization problems, if the KKT conditions hold, then the strong
duality holds between the primal and the dual problems in which both primal and dual
variables will be optimal [152].
3.2 Machine Learning
Machine learning is the scientific study of algorithms and statistical models, which are
used by computers to learn and improve automatically from the environment without being
explicitly programmed [38, 35, 37]. Recently, with the massive availability of training data
and the recent development of advanced high speed processors, the applications of machine
learning have grown dramatically across different research domains [35, 157, 158]. Machine
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learning has been applied in numerous fields to solve different challenging problems in day to
day lives of people, including finance, healthcare, traffic and information technologies [157].
One of the attractive features of machine learning techniques in wireless communications
is that they have the potential capabilities to meet the requirements of ultra low latency
and high reliability of 5G and future wireless networks, which address the issues of the
high computational complexity and computation time of conventional convex optimization
techniques. Recently, machine learning based optimization approaches have been applied
to solve different complicated problems in wireless communication [138, 133, 61, 137].
The following subsections introduce different machine learning techniques which have been
widely employed in different domains of wireless communications.
3.2.1 Linear Regression
Linear regression is an approach that constructs an appropriate linear function which
can capture the relationship between inputs and the corresponding outputs [38, 158]. In
this subsection, the underlying fundamental concepts of this linear regression technique are
described. For a given set of N input variables, the linear regression can be modelled as a
following single function that combines the input variables linearly [38]:
h(x) = θ0 + θ1x1 + ...+ θNxN , (3.20)
where θ0, ..., θN are the weights that need to be determined to approximate the relationship
between the inputs and the outputs. By introducing a new parameter x0 = 1, the equation in
(3.20) can be written in a compact form as follows:
h(x) =
N∑
i=0
θixi = θ
Tx, (3.21)
where θ = [θ0, ..., θN ] and x = [x0, ..., xN ]. Assume that there are M training examples
available, the dataset {(x(m), y(m));m = 1, ...M} is called a training set, where x(m) is the
m-th input vector and y(m) is them-th target value that this approach need to approximate. It
is assumed that the relationship between the target parameter y(m) and the inputs is defined
through a deterministic function h(x) as [159]
y(m) = h(x(m)) + ε(m) = θTx(m) + ε(m), (3.22)
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where ε(m) is an error term that captures either un-modelled effects or random noise.
Furthermore, ε(m) is independently and identically distributed. Based on the Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and variance σ2 , the probability density function of ε(m) can be
expressed as [159]
p(ε(m)) =
1√
2πσ
exp
(
− (ε
(m))2
2σ2
)
. (3.23)
Hence, the likelihood function can be written as follows [159]:
L(θ) =
M∏
m=1
p(y(m)|x(m);θ)
=
M∏
m=1
1√
2πσ
exp
(
− (y
(m) − θTx(m))2
2σ2
)
. (3.24)
The basic concept of maximum likelihood is to choose the parameters θ to maximize L(θ).
Based on the strictly increasing characteristic of logarithmic functions, the logarithm of the
likelihood function L(θ) can be considered as
l(θ) = logL(θ)
= log
M∏
m=1
1√
2πσ
exp
(
− (y
(m) − θTx(m))2
2σ2
)
,
=
M∑
m=1
log
1√
2πσ
exp
(
− (y
(m) − θTx(m))2
2σ2
)
,
=M log
(
1√
2πσ
)
− 1
2σ2
M∑
m=1
(y(m) − θTx(m))2. (3.25)
SinceM log( 1√
2πσ
) and 1
σ2
are constants, maximizing l(θ) is equivalent to minimizing the
following part of the log-likelihood function in (3.25):
1
2
M∑
m=1
(y(m) − θTx(m)))2. (3.26)
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As a result, the cost function (also known as loss function in the literature) can be defined as
[159]
J(θ) =
1
2
M∑
m=1
(y(m) − θTx(m))2. (3.27)
In order to minimize the cost function, a well-known gradient descent iterative algorithm is
considered. In particular, this iterative algorithm begins with a set of initial values for the
weights θ, and iteratively updates θ as
θ = θ − α∂J(θ)
∂θ
, (3.28)
where α is the learning rate. The partial derivative ∂J(θ)
∂θ
can be expressed as
∂
∂θ
J(θ) =
∂
∂θ
1
2
M∑
m=1
(y(m) − θTx(m))2
=
M∑
m=1
(y(m) − θTx(m)) · ∂
∂θ
(y(m) − θTx(m))
=
M∑
m=1
(θTx(m) − y(m))x(m), (3.29)
which gives the definition of the updating steps of the weights as follows:
θ − α
M∑
m=1
(θTx(m) − y(m))x(m). (3.30)
3.2.2 Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is another type of machine learning technique which is used to
determine the parameters of a logistic model. This approach has been widely used in different
classification problems [38, 158]. In this subsection, a binary logistic model is considered,
in which the output y can take only two possible values, 0 and 1. The hypotheses h(x) in
logistic regression can be defined as [158]
h(x) = g(θTx), (3.31)
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where g(z) = 1
1+e−z , is defined as the sigmoid function. Note that g(z) tends to approach 1
as z → +∞, while g(z) tends to approach to 0 as z → −∞. Hence, the hypotheses h(x) is
always bounded between 0 and 1. ConsideringM training examples and
P (y = 1|x;θ) = h(x), (3.32)
P (y = 0|x;θ) = 1− h(x), (3.33)
the likelihood function can be expressed
L(θ) =
M∏
m=1
p(y(m)|x(m)θ)
=
M∏
m=1
(h(x(m)))y
(m)
(1− h(x(m)))1−y(m) . (3.34)
The log likelihood can be written as
l(θ) = logL(θ)
=
M∑
m=1
y(m) log h(x(m)) + (1− y(m)) log(1− h(x(m))). (3.35)
Different from the derivation provided for linear regression, a gradient ascent method can be
exploited in logistic regression to determine the parameters θ to maximize the likelihood
function. First, the partial derivatives of the log likelihood function are given as follows
[158]:
∂
∂θ
l(θ) =
M∑
m=1
(
y(m)
1
g(θTx(m))
− (1− y(m)) 1
1− g(θTx(m))
)
∂
∂θ
g(θTx(m))
=
M∑
m=1
(y(m) − h(x(m)))x(m). (3.36)
Based on these derivatives, the stochastic gradient ascent rule can be defined as follows [158]:
θ = θ + α
M∑
m=1
(y(m) − h(x(m)))x(m), (3.37)
where α is the learning rate.
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3.2.3 Neural Network
Fig. 3.1 A NN framework.
The fundamental idea behind the development of a NN is to mimic the information
processing in biological systems [39], which has been used broadly to deal with a wide range
of different realistic problems [38]. A typical NN consists of three layers: input layer, hidden
layer(s) and output layer. Fig. 3.1 shows a feed-forward NN, in which the data are passed
through the NN starting from the input layer, then the information moves in only one direction
through the hidden layers, and finally to the output layer. This process can be expressed
mathematically as [35]
z(l+1) =W(l)a(l) + b(l), (3.38)
a(l+1) = g(z(l+1)), (3.39)
where z(l+1) is the linear transformation of given inputs at the l+ 1-th layer, whereas a(l+1) is
output activation value of the l + 1-th layer. Note that g(z) denotes any activation function.
Different activation functions can be chosen based on the types of problems. The activation
functions include [39]:
g(z) =
1
1 + e−z
(sigmoid), (3.40)
g(z) = max(0, z) (Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU)), (3.41)
g(z) =
ez − e−z
ez + e−z
(tanh). (3.42)
The algorithmic procedure to determine the weights and the bias is called back-propagation.
It is assumed that J(W,b) is the loss function of the NN, note that the loss function can be
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different based on different activation functions. The following hold based on the chain rule:
∂J(W,b)
∂W(l)
=
∂J(W,b)
∂z(l+1)
∂z(l+1)
∂W(l)
= δ(l+1)(a(l))T , (3.43)
∂J(W,b)
∂b(l)
=
∂J(W,b)
∂z(l+1)
∂z(l+1)
∂b(l)
= δ(l+1). (3.44)
Since a(l) can be calculated from feed-forward process, then, δ(l) can be derived based on the
chain rule as follows:
δ(l) =
∂J(W,b)
∂z(l)
=
∂J(W,b)
∂z(l+1)
∂z(l+1)
∂a(l)
∂a(l)
∂z(l)
= [(W(l))Tδ(l+1)] · g′(z(l)). (3.45)
Starting from the output layer, the δ(l) can be calculated backward layer by layer until the
input layer. Finally, by assuming α as the learning rate, the weights matrixW(l) and the bias
vector b(l) for the l-th layer can be updated respectively as follows [35]:
W(l) =W(l) − α[δ(l+1)(a(l))T ], (3.46)
b(l) = b(l) − αδ(l+1), (3.47)
3.2.4 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning is another area of machine learning technique, in which machine
performs a set of suitable actions to maximize some notion of cumulative reward in a particular
situation. The underlyingmathematical principle of reinforcement learning isMarkov decision
processes. In particular, a Markov decision process is a tuple (S, A, {Psa}, γ, R), where
S is a set of states, A is a set of actions and Psa are the state transition probabilities. The
parameter γ ∈ [0, 1) denotes the discount factor, whereas R : S ×A → R is the reward
function. In some state s0, action a0 ∈ A is carried out. As a result of a0, the state randomly
transits to another state s1, according to s1 ∼ Ps0a0 . Then, another action a1 is carried out, as
a result, the state randomly changes again, to s2 ∼ Ps1a1 and then action a2 takes place and
so on. Hence, the total reward is defined as [160]
R(s0) + γR(s1) + γ
2R(s2) + · · · , (3.48)
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In reinforcement learning, the aim is to choose actions to maximize the expected value of the
total pay-off [160]:
E[R(s0) + γR(s1) + γ2R(s2) + · · · ]. (3.49)
A policy is any function mapping from the states to the actions, i.e., for a state s, the action
a = π(s). The value function for a policy π can be defined as
V π(s) = E[R(s0) + γR(s1) + γ2R(s2) + · · · |s0 = s, π]. (3.50)
V π(s) denotes the expected sum value of the rewards starting from state s and taking actions
according to policy π. With a fixed policy π, the value function V π(s) satisfies the following
Bellman equations [160]:
V π(s) = R(s) + γ
∑
s′∈S
Psπ(s)(s
′)V π(s′). (3.51)
Then, the optimal value of the function can be expressed as [160]
V ∗(s) = R(s) + max
a∈A
γ
∑
s′∈S
Psπ(s)(s
′)V π(s′). (3.52)
3.3 Summary
This chapter has presented the required mathematical background for this thesis. In the
first section, basic elements of convex optimization techniques, as well as duality and KKT
conditions have been discussed. In the second section, some fundamental machine learning
approaches have been provided, including linear regression, logistic regression, NN and
reinforcement learning. In this thesis, convex optimization techniques are utilized to justify
the convexity of optimization problems and transform non-convex problems into convex
forms. In particular, different optimization problems, including AN power maximization,
SEE maximization and secrecy rate maximization problems, are solved through convex
optimization techniques. Specifically, Lagrangian dual problems and KKT conditions are
exploited to prove the optimality of relaxed problems. Furthermore, NN is employed to map
the relationship between the input and output parameters for a secrecy transmission network,
which has the capability to provide near optimal performance with reduced computational
complexity.
Chapter 4
Robust Beamforming for AN Aided
MISO SWIPT System with Unknown
Eavesdroppers and Non-linear EHModel
4.1 Introduction
It is difficult for the transmitter to obtain perfect CSI in wireless networks due to the
channel estimation and quantization errors. In beamforming designs for secure transmissions,
the secrecy performance may significantly degrade if the channel uncertainties are not taken
into account in the designs. Therefore, it is important to incorporate the channel uncertainties
in the beamforming designs. Recently, robust beamforming designs have been considered
to address this channel uncertainty issue, where two types of robust designs are studied,
namely, the worst-case robust design [69, 87–89], and the outage probability based design
[95–97]. In the worst-case robust design, the channel uncertainties are assumed to be
norm-bounded, whereas in the outage probability design, the CSI errors are modelled as
random variables with known statistical properties. Furthermore, in most existing works
on secure transmission schemes, it is assumed that the transmitter has perfect or imperfect
knowledge on the CSI of EVEs [113, 53, 55, 89]. However, it is not always possible to obtain
the CSI of EVEs in practical scenarios, for example, the EVEs might be purely passive during
the transmissions. Most recently, robust beamforming designs with unknown EVEs have been
studied in [161, 162], where the power of AN or jamming signal is maximized to confuse the
unknown EVEs as much as possible under the QoS requirement at the legitimate user.
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In this chapter, a beamforming design is considered for downlink transmission of a
multi-user MISO system where each legitimate user employs a PS SWIPT technique. The
transmitter intends to send confidential information to its legitimate users in the presence
of purely unknown EVEs. The transmitter is equipped with multiple antennas, while the
legitimate users and the EVEs have a single antenna. Furthermore, it is assumed that all the
legitimate users can simultaneously perform information decoding and EH. A non-linear
EH model is adopted in the legitimate users to capture the characteristics of practical EH
circuits. In addition, it is assumed that all the EVEs are purely passive, hence their CSI
is not available at the transmitter, and AN is exploited to mask the signal intended for the
legitimate users. In this work, the aim is to maximize the power of AN to confuse the
unknown EVEs while satisfying QoS and EH requirements at the legitimate users. Two
robust joint beamforming and PS designs with the AN approach are considered: (1) For the
bounded channel uncertainties, the problem is transformed as a SDP through SDR and a
linear matrix inequality representation; (2) For the statistical channel uncertainties, both SDR
and Bernstein-type inequality are exploited to reformulate the original problem into a convex
form.
4.2 System Model
In this work, the downlink transmission of an AN aided MISO SWIPT system with
K legitimate users and J EVEs is considered, as shown in Fig. 4.1. It is assumed that
the legitimate transmitter is equipped with NT antennas whereas both legitimate users and
EVEs are equipped with single antennas. The channels between the transmitter and the k-th
legitimate user, and the j-th EVE are denoted as hs,k ∈ CNT×1 and he,j ∈ CNT×1, respectively.
The qk ∈ CNT×1 and v ∈ CNT×1 represent the information signal vector and the AN vector.
In addition, the elements in AN vector v follow a zero mean complex Gaussian distribution
with a covariance matrixV ⪰ 0. The received signal at the k-th legitimate user and the j-th
EVE can be expressed as
ys,k =
K∑
l=1
hHs,kqlxk + h
H
s,kv + ns,k, (4.1)
ye,j =
K∑
l=1
hHe,jqlxk + h
H
e,jv + ne,j, (4.2)
respectively, where ns,k and ne,j are the joint effects of thermal noise and signal processing
noise, respectively, at the k-th legitimate receiver and the j-th EVE, which are modelled as
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Fig. 4.1 A MISO SWIPT system with K single-antenna legitimate users in the presence of J
single-antenna EVEs.
AWGN with zero mean and variance σ2s,k and σ2e,j . xk (E{|xk|2} = 1) denotes signal from
the transmitter intended to the k-th legitimate user. By employing PS approach, the received
signal at the information decoding circuit of k-th legitimate user can be written as follows:
yIDs,k =
√
ρs,k(
K∑
l=1
hHs,kqlxl + h
H
s,kv + ns.k) + nsp,k, (4.3)
where ρs,k ∈ (0, 1] denotes the PS factor of the k-th legitimate user. Furthermore, nsp,k ∼
CN (0, σ2sp,k) is the noise introduced by the information decoding circuit of the k-th legitimate
user. The received SINR at the k-th legitimate receiver and the j-th EVE can be written,
respectively, as
Γs,k=
hHs,kqkq
H
k hs,k∑
i ̸=k h
H
s,kqiq
H
i hs,k + h
H
s,kVhs,k + σ
2
s,k +
σ2sp,k
ρs,k
, (4.4)
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and
Γe,j =
hHe,jqkq
H
k he,j∑
i ̸=k h
H
e,jqiq
H
i he,j + h
H
e,jVhe,j + σ
2
e,j
. (4.5)
Furthermore, the received signal for the EH circuit of the k-th legitimate user is given by
yEHs,k =
√
1− ρs,k(
K∑
l=1
hHs,kql + h
H
s,kv + ns,k). (4.6)
The received RF power at the k-th legitimate user can be expressed as
Pk = (1− ρs,k)(
K∑
l=1
hHs,kqlq
H
l hs,k + h
H
s,kVhs,k + σ
2
s,k). (4.7)
The linear EH model is widely adopted in the literature [33, 32, 163, 48], where the output
power of the k-th legitimate user can be given by the following linear model:
Elk = ζkPk, (4.8)
where ζk represents the EH efficiency of the k-th legitimate user. In this work, a non-linear
parametric EH model is adopted, which means the RF to direct current conversion efficiency
depends on the input power level. Let the parameter ak be the non-linear charging rate w.r.t.
the input power and bk be a minimum turn-on voltage of the EH circuit based parameter.
Then, the output direct current power at the k-th legitimate user can be given by
Enlk =
Ψk −MkΩk
1− Ωk , (4.9)
where Ωk = 11+exp(akbk) , Ψk =
Mk
1+exp(−ak(Pk−bk)) andMk is a constant denoting the maximum
output direct current power at the k-th legitimate user.
4.3 Problem Formulation
As it is assumed that the CSI of EVEs is unavailable at the transmitter, the best approach
is to exploit AN to degrade intercepting capability of EVEs. The aim is to maximize the AN
power while ensuring the worst-case SINRs and energy harvesting requirements are satisfied.
This design problem to jointly optimize beamforming vectors and AN covariance matrix can
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be mathematically formulated as
max
V,(qk,ρs,k,∀k)
tr(V)
s.t. Γs,k ≥ γ, ∀k,
Ek ≥ E¯s, ∀k,
K∑
l=1
∥ql∥22 + tr(V) ≤ Ptotal,
0 < ρs,k ≤ 1,V ⪰ 0. (4.10)
Firstly, the information beamforming vector qk is tackled, by defining a new rank-one matrix
Qk = qkq
H
k . Then the original problem becomes
max
V,(Qk,ρs,k,∀k)
tr(V) (4.11a)
s.t.
hHs,kQkhs,k∑
i ̸=k h
H
s,kQihs,k + h
H
s,kVhs,k + σ
2
s,k +
σ2sp,k
ρs,k
≥ γ, (4.11b)
(1− ρs,k)(
K∑
l=1
hHs,kQlhs,k + h
H
k Vhk + σ
2
s,k) ≥ ωk, (4.11c)
tr(
K∑
l=1
Ql +V) ≤ Ptotal,V ⪰ 0,Qk ⪰ 0,∀k, (4.11d)
0 < ρs,k ≤ 1, (4.11e)
rank(Qk) = 1. (4.11f)
where ωk represents the required received power under the non-linear EH model, which is
given by
ωk = bk −
ln( Mk
E¯s+(Mk−E¯s)Ωk − 1)
ak
. (4.12)
By employing SDR, the problem defined in (4.11) is relaxed by dropping the non-convex
rank constraint rank(Qk) = 1, the relaxed problem becomes:
max
V,(Qk,ρs,k,∀k)
tr(V)
s.t. (4.11b)-(4.11e). (4.13)
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Proposition 4.1: Provided that the problem (4.13) is feasible, the optimal solution will
be always rank-one.
Proof : Please refer to Section 4.8.1. ■
4.4 Robust Design with Ellipsoidal Channel Uncertainties
By taking into account the inevitable channel estimation and quantization errors, it is
assumed that the transmitter has imperfect CSI of the legitimate users. The imperfect CSI are
modelled based on the deterministic models [164, 162] and the actual channel of the k-th
legitimate user can be written as follows:
hs,k = hˆs,k + eˆs,k, (4.14)
where eˆs,k represents the channel uncertainties, and hˆs,k denotes the estimated channel vector.
In this deterministic model, the Euclidean norms of channel errors are bounded by a set of
thresholds as
||eˆs,k||2 = ||hs,k − hˆs,k||2 ≤ ϵs,k, (4.15)
where ϵs,k ≥ 0 denotes the upper bound of channel uncertainties. By incorporating these
uncertainties, the original problem can be formulated as the following robust optimization
problem:
max
V,(Qk,ρs,k,∀k)
tr(V) (4.16a)
s.t. (hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
HQk(hˆs,k + eˆs,k) ≥ γ
[∑
i ̸=k
(hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
HQi(hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
+ (hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
HV(hˆs,k + eˆs,k) + σ
2
s,k +
σ2sp,k
ρs,k
]
, (4.16b)
(1− ρs,k)
[ K∑
l=1
(hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
HQl(hˆs,k + eˆs,k) + (hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
HV(hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
+ σ2k
]
≥ ωk, (4.16c)
tr(
K∑
l=1
Ql +V) ≤ Ptotal, (4.16d)
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0 < ρs,k ≤ 1,Qk ⪰ 0,∀k, (4.16e)
V ⪰ 0, ||eˆs,k||2 ≤ ϵs,k. (4.16f)
Then, the channel errors are eliminated and the constraints in (4.16b) and (4.16c) are
transformed into LMI forms. In order to convert (4.16b) into LMI form, a new variable
Wk =
1
γ
Qk −
∑
i ̸=kQi −V is first defined, then the following lemma is employed:
Lemma 4.1: (Schur complement [152]): LetX be a complex hermitian matrix,
X = XH =
[
B1 B2
BH2 B3
]
. (4.17)
Thus, B4 = B3 − BH2 B−11 B2 is the Schur complement of B1 in X and the following
statements hold: (1)X ⪰ 0, if and only if B1 ⪰ 0 and B4 ⪰ 0, (2) if B1 ⪰ 0 thenX ⪰ 0 if
and only if B4 ⪰ 0.
By utilizing Lemma 4.1, the constraint in (4.16b) can be rewritten as the following
semidefinite constraint:[
ρs,k σsp,k
σsp,k (hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
HWk(hˆs,k + eˆs,k)− σ2s,k
]
⪰ 0. (4.18)
However, this semidefinite constraint in (4.18) is not convex due to the channel uncertainties
eˆs,k. In order to make this constraint tractable, the following lemma is utilized to convert it
into LMIs:
Lemma 4.2: [165] IfD ⪰ 0, then the following LMI[
A1 A2 +A3X
(A2 +A3X)
H A4 +X
HA5 +A
H
5 X+X
HA6X
]
⪰ 0, (4.19)
∀X : I−XHDX ⪰ 0, (4.20)
is equivalent to the following inequality. There exists λ ≥ 0 such thatA1 A2 A3AH2 A4 AH5
AH3 A5 A6
− λ
0 0 00 I 0
0 0 −D
 ⪰ 0. (4.21)
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To proceed, it is set thatX = eˆs,k,D = 1/ϵ2s,kI,A1 = ρs,k,A2 = σsp,k,A3 = 01×NT ,A4 =
hˆHs,kWkhˆs,k − σs,k,A5 = Wkhˆs,k,A6 = Wk. Now the norm-bounded error vector eˆs,k,
i.e., ||eˆs,k||2 ≤ ϵs,k can be rewritten as I− eˆHs,k Iϵ2s,k eˆs,k ⪰ 0, then adopting Lemma 4.2, the
constraint (4.18) can be equivalently expressed as ρs,k σsp,k 01×NTσsp,k hˆHs,kWkhˆs,k − σ2s,k − λk hˆHs,kWk
0NT×1 Wkhˆs,k Wk +
λk
ϵ2s,k
I
 ⪰ 0, (4.22)
where λk ≥ 0 is an auxiliary variable. Similarly, definingMk =
∑K
l=1Ql +V and applying
Lemma 4.1, the constraint in (4.16c) can be equivalently reformulated as[
(1− ρs,k) √ωk√
ωk (hˆs,k + eˆs,k)
HWk(hˆs,k + eˆs,k) + σ
2
s,k
]
⪰ 0. (4.23)
By setting X = eˆs,k,D = 1/ϵ2s,kI,A1 = (1 − ρs,k),A2 =
√
ωk,A3 = 01×NT ,A4 =
hˆHs,kMkhˆs,k + σs,k,A5 = Mkhˆs,k,A6 = Mk and employing Lemma 4.2, the constraint
(4.23) can be recast as(1− ρs,k)
√
ωk 01×NT√
ωk hˆ
H
s,kMkhˆs,k + σ
2
s,k − tk hˆHs,kMk
0NT×1 Mkhˆs,k Mk +
ts,k
ϵ2s,k
I
⪰0, (4.24)
where tk ≥ 0 is an auxiliary variable. Hence, the original problem (4.16) can be reformulated
as
max
V,(Qk,ρs,k,λk,tk,∀k)
tr(V)
s.t. (4.11d), (4.11e), (4.22), (4.24),
λk ≥ 0, tk ≥ 0. (4.25)
The problem (4.25) is convex and can be solved efficiently via CVX [152].
4.5 Robust Design with Statistical Channel Uncertainties
In this subsection, another robust design is developed to handle statistical channel
uncertainties which are modelled as Gaussian random variables with known statistical
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distributions. In particular, it is assumed that the channel uncertainties have the following
distribution:
eˆs,k ∼ CN (0,Θs,k), (4.26)
where Θs,k ⪰ 0 is the given covariance matrix for eˆs,k. Then the robust problem can be
written with statistical channel uncertainties as
max
V,(Qk,ρs,k,∀k)
tr(V) (4.27a)
s.t. Prob(Γs,k ≥ γ) ≥ 1− ps,k (4.27b)
Prob(Ek ≥ E¯s) ≥ 1− qs,k, (4.27c)
hs,k = hˆs,k + eˆs,k, eˆs,k ∼ CN (0,Θs,k), (4.27d)
(4.11d), (4.11e), (4.27e)
where ps,k ∈ (0, 1] and qs,k ∈ (0, 1] are the predefined outage probabilities for the SINR
and EH requirements of the k-th legitimate user, respectively. These thresholds ensure the
probabilities that the k-th legitimate user is served with a satisfiable SINR and EH no less than
(1− ps,k)× 100% and (1− qs,k)× 100%, respectively. The problem (4.27) is non-convex due
to the outage probability constraints in (4.27b) and (4.27c) which do not have closed-form
expressions. To circumvent this issue, the following lemma is exploited:
Lemma 4.3: (Bernstein-type Inequality [166]): Let e ∼ CN (0, In), Q ∈ Hn, r ∈ Cn
and s ∈ R, for any 0 < p ≤ 1,
Prob{eHQe+ 2Re(eHr) + s ≥ 0} ≥ 1− p, (4.28)
is equivalent to the following set of convex constraints:
tr(Q)−
√
−2ln(p)t1 + ln(p)t2 + s ≥ 0,∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
[
vec(Q)√
2r
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ t1,
t2I+Q ⪰ 0, t2 ≥ 0, (4.29)
where t1 and t2 are new set of slack variables. The following equations are first defined:
Bk = Θ
1
2
s,kWkΘ
1
2
s,k, rk = Θ
1
2
s,kWkhˆs,k, sk = hˆ
H
s,kWkhˆs,k − σ2s,k − σ2sp,k/ρ, (4.30)
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Ek = Θ
1
2
s,kMkΘ
1
2
s,k,gk = Θ
1
2
s,kMkhˆs,k, lk = hˆ
H
s,kMkhˆs,k + σ
2
s,k −
ωk
1− ρk . (4.31)
Then, by applying Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.3, the constraint in (4.27b) is equivalent to[
fs,k + hˆ
H
s,kWkhˆs,k − σ2s,k σsp,k
σsp,k ρs,k
]
⪰ 0,
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
[
vec(Bk)√
2rk
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ xs,k,
ys,kI+Bk ⪰ 0, ys,k ≥ 0, (4.32)
where fs,k = tr(Bk)−
√−2ln(ps,k)xs,k + ln(ps,k)ys,k, and xs,k and ys,k are slack variables.
Similarly, the constraint in (4.27c) can be equivalently written as[
gs,k + hˆ
H
s,kMkhˆs,k + σ
2
s,k
√
ωk√
ωk 1− ρs,k
]
⪰ 0,
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
[
vec(Ek)√
2gk
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ ms,k,
ns,kI+ Ek ⪰ 0, ns,k ≥ 0, (4.33)
where gs,k = tr(Ek)−
√−2ln(qs,k)ms,k + ln(qs,k)ns,k, andms,k and ns,k are slack variables.
The statistical channel uncertainty based robust optimization problem in (4.27) is reformulated
as
max
V,(Qk,ρs,k,xs,k,ys,k,ms,k,ns,k,∀k)
tr(V)
s.t. (4.11d), (4.11e), (4.32), (4.33). (4.34)
The formulation in (4.34) is a convex optimization problem and can be solved efficiently by
available convex optimization software. [152].
4.6 Simulation Results
In this section, numerical results are presented to validate the performance of the
proposed robust schemes. Here, a wireless communication system with one transmitter and
three legitimate users is considered, where the transmitter is equipped with NT = 4 antennas
and all the legitimate users are equipped with single antenna. It is assumed that all the
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Fig. 4.2 Comparison of the output direct current power for the non-linear EH model and the
linear EH model, where a similar performance comparison can be found in [112].
channel models include both large scale and small scale fading. The simplified large scale
fading model is given by D = ( d
d0
)−Φ1 , where d is the distance between the transmitter and
the receiver, d0 =10 m is assumed as the reference distance, and Φ1 = 2 as the path loss
exponent. Furthermore, it is assumed that d1=10 m, d2=14 m and d3 =18 m as the distance
between the transmitter and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd legitimate user, respectively. All the channel
coefficients are modelled as Rician fading, which can be expressed as
hs,k =
√
KR
1 +KR
hLOSs,k +
√
1
1 +KR
hNLOSs,k , (4.35)
where hLOSs,k indicates the line of sight deterministic component with ||hLOSs,k ||22 = D,
hNLOSs,k ∼ CN (0, DI) represents the Rayleigh fading component. KR is the Rician factor
which is set to be 3. In addition, for the line of sight component, the far-field uniform linear
antenna array is employed to model the channels [167]. The line of sight channel vectors can
be modelled as [167]
hLOSs,k =
√
D/NT [1 e
jθk ... ej(NT−1)θk ]T
with θk = −wπΨ sin(ϕk)wl , where wl is the carrier wavelength, Ψ = wl/2 is the spacing between
successive antenna elements at the transmitter, and ϕk is the direction of the k-th legitimate
user to the transmitter. It is assumed that ϕ1 = −30◦, ϕ2 = 0◦ and ϕ3 = 30◦. For the
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Fig. 4.3 Maximum SINR among EVEs versus the SINR requirement at legitimate users
with different antennas and error bounds for the robust design with ellipsoidal channel
uncertainties.
non-linear EH model, M is set to be 10 dBm which corresponds to the maximum output
direct current power. Besides, ak = 150 ∀k and bk = 0.014 ∀k are adopted as provided in
[112, 168]. The available total transmit power Ptotal is assumed to be 30 dBm. The EH
efficiency ζk is set to be 1 for linear EH model. Note that the CSI of the EVEs is unavailable
in both robust designs. To determine the worst-case SINR for EVEs, the channels of the EVEs
are randomly generated in the same way as the channels of the legitimate users, by setting
all the distance between the transmitter and EVEs to 8 m and the number of EVEs J = 2.
For the statistical channel uncertainty based robust design, the covariance matrices are set to
beΘs,k = ϵ2s,kI, ∀k. In addition, the SINR and EH outage probability requirements in this
design are set to be ps,k = qs,k = 0.1. All the numerical results are obtained by averaging
over 1000 different random channel realizations. All the parameters described above are used
in simulations unless or otherwise specified.
First, Fig. 4.2 provides the comparison of the output direct current power for the
non-linear EH model and the linear EH model. As shown in Fig. 4.2, the output power of
linear EH model increases as the input RF power increases. However, the output direct power
of the non-linear EH model first increases and then becomes a constant. It is due to the fact
that the output power of non-linear EH model cannot exceed the maximum output power
thresholdM , no matter how high the input RF power is.
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Fig. 4.4 Maximum SINR among EVEs versus the SINR requirement at legitimate users with
different antennas and error bounds for the robust design with statistical channel uncertainties.
Fig. 4.3 compares the achieved maximum SINR at the EVEs between the perfect CSI
design and robust design with the ellipsoidal channel uncertainties for different target SINRs
and EH (E¯s = 8 dBm) requirements. As seen in Fig. 4.3, the largest SINR at the EVEs
increases with the SINR targets and the error bounds. The design with perfect CSI achieves
the least SINR at the EVEs with the same number of transmit antennas. Besides, it is obvious
that the achievable SINR at the EVEs can be reduced with larger number of transmit antennas
due to the additional degrees of freedom offered in the beamforming design.
Fig. 4.4 compares the achieved maximum SINR at the EVEs between the perfect CSI
design and the robust design with statistical channel uncertainties for different target SINRs
and EH (E¯s = 8 dBm) requirements. As seen in Fig. 4.4, the largest SINR at the EVEs
increases with the SINR targets and the error bounds. The design with perfect CSI achieves
the least SINR at the EVEs with the same number of transmit antennas. Similar to Fig. 4.3,
it is obvious that the achievable SINR at the EVEs can be reduced by using a larger number
of transmit antennas.
Fig. 4.5 compares non-linear EH model and linear EH model for robust design with
ellipsoidal channel uncertainties. The required SINR at legitimate users is set to be 8 dB
with the error-bound ϵ2s,k = 0.01. The largest SINR at the EVEs increases as EH requirement
increases for both EH models. However, there exists a saturation point on the EH requirement
E¯s in the non-linear EH model, as seen in Fig. 4.5, due to the non-linear characteristics
of practical RF-EH conversion circuit. Furthermore, for the non-linear EH model, the EH
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Fig. 4.5 Non-linear EH model vs linear EH model for robust design with ellipsoidal channel
uncertainties.
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Fig. 4.6 Non-linear EH model vs linear EH model for robust design with statistical channel
uncertainties.
requirements can be guaranteed only with E¯s < Mk due to the maximum output direct current
power limitation of the practical RF-EH conversion circuit. On the other hand, adopting
the linear EH model may lead to false output direct current power. Hence, employing the
non-linear EH model can reflect the characteristics of the practical RF-EH conversion circuit.
4.6 Simulation Results 58
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 Required SINR at legitimate users (dB)
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
M
a
x
im
u
m
 S
IN
R
 a
t 
E
V
E
s 
(d
B
)
No AN aided, 
s,k
2
=0.01
AN aided, perfect CSI
AN aided, 
s,k
2
=0.01
No AN aided, perfect CSI
Fig. 4.7 Maximum SINR among EVEs versus the SINR requirement at legitimate users for
different transmission schemes under the assumption of ellipsoidal channel uncertainties.
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Fig. 4.8 Maximum SINR among EVEs versus the SINR requirement at legitimate users for
different transmission schemes with under assumption of statistical channel uncertainties.
Similar performance is shown in Fig. 4.6 for the statistical channel uncertainty based robust
design with γ = 8 dB, and ϵ2s,k = 0.01.
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Next, Fig. 4.7 compares the achieved maximum SINR at the EVEs versus the SINR
requirement at legitimate users for different transmission schemes with ellipsoidal channel
uncertainties: AN aided and no AN aided schemes. The problem of no AN aided scheme is
formulated as a power minimization problem as follows:
min
(Qk,ρs,k,λk,tk,∀k)
tr(
K∑
k=1
Qk)
s.t. (4.11d), (4.11e), (4.22), (4.24),
λk ≥ 0, tk ≥ 0, (4.36)
where the AN covariance matrix in the constraints of the above problem is set toV = 0. As
seen in Fig. 4.7, the largest SINR at the EVEs increases with the SINR targets. Furthermore,
the proposed AN aided design outperforms the no AN scheme in all SINR regions for both
perfect and imperfect CSI assumptions. This is due to the fact that: (1) The achieved SINR at
EVEs is reduced by introducing AN; (2) The legitimate users have the capability to harvest
energy from AN, and hence more power is split to the information decoding circuit. In other
words, the same SINR at legitimate users can be achieved with less beamforming power in
AN aided design than that of the no AN aided scheme.
Finally, Fig. 4.8 compares the achieved maximum SINR at the EVEs versus the SINR
requirement at legitimate users for different transmission schemes with statistical channel
uncertainties: AN aided and no AN aided schemes. The problem of no AN aided scheme is
formulated as a power minimization problem as follows:
min
(Qk,ρs,k,xs,k,ys,k,ms,k,ns,k,∀k)
tr(
K∑
k=1
Qk)
s.t. (4.11d), (4.11e), (4.32), (4.33). (4.37)
where the AN covariance matrix in the constraints of the above problem is set to V = 0.
Similar to Fig. 4.7, the proposed AN aided design achieves much less SINR at the EVEs in
comparison with the no AN aided scheme.
4.7 Summary
This chapter studied different robust beamforming designs in an AN-aided MISO
SWIPT system in the presence of multiple purely passive EVEs. By considering practical
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non-linear EH models, two robust designs have been developed based on different types of
channel uncertainties: bounded and statistical based channel uncertainties. In the robust
design with bounded uncertainties, this robust optimization problem was non-convex and
was reformulated into a SDP through SDR, Schur complement and a LMI representation
techniques. Then, by exploiting both SDR and Bernstein-type inequality approaches, the
robust design with statistical channel uncertainties were recast as another convex optimization
problem. Simulation results were provided to demonstrate that the proposed AN aided
transmit schemes could significantly reduce the achieved SINR at EVEs while comparing
with that of the no AN aided designs. The performance comparisons of both robust designs
between different number of transmit antennas were also provided, which indicated that the
achieved SINR at EVEs can be reduced by introducing more transmit antennas. Furthermore,
the performance comparisons between the linear and non-linear EH model for both robust
designs were provided, which showed that when the EH requirements are not constants, the
resource allocation designs with non-linear EH model are more accurate than that with the
linear EH model to reflect practical EH circuits.
4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
First, the Lagrangian function of problem (4.13) can be derived as:
L(Qk,V,Zk,Y, α, β, γ, µ)=−tr(V)−tr(ZkQk)−tr(YV)−λk{tr[hs,khHs,k(
Qk
γ
−
∑
i ̸=k
Qi
−V)− σ2s,k − σ2sp,k/ρs,k]} − µk{tr[hs,khHs,k(
K∑
l=1
Ql +V) + σ
2
s,k]− ωk/(1− ρs,k)}
+ α[tr(
K∑
l=1
Ql +V)− Ptotal], (4.38)
where Zk ∈ HNT+ , Y ∈ HNT+ , λk ∈ R+, µk ∈ R+, α ∈ R+ are the Lagrangian multipliers
associated with problem (4.13). Then the corresponding KKT conditions [152] can be
expressed as:
∂L
∂Qk
= −Zk − (λk/γ + µk)hs,khHs,k + αI = 0, (4.39)
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∂L
∂V
= −I−Y + (λk − µk)hs,khHs,k + αI = 0, (4.40)
ZkQk = 0,ZK ⪰ 0,YV = 0,Y ⪰ 0. (4.41)
The following equality holds:
(4.39)-(4.40) =− Zk + I+Y − λk(1 + 1
γ
)hs,kh
H
s,k = 0, (4.42)
⇒Zk = I+Y − λk(1 + 1
γ
)hs,kh
H
s,k, (4.43)
⇒{I+Y − λk(1 + 1
γ
)hs,kh
H
s,k}Qk = 0. (4.44)
Hence, the following rank relation holds:
rank(Qk) = rank
{
λk(1 +
1
γ
)hs,kh
H
s,k
I+Y
Qk
}
≤ rank[λk(1 + 1
γ
)hs,kh
H
s,k] ≤ 1, (4.45)
By eliminating the trivial solutionQk = 0, one can obtain rank(Qk) = 1, which completes
the proof of proposition 4.1. ■
Chapter 5
Energy Efficiency Optimization for
Secure Transmission in MISO Cognitive
Radio Network with Energy Harvesting
5.1 Introduction
Radio spectrum is a nature resource that enables wireless communications [169].
Conventionally, radio spectrum is allocated to users base on the static spectrum allocation
policy [170–175], where every user need to obtain a license to access to a exclusive spectrum.
This policy has been working well in the past decades, however, with the exponential growth
of wireless devices, one critical issue has been exposed that the spectrum is not enough
for allocating to every user [170]. Furthermore, most spectrum that allocated for licensed
users are not fully utilized [171]. As a result, dynamic spectrum access has been proposed
as a promising solution to the spectrum scarcity and inefficiency issues [176]. In dynamic
spectrum access, the secondary users who do not have licenses to access the spectrum are
allowed to either use the idle spectrum, or share the spectrum that belongs to primary users
who are the license holders [176].
CR has been recognized as a key technique to implement dynamic spectrum access [177].
The concept of CR was firstly proposed in 1999 by Mitola [178]. CR networks have the
capability to learn and exchange messages with the surrounding wireless networks to sense and
exploit the idle spectrum source. Alternatively, in CR networks, the occurrence of conflicts
can be effectively restricted or reduced through sensing the environment and dynamically and
autonomously adapt its transmission strategies (i.e., transmit power and carrier frequency)
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[169, 179–181, 23, 175, 182, 183]. The operation of CR can be classified into two categories,
namely, opportunistic spectrum access and spectrum sharing. In opportunistic spectrum
access model, the secondary users have to monitor the radio spectrum before transmission.
When the spectrum is idle, the secondary users can access to the spectrum [184]. Different
from opportunistic spectrum access, in spectrum sharing model, both primary and secondary
users are allowed to transmit messages simultaneously [184]. However, to enabling spectrum
sharing, the secondary transmitter has to obtain CSI and then adjust its transmit strategies to
control the amount of interference power to the primary receivers [185]. The interference
caused by the secondary transmission is acceptable for the primary users, and the maximum
value of this interference power is named as the interference leakage tolerance [169].
Most research work on physical layer security transmission techniques consider either
fully utilizing the available power to maximize the secrecy rate [11, 75, 83] or minimizing
the required power to meet the target secrecy rate [22, 18]. However, these designs might
not be able to achieve the maximum SEE due to their objectives which do not take into
account the SEE performance metric. Therefore, from the perspective of energy efficient
secure communication, the SEE has been considered as an appropriate performance metric to
measure the efficient utilization of the limited power resource.
In this chapter, a number of SEE maximization problems for an underlay MISO CR
networkwith EH requirements are solved. In particular, amulti-antenna SU-Tx simultaneously
sends confidential information and energy to a SU-Rx and an ER, respectively. This SWIPT
communication is established by sharing the spectrum that is allocated for communication for
primary user terminals. In this CR network, transmit beamforming design is considered to
maximize the achievable SEE under the constraints of secrecy rate on the SU-Rx, interference
leakage on the PU-Rx and EH requirement on ER. Furthermore, the ER is considered to be a
potential EVE due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmission.
5.2 System Model
A downlink transmission of MISO CR network is considered as shown in Fig. 5.1. This
CR network consists of five terminals: an SU-Tx, an SU-Rx, a PU-Tx, a PU-Rx and an ER.
The SU-Tx is equipped with NT antennas, while the rest of the four terminals consist of a
single antenna. Furthermore, it is assumed that the multi-antenna SU-Tx intends to send
confidential information to the single antenna SU-Rx while satisfying the interference leakage
threshold on the PU-Rx. The ER harvests energy from the SU-Tx transmission through WPT
technique. However, the ER might as well be a potential EVE and may attempt to intercept
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Fig. 5.1 An underlay CR network with a multi-antenna SU-Tx and single antenna PU-Tx,
PU-Rx, SU-Rx and ER.
the message intended to the SU-Rx. Therefore, the ER is assumed to be a potential EVE in
this CR network. The channel coefficients between the SU-Tx and PU-Rx, SU-Rx and ER
are denoted by hp ∈ CNT×1, hs ∈ CNT×1 and he ∈ CNT×1, respectively. Thus, the received
signal at SU-Rx and ER can be expressed as
ys = h
H
s qxs + ts
√
Ψxp + ns, (5.1)
ye = h
H
e qxs + te
√
Ψxp + ne, (5.2)
where q ∈ CNT×1 and xs (E{|xs|2} = 1) denote the beamforming vector and the signal
from the SU-Tx, respectively. The notations ns ∼ CN (0, σ2s) and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e) represent
the joint effects of thermal noise and signal processing noise, at the SU-Rx and the ER,
respectively. Moreover, it is assumed that Ψ and xp (E{|xp|2} = 1) are the transmit power of
PU-Tx and the information signal intended to the PU-Rx, respectively. The ts ∈ C1×1 and
te ∈ C1×1 denote the channel coefficients between the PU-Tx and the SU-Rx as well as the
ER, respectively. Furthermore, the equivalent noise at the SU-Rx and ER, which captures the
joint effect of the received interference from the PU-Tx, can be modelled as additive white
Gaussian noise with zero mean and σ2su and σ2er variances, respectively [186, 169, 187]. The
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achievable secrecy rate at the SU-Rx is defined as
Rs = log2
(
1 +
1
σ2su
hHs qq
Hhs
)
− log2
(
1 +
1
σ2er
hHe qq
Hhe
)
. (5.3)
The total transmit power consumption at the SU-Tx is
Pt =
||q||22 + Pc
ξ
, (5.4)
where Pc is the circuit power consumption of the transmitter and the ξ ∈ (0, 1] is the power
amplifier efficiency, which is assumed to be one (ξ = 1) throughout this chapter without loss
of generality. The SEE, which is defined as the ratio between the achievable secrecy rate and
the total transmit power consumption, can be expressed as
η =
Rs
Pt
=
log2(1 +
1
σ2su
hHs qq
Hhs)− log2(1 + 1σ2erh
H
e qq
Hhe)
||q||22 + Pc
. (5.5)
The interference leakage to the PU-Rx is defined as
Pil = h
H
p qq
Hhp. (5.6)
Recently, non-linear EH models have been investigated in the literature [64–66], which are
more realistic and practical models to reflect the non-linear relationship between the RF
and direct current conversion circuits. However, a generic non-linear EH model that could
address all the issues in practical EH scenarios is still non-existent [188, 189]. Furthermore,
by observing the measurement data presented in [190, 191], the output power of the linear EH
model is accurate when compared against the non-linear model, even when considered across
wider ranges of the input RF power. The linear EH model is also an effective model and has
been widely adopted in the analysis and optimal design for EH systems [33, 32, 163, 48]. By
assuming that the input RF power is well within the linear regime of the rectifier, a linear EH
model is adopted. The harvested energy at the ER can be written as
Pr = ζeh(h
H
e qq
Hhe + σ
2
er), (5.7)
where ζeh ∈ (0, 1] represents the EH efficiency of the ER.
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5.3 SEE Maximization with Perfect CSI
In this section, an SEE maximization problem is solved with the minimum harvested
energy and the maximum interference leakage constraints at the ER and PU-Rx, respectively.
It is assumed that perfect CSI of all terminals is available at the SU-Tx. Note that for the
passive ER, the perfect CSI can be estimated by the SU-Tx through local oscillator power
leakage from the ER’s RF front end, which is described in detail in the literature [192]. This
SEE maximization problem is formulated as
max
q
log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs qq
Hhs)−log2(1+ 1σ2erh
H
e qq
Hhe)
||q||22 + Pc
(5.8a)
s.t. log2(1 +
1
σ2su
hHs qq
Hhs)− log2(1 +
1
σ2er
hHe qq
Hhe) ≥ Rd, (5.8b)
ζeh(h
H
e qq
Hhe + σ
2
er) ≥ ωs, (5.8c)
hHp qq
Hhp ≤ Pf , ||q||22 ≤ Ptx, (5.8d)
where ωs indicates the minimum EH requirement at the ER. The Pf and Ptx are the predefined
interference leakage tolerance at the PU-Rx and the maximum available transmit power at the
SU-Tx, respectively. Let Qs be a rank-one covariance matrix, based on the beamforming
vector q such thatQs = qqH . Then the original problem can be expressed as
max
Qs
Rs(Qs)
Pt(Qs)
(5.9a)
s.t. log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−log2(1+
1
σ2er
hHe Qshe) ≥ Rd, (5.9b)
ζeh(h
H
e Qshe + σ
2
er) ≥ ωs, (5.9c)
hHp Qshp ≤ Pf , (5.9d)
tr(Qs) ≤ Ptx,Qs ⪰ 0, rank(Qs) = 1, (5.9e)
where Rs(Qs) = log2(1+ 1σ2suh
H
s Qshs)−log2(1+ 1σ2erh
H
e Qshe) and Pt(Qs) = tr(Qs) + Pc.
This is a non-convex problem due to the fractional objective function. To recast this
problem as a convex one, non-linear fractional and DC programming are employed in the
following subsections.
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5.3.1 Non-linear Fractional Programming
The objective function defined in (5.9a) is a fractional function with non-linear terms
in the numerator and denominator. Furthermore, the overall problem presented in (5.9) is
known as a non-linear fractional problem in the literature [45]. First, it is transformed into a
parametric programming.
Theorem 5.1 (From [45]): Let Rs(Q∗s) > 0 and Pt(Q∗s) > 0 be the optimal achieved
secrecy rate and optimal minimum total power consumption of the problem defined in (5.9),
respectively. Further, letF be the feasible solution set of this problem. Moreover, the transmit
covariance matrixQ∗s provides the maximum SEE such that
λ∗ =
Rs(Q
∗
s)
Pt(Q∗s)
= max
Qs∈F
{
Rs(Qs)
Pt(Qs)
}
, (5.10)
if and only if Rs(Q∗s), Pt(Q∗s) and λ∗ satisfy the following condition:
max
Qs∈F
{Rs(Qs)− λ∗Pt(Qs)} = Rs(Q∗s)− λ∗Pt(Q∗s) = 0. (5.11)
Additionally,
max
Qs,λ
{Rs(Qs)− λPt(Qs)} (5.12)
is defined as a parameteric programming with parameter λ [45].
Proof : Please refer to Section 5.8.1 ■
Lemma 5.1: The objective function defined in (5.12) is a convex, strictly decreasing and
continuous function w.r.t. λ.
Lemma 5.2: The equation maxQs,λ{Rs(Qs) − λPt(Qs)} = 0 has a unique solution,
and let denote it by λ0. Then, the problems defined in (5.12) and (5.9) have the same optimal
solution with the optimal SEE of λ0.
Proof : Please refer to [45]. ■
By utilizing Theorem 5.1, the original problem defined in (5.9) is recast into the following
parametric programming problem with parameter λ:
F (λ) = max
Qs
[Rs(Qs)− λPt(Qs)]
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= max
Qs
{log2(1 +
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)− log2(1 +
1
σ2er
hHe Qshe)− λ[tr(Qs) + Pc]}
s.t. (5.9b)-(5.9e). (5.13)
It can be seen that the original problem presented in (5.9) is transformed into a parameterized
polynomial subtractive form. As a result, the original problem is reformulated to determine
λ∗ and Q∗s, which can satisfy the condition provided in (5.11). Furthermore, by utilizing
Dinkelbach’s algorithm [45] with an initial value λ0 of λ, the optimal solutions of (5.9) can
be obtained by iteratively solving the following optimization problem:
max
Qs
[Rs(Qs)− λiPt(Qs)]
s.t. (5.9b)-(5.9e), (5.14)
for a given λi at the ith iteration. The value of λi can be considered as the SEE obtained at
the previous iteration. At each iteration, λi+1 should be updated such that
λi+1 =
Ris(Qs)
P it (Qs)
, (5.15)
where Ris and P it denote the achieved secrecy rate and total power consumption of (5.14) for
a given λi from the previous iteration, respectively. This iterative process will be terminated
when the condition in (5.11) is satisfied. However, in practice the iterative process will be
carried out until the following inequality is satisfied:
∆F (λ) = |Ris(Qs)− λiP it (Qs)| ≤ ε, (5.16)
where ε > 0 is the convergence threshold.
5.3.2 DC Programming
In this subsection, the required details on DC programming are provided to solve the
SEE maximization problem. DC programming is a well-known optimization approach to
solve non-convex problems. In particular, this technique can be exploited in an optimization
problem with an objective function defined as a difference of two concave functions. Since
the objective function in (5.14) falls under this category, DC programming is utilized to solve
this problem.
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The fundamental idea of DC programming is to locally linearize the non-concave
functions at a feasible pointQks , and to iteratively update the approximation by solving the
corresponding approximated problem [46]. The following function is defined to approximate
the second term of the objective function in (5.14):
f(Qs,Q
k
s) = log2(1 +
1
σ2er
hHe Q
k
she) +
1
σ2er
hHe (Qs −Qks)he
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Q
k
she) ln 2
. (5.17)
Based on this approximation, the problem defined in(5.14) can be transformed into an
equivalent problem as follows:
max
Qs
{log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−f(Qs,Qks)−λi[tr(Qs)+Pc]}
s.t. (5.9b)-(5.9e). (5.18)
This problem is still non-convex due to the non-convex rank-one constraint. By employing
SDR, the problem in (5.9) is relaxed by dropping the rank constraint rank(Qs) = 1, which
can be defined as:
max
Qs
{log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−f(Qs,Qks)−λi[tr(Qs)+Pc]}
s.t. (5.9b)-(5.9d), Qs ⪰ 0, tr(Qs) ≤ Ptx. (5.19)
Proposition 5.1: Provided that the problem (5.19) is feasible, the optimal solution will
be always rank-one.
Proof : Please refer to Section 5.8.2. ■
This approximated problem is convex in terms ofQs. Hence, the suboptimal solution
Q∗s to the original problem can be obtained by solving the problem in (5.19) and iteratively
updating Qks based on the solution obtained from the previous iteration. Note that DC
programming is developed based on the first-order Taylor approximation, where the rest
terms are ignored. Hence, the iterative algorithm of DC programming only guarantees to
converge to a suboptimal [152]. The algorithm based on DC programming is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Iterative algorithm to solve (5.19)
1: Initialize i = 0 and choose an initial value λ0;
2: repeat← Outer loop (Dinkelbach’s algorithm)
3: Initial k = 0, choose an initial valueQks = 0 and F (λ)i,k = 0;
4: repeat← Inner loop (DC programming)
5: Solve the problem (5.19) with λ = λi and obtainQk+1s ;
6: Compute F (λ)i,k+1 = log2(1 + 1σ2suh
H
s Q
k+1
s hs) − log2(1 + 1σ2suh
H
e Q
k+1
s he)−
λi[tr(Qk+1s ) + Pc];
7: ∆µ = F (λ)i,k+1 − F (λ)i,k;
8: Update k = k + 1;
9: until |∆µ| ≤ ζ;
10: Update λi+1 through (5.15);
11: i = i+ 1;
12: until (5.16) satisfied;
13: Return λ∗ = λi, P ∗t (Qs) = P i−1t (Qs), R∗s = Ri−1s ;
14: Output λi.
5.3.3 Computational Complexity
In this subsection, the computational complexity analysis of Algorithm 1 is provided.
The problem defined in (5.19) can be solved by a standard interior point method [193]. To
analyse the computational complexity of interior point methods, a general conic program is
first presented as follows:
min
z∈Rn
cTz (5.20a)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
ziA
j
i −Bj ∈ Skj+ for j = 1, ..., p, (5.20b)
where Skj+ is the set of k × k positive semidefinite matrices. Note that linear constraints
are equivalent to LMI constraints, i.e., aTz − b ≥ 0 is equivalent to aTz − b ∈ S1+. The
computational complexity of a generic interior point method for solving (5.20) consists of the
following parts [166, 193]:
1. Iteration complexity: The number of iterations required to reach an ϵ-optimal solution
for a given ϵ > 0 of (5.20) is on the order of
√
Υ (k) ln(1/ϵ), where
√
Υ (k) =
∑p
j=1 kj
is known as barrier parameter associated with the cone k =
∏p
j=1 S
kj
+ .
2. Per-iteration computational complexity: The search direction can be determined
by solving n linear equations in n variables in each iteration. This computational
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complexity is obtained by calculating the sum of formation and factorization of n× n
coefficient matrixH. The computational complexity of the formation is on the order of
Cform = n
p∑
j=1
k3j + n
2
p∑
j=1
k2j ,
and that of factorizing H is on the order of Cfact = n3. Therefore, the total
computational complexity of this part is on the order of Λ = Cform + Cfact.
Combining these two parts, the computational complexity of a generic interior point method
for solving (5.20) is on the order of
√
Υ (k)Λ ln(1/ϵ).
The problem defined in (5.19) has four linear constraints, and one LMI constraint of size
NT . The number of variables n is in the order of N2T . To obtain an optimal solution to the
problem defined in (5.19), the computational complexity is in the order of
√
Υ (k)Λ ln(1/ϵ),
where Υ (k) = NT + 4, ϵ > 0, and Λ = n3 + n(N3T + 4)+ n2(N2T + 4) [166, 193]. The total
computational complexity of solving the problem defined in (5.9) can be calculated through
multiplying the computational cost of solving (5.19) by the number of both inner and outer
loop iterations. Therefore, the computational complexity of solving the problem defined in
(5.9) should be in the order of TK
√
NT + 4[n
3 + n(N3T + 4) + n
2(N2T + 4)] ln(1/e), where
T and K are the numbers of iterations of the inner and the outer loop, respectively.
5.4 SEE Maximization with Statistical CSI
In this section, a robust design is considered with a realistic assumption that only the
statistical CSI of ER is available at the SU-Tx. This scenario could arise when ER is part of
neither the primary nor the secondary system. Hence, it is difficult to have ER’s CSI at the
SU-Tx based on handshaking signals. Furthermore, this assumption can be further supported
by the fact that the ER might be silent or passive to hide its existence from the SU-Tx. Hence,
it is assumed that only the statistical information on CSI of ER is available at the SU-Tx and
the corresponding CSI of ER can be defined as
he ∼ CN (0,Ge), (5.21)
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whereGe ⪰ 0 is the covariance matrix of he. With this statistical CSI, the SEE maximization
problem can be formulated by introducing a new slack variable δ as follows:
max
Qs,δ
δ (5.22a)
s.t. Pr{fs(Qs) ≥ δ} ≥ 1− α, (5.22b)
Pr{gs(Qs) ≥ Rd} ≥ 1− β, (5.22c)
Pr{ζeh(hHe Qshe + σ2er) ≤ ωs} ≤ γ, (5.22d)
hHp Qshp ≤ Pf , (5.22e)
tr(Qs) ≤ Ptx,Qs ⪰ 0, rank(Qs) = 1, (5.22f)
where fs(Qs) and gs(Qs) are defined as
fs(Qs) =
log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−log2(1+ 1σ2erh
H
e Qshe)
tr(Qs) + Pc
, (5.23)
gs(Qs) = log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−log2(1+
1
σ2er
hHe Qshe). (5.24)
In (5.22b)-(5.22d), the parameters α, β and γ are chosen to define the outage probabilities for
SEE, secrecy rate and EH at ER as 0 < α < 0.5, 0 < β < 0.5 and 0 < γ < 0.5, respectively.
Furthermore, the left hand side of the constraint in (5.22b) can be formulated as
Pr
{
log
1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs
1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Qshe
≥ δ(tr(Qs) + Pc)
}
= Pr
{
1
σ2er
hHe Qshe≤(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)2
−δ(tr(Qs)+Pc)−1
}
(a)
= 1− exp
(
1− (1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)2
−δ(tr(Qs)+Pc)
1
σ2er
tr(GeQs)
)
, (5.25)
where equality (a) in (5.25) is derived based on the fact that the random variable hHe Qshe
follows an exponential distribution with mean tr(GeQs). Similarly, the left hand side of the
constraints in (5.22c) and (5.22d) can be recast respectively as
(5.22c)⇒ 1− exp
(
1− (1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)2
−Rd
1
σ2er
tr(GeQs)
)
≥ 1− β, (5.26)
(5.22d)⇒ 1− exp
(
ζehσ
2
er − ωs
ζehtr(GeQs)
)
≤ γ. (5.27)
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Hence, the original problem in (5.22) can be rewritten as
max
Qs,δ
δ
s.t. exp
(
1− (1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)2
−δ(tr(Qs)+Pc)
1
σ2er
tr(GeQs)
)
≤ α,
exp
(
1− (1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)2
−Rd
1
σ2er
tr(GeQs)
)
≤ β,
1− exp
(
ζehσ
2
er − ωs
ζehtr(GeQs)
)
≤ γ, (5.22e), (5.22f). (5.28)
By performing some matrix manipulations (i.e., arithmetic and inequality operations), the
following equivalent optimization problem is derived:
max
Qs
log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−log2(1− 1σ2su tr(GeQs) lnα)
tr(Qs) + Pc
(5.29a)
s.t. 1 +
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs ≥ 2Rd −
2Rd
σ2er
tr(GeQs) ln β, (5.29b)
ζehtr(GeQs) ln(1− γ) ≤ ζehσ2er − ωs, (5.29c)
(5.22e), (5.22f). (5.29d)
In the following subsections, an approach is presented to solve this equivalent problem based
on non-linear fractional and DC programming.
5.4.1 Non-linear Fractional Programming
Following a similar approach as in (5.13), first a parametric problem is defined w.r.t. λ,
as follows:
Fs(λ) = max
Qs
log2(1 +
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)− log2(1−
1
σ2er
tr(GeQs) lnα)− λ(tr(Qs) + Pc),
s.t. (5.29b), (5.29c), (5.22e), (5.22f). (5.30)
The value of λi at the ith iteration can be chosen as the SEE obtained at the previous iteration.
Furthermore, λi should be updated at each iteration as λi+1 = R
i
st(Qs)
P ist(Qs)
, where Rist(Qs) and
P ist(Qs) denote the achieved secrecy rate and total power consumption that are obtained by
solving (5.30) for the given λi, respectively. In practice, the iterative process will be repeated
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until the following inequality is satisfied:
∆Fs(λ) = |Ris(Qs)− λiP it (Qs)| ≤ ς, (5.31)
with a small convergence tolerance ς > 0.
5.4.2 DC Programming
Next, DC programming is exploited to solve the optimization problem defined in (5.30).
Based on this approximation, the problem can be converted into the following equivalent
problem:
max
Qs
{log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−fs(Qs,Qks)−λi[tr(Qs)+Pc]}
s.t. (5.29b), (5.29c), (5.22e), (5.22f), (5.32)
where
fs(Qs,Q
k
s) = log2(1−
1
σ2er
tr(GeQks) lnα))−
lnα
σ2er
tr(Ge(Qs −Qks))
(1− 1
σ2er
tr(GeQks) lnα) ln 2
. (5.33)
Then, by exploiting SDR, the relaxed problem can be defined by dropping the rank-one
constraint rank(Qs) = 1 in (5.32) as follows:
max
Qs
{log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−fs(Qs,Qks)−λi[tr(Qs)+Pc]}
s.t. (5.29b), (5.29c), (5.22e), tr(Qs) ≤ Ptx,Qs ⪰ 0. (5.34)
Proposition 5.2: Provided that the problem (5.34) is feasible, the optimal solution will be
always rank-one.
Proof : Please refer to Section 5.8.3. ■
This approximated problem is convex in terms ofQs. Hence, the suboptimal solution
Q∗s of the original problem in (5.22) can be obtained through iteratively solving problem
(5.34) and updating Qks at each iteration based on the solution obtained from the previous
iteration. The proposed algorithm based on DC programming is provided in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Iterative algorithm for solving (5.34)
1: Initialize i = 0 and choose an initial value λ0 for λ;
2: repeat← Outer loop (Dinkelbach’s algorithm)
3: Initialize k = 0, choose an initial valueQks = 0 and Fs(λ)i,k = 0;
4: repeat← Inner loop (DC programming)
5: Solve the problem (5.34) with λ = λi and obtainQk+1s ;
6: ComputeFs(λ)i,k+1=log2(1+ 1σ2suh
H
s Q
k+1
s hs)− log2(1− 1σ2er tr(GeQ
k+1
s ) lnα)−
λi(tr(Qk+1s ) + Pc);
7: ∆µ = Fs(λ)i,k+1 − F (λ)i,k;
8: Update k = k + 1;
9: until |∆µ| ≤ ζ;
10: Update λi+1 = R
i
st(Qs)
P ist(Qs)
,;
11: i = i+ 1;
12: until (5.31) satisfied;
13: Return λ∗ = λi, P ∗st(Qs) = P i−1st (Qs), R∗st(Qs) = Ri−1st (Qs);
14: Output λi.
5.4.3 Computational Complexity
The problem defined in (5.34) has four linear constraints, and one LMI constraint of size
NT . By utilizing the same method in the literature [166, 193], the computational complexity
of the solution for (5.22) should be in the order of TK
√
NT + 4[n
3 + n(N3T + 4) + n
2(N2T +
4)] ln(1/ϵ), where T and K are the numbers of iterations of the inner and the outer loop,
respectively.
5.5 SEE Maximization with Imperfect CSI
In this section, a tractable approach is developed to solve the robust SEE maximization
problem with imperfect CSI on all set of channels. First, this robust problem is reformulated
into a simple parametric problem by exploiting a well-known non-linear fractional program-
ming. Then, it is showed that the optimal solution can be obtained by solving a series of SDP.
The actual channel coefficients can be modelled by channel uncertainties as follows:
hs = hˆs + eˆs, hp = hˆp + eˆp, he = hˆe + eˆe, (5.35)
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where eˆs, eˆp and eˆe represent the channel uncertainties. Furthermore, these channel
uncertainties can be defined based on an ellipsoid model as
||eˆs||2 = ||hs − hˆs||2 ≤ ϵs, (5.36)
||eˆp||2 = ||hp − hˆp||2 ≤ ϵp, (5.37)
||eˆe||2 = ||he − hˆe||2 ≤ ϵe, (5.38)
where ϵs ≥ 0, ϵp ≥ 0 and ϵe ≥ 0 are Euclidean norm-based error bounds. By incorporating
these channel uncertainties in the original design, the SEE maximization problem can be
reformulated into the following robust optimization framework:
max
Qs
Rm(Qs)
Pm(Qs)
(5.39a)
s.t. log2(1 +
1
σ2su
(hˆs + eˆs)
HQs(hˆs + eˆs))− log2(1 +
1
σ2er
(hˆe + eˆe)
HQs(hˆe + eˆe)) ≥ Rd,
(5.39b)
ζeh((hˆe + eˆe)
HQs(hˆe + eˆe) + σ
2
er) ≥ ωs, (5.39c)
(hˆp + eˆp)
HQs(hˆp + eˆp) ≤ Pf , (5.39d)
tr(Qs) ≤ Ptx,Qs ⪰ 0, rank(Qs) = 1, (5.39e)
whereRm(Qs) = log2(1+ 1σ2su (hˆs+ eˆs)
HQs(hˆs+ eˆs))− log2(1+ 1σ2er (hˆe+ eˆe)
HQs(hˆe+ eˆe))
and Pm = tr(Qs) + Pc. Next a two stage reformulation is presented to solve the above robust
problem.
5.5.1 A Two-stage Reformulation of Problem (5.39)
First, Theorem 5.1, Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2 are exploited to recast the problem in
(5.39) into the following parametric problem:
max
Qs
[Rm(Qs)− λPm(Qs)]
s.t. (5.39b)-(5.39e). (5.40)
It is obvious that the original problem (5.39) is transformed into a parameterized polynomial
subtractive form. As a result, the original problem is reformulated to determine λ∗ andQ∗s to
satisfy the condition defined in (5.11). Furthermore, Dinklebach’s algorithm is employed,
which iteratively solves the problem defined in (5.40) for a given λ and updates λ in the next
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iteration as follows:
λi+1 =
Rim(Qs)
P im(Qs)
, (5.41)
where Rim(Qs) and P im(Qs) denote the achieved secrecy rate and total power consumption
of (5.39) for the given λi, respectively, and subscript i denotes the iteration number. This
iterative process will be terminated once the following condition is satisfied:
∆Fm(λ) = |Rim(Qs)− λiP im(Qs)| ≤ ρ, (5.42)
where ρ > 0 is the termination threshold. By introducing a new slack variable τ , the following
equivalent problem of (5.40) is derived:
Fm(λ) = max
Qs,τ
log2
(
1 + 1
σ2su
(hˆs + eˆs)
HQs(hˆs + eˆs)
τ
)
− λ[tr(Qs) + Pc]}
s.t. 1 +
1
σ2er
(hˆe + eˆe)
HQs(hˆe + eˆe) ≤ τ, (5.43a)
log2(1 +
1
σ2su
(hˆs + eˆs)
HQs(hˆs + eˆs))− log2(τ) ≥ Rd, (5.43b)
(5.39c)-(5.39e). (5.43c)
Next, by introducing a new slack variable ν, the above problem is transformed into a two-stage
problem, namely, outer problem and inner problem. The outer problem can be defined as
Fm(λ) =max
ν
{log2Θ(λ, ν)− ν}
s.t. λ(νmin + Pc) ≤ ν ≤ λ(Ptx + Pc), (5.44)
where νmin denotes the minimum value of ν which can be obtained by solving the power
minimization problem defined in (5.52). Furthermore, the inner problem determines Θ(λ, ν)
for a given ν, which can be defined as
Θ(λ, ν) = max
Qs,τ
1 + 1
σ2su
(hˆs + eˆs)
HQs(hˆs + eˆs)
τ
s.t. λ(tr(Qs) + Pc) ≤ ν, (5.43a)-(5.43c). (5.45)
However, the outer problem (5.44) is a single variable optimization problem with a set of
feasible values ν ∈ [λ(νmin + Pc), λ(Ptx + Pc)]. It is well-known that the optimal value can
be efficiently obtained through an one-dimensional search. Furthermore, it is worthy note
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that the one-dimensional search approach is a kind of exhaustive algorithms, which has the
capability to provide global optimal solution [169, 11]. By relaxing the non-convex rank-one
constraint, the relaxed inner problem can be defined as
Θ(λ, ν) = max
Qs,τ
1 + 1
σ2su
(hˆs + eˆs)
HQs(hˆs + eˆs)
τ
s.t. (5.43a),(5.43b),(5.39c),(5.39d),
λ(tr(Qs) + Pc) ≤ ν, tr(Qs) ≤ Ptx,Qs ⪰ 0. (5.46)
Proposition 5.3: Provided that the problem (5.46) is feasible, the optimal solution will
be always rank-one.
Proof : Please refer to Section 5.8.4. ■
In the following subsection, an SDP formulation based on the Charnes-Cooper transfor-
mation [194] and S-Procedure [47] is presented to solve the above relaxed inner problem.
5.5.2 SDP-based Reformulation of the Inner Problem (5.46)
First, the Charnes-Cooper transformation [194] is introduced as
W =
Qs
τ
,Γ =
1
τ
, (5.47)
and a slack variable ϱ to recast the inner problem (5.46) as
Θ(λ, ν) = max
W,Γ,ϱ
ϱ
s.t. Γ +
1
σ2su
(hˆs + eˆs)
HW(hˆs + eˆs) ≥ ϱ, (5.48a)
Γ +
1
σ2er
(hˆe + eˆe)
HW(hˆs + eˆs) ≤ 1, (5.48b)
Γ +
1
σ2su
(hˆs + eˆs)
HW(hˆs + eˆs) ≥ 2Rd , (5.48c)
ζeh((hˆe + eˆe)
HW(hˆe + eˆe) + Γσ
2
e) ≥ ωsΓ, (5.48d)
(hˆp + eˆp)
HW(hˆp + eˆp) ≤ ΓPf , (5.48e)
λ(tr(W) + ΓPc) ≤ Γν, tr(W) ≤ ΓPtx,W ⪰ 0. (5.48f)
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To further proceed with this problem, the following lemma is required:
Lemma 5.3: (S-Procedure [47]) Define fi(x), i = 1, 2 such as
fi(x) = x
HAix+ 2Re{bHi x}+ ci, (5.49)
in which x ∈ CNT×1,Ai ∈ CNT×NT , bi ∈ CNT×1 and ci ∈ R. The implication f1(x) ≥ 0→
f2(x) ≥ 0 holds if and only if there exists a ϑ ≥ 0 such that[
A2 b2
bH2 c2
]
− ϑ
[
A1 b1
bH1 c1
]
⪰ 0. (5.50)
By applying Lemma 5.3, the inner problem defined in (5.48) can be recast as
Θ(λ, ν) = max
W,τ,ϱ
ϱ (5.51a)
s.t.
[
ϑ1I+
1
σ2su
W 1
σ2su
Whˆs
1
σ2su
hˆHs W t1
]
⪰ 0, (5.51b)[
ϑ2I− 1σ2erW −
1
σ2er
Whˆe
− 1
σ2er
hˆHe W t2
]
⪰ 0, (5.51c)[
ϑ3I+
1
σ2su
W 1
σ2su
Whˆs
1
σ2su
hˆHs W t3
]
⪰ 0, (5.51d)[
ϑ4I+ ζehW ζehWhˆe
ζehhˆ
H
e W t4
]
⪰ 0, (5.51e)[
ϑ5I−W −Whˆp
−hˆHp W t5
]
⪰ 0, (5.51f)
(5.48f), ϑ1 ≥ 0, ϑ2 ≥ 0, ϑ3 ≥ 0, ϑ4 ≥ 0, ϑ5 ≥ 0, (5.51g)
where t1 = 1σ2su hˆ
H
s Whˆs+Γ−ϱ−ϑ1ϵ2s, t2 = 1− 1σ2er hˆ
H
e Whˆe−Γ−ϑ2ϵ2e, t3 = 1σ2su hˆ
H
s Whˆs−
2Rd +Γ− ϑ3ϵ2s, t4 = ζehhˆHe Whˆe + ζehΓσ2e − ωsΓ− ϑ4ϵ2e and t5 = ΓPf − hˆHp Whˆp − ϑ5ϵ2p.
This inner problem in (5.51) is convex and can be efficiently solved through existing convex
optimization software [152]. Furthermore, υmin can be obtained through solving the following
convex problem
υmin = min
Qs,Γ
tr(Qs)
s.t. (5.51c)− (5.51f), (5.48f),
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ϑ2 ≥ 0, ϑ3 ≥ 0, ϑ4 ≥ 0, ϑ5 ≥ 0. (5.52)
The above developed procedures for solving this robust SEE maximization problem are
summarized in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Dinkelbach’s algorithm for solving the SEE maximization problem in (5.39)
1: Initialization i = 0 and λ = λ0;
2: repeat
3: Perform a one-dimensional search over ν to obtain the optimal values (ν∗,Θ(λi, ν∗))
for the outer problem in (5.44), where each Θ(λi, ν) is obtained by solving the inner
problem in (5.51);
4: Retrieve the correspondingQ∗s through (5.47);
5: Compute F (λi) = Rim(Q∗s)− λiP im(Q∗s);
6: Update λi+1 by using (5.41);
7: i = i+ 1;
8: until the condition in (5.42) is satisfied;
9: Return the optimal value of the inner problem in (5.51) to the outer problem in (5.44);
10: Output the maximum SEE obtained by the outer problem in (5.44).
5.5.3 Computational Complexity
The problem defined in (5.51) has five LMI constraints of size NT + 1, one LMI
constraint of size NT , and seven linear constraints. The number of variables n is on the order
ofN2T . By following the same method in [166, 193], the computational complexity of solving
the problem defined in (5.39) should be on the order of TK
√
6NT + 12{n3 + n[5(NT +
1)3 + N3T + 7] + n
2[5(NT + 1)
2 + N2T + 7]} ln(1/ϵ), where T and K are the numbers of
iterations of the one dimensional search and the Dinkelbach’s algorithm, respectively.
5.6 Simulation Results
To validate the proposed approaches, a number of simulations are performed based on
the proposed model, but with different configurations. An underlay MISO CR network is
considered, where the multi-antenna SU-Tx simultaneously transmits confidential information
and energy to the SU-Rx and ER, respectively. This communication is established by sharing
the spectrum that has been assigned for signal transmission between a PU-Tx and a PU-Rx.
It is assumed that the SU-Tx is equipped with three (Nt = 3) antennas, while the PU-Rx,
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Fig. 5.2 Convergence of the proposed algorithm with perfect CSI assumption in Algorithm 1
for different sets of channels.
SU-Rx and ER each has a single antenna. All the channel coefficients are generated by CSCG
with zero mean and unit variance.1 The maximum interference leakage to the PU-Rx is set to
be 0 dBW. Furthermore, the energy conversion ratio is assumed to be ζeh = 0.5. The noise
variances at the SU-Rx and ER are set to σ2su = 1 and σ2er = 1, respectively. The convergence
tolerances ε, ς and ρ defined in (5.16), (5.31) and (5.42), respectively, are assumed to be 10−3.
Note that in majority of the simulation scenarios outlined here, the difference between
the transmit power and the EH requirement is large, and thus, may raise concerns on the
validity of this assumption (ωs = −20 dBW). However, this assumption being is reasonable,
for the following two reasons: 1) similar assumptions (large gap between transmit power and
EH requirements) have been widely made in the literature, for instance in [198, 199, 84]; and
2) for the secondary system in CR network, the ER could be wireless sensors or IoT devices.
For these devices, only a power in the order of milliwatts is sufficient [60].
First, the convergence of the proposed algorithms are evaluated by randomly generating
different five sets of channels for each CSI assumption (perfect CSI, statistical CSI on the ER
channel and imperfect CSI. Figure 5.2 presents the convergence of the achieved SEE with
perfect CSI obtained by Algorithm 1. Here, the target secrecy rate (Rd), the transmit power
consumption (Ptx) and the EH requirement (ωs) have been set to 0.5 bps/Hz, 20 dBW and
ωs = −20 dBW, respectively. Then the convergence of achieved SEE with statistical CSI on
1Similar assumptions have been employed in the literature [195, 169]. In practical communication scenarios,
this assumption may be implemented in wireless sensors and mobile wearable devices [196, 197].
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Fig. 5.3 Convergence of the proposed algorithm with the assumption of statistical CSI on the
ER channel in Algorithm 2 for different sets of channels.
the ER’s channel, and the convergence of the achieved SEE with imperfect CSI are showed
in Fig. 5.3 and 5.4. Here, the system parameters are: target secrecy rate Rd = 0.5 bps/Hz,
the transmit power consumption Ptx = 20 dBW and the EH requirement ωs = −20 dBW. As
can be observed, the maximum SEE and the convergence of the proposed algorithms can be
attained with a limited number of iterations.
Figure 5.5 shows the achieved SEE with different target secrecy rates, and EH require-
ments under the assumption of perfect CSI. As seen in Fig. 5.5, the optimal SEE decreases
as the target rate increases. Note that zero SEE means that the original SEE maximization
problem is infeasible; this is due to unachievable target secrecy rate constraint. Furthermore,
it is possible to achieve a better SEE performance with a reduced EH requirement. Note that
the same SEE performance can be achieved with different available transmit power as in Fig.
5.5 provided the SEE maximization problem is feasible with the same rest of the constraints.
Hence, increasing the transmit power consumption cannot provide a better SEE. However, it
can achieve a higher secrecy rate.
The performance comparisons between the proposed schemes and similar schemes
available in the literature is also performed. Fig. 5.6 provides comparisons of the achievable
SEE of three different transmission schemes under the perfect CSI assumption: SEE
maximization, power minimization and secrecy rate maximization. The power minimization
problem is formulated as
min
Qs
tr(Qs)
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Fig. 5.4 Convergence of the proposed algorithm with norm-error bounded imperfect CSI
assumption in Algorithm 3 for different sets of channels.
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Fig. 5.5 The achieved SEE with different target secrecy rates, transmit power constraints and
EH requirements under the perfect CSI assumption.
s.t. (5.9b)-(5.9d), Qs ⪰ 0, tr(Qs) ≤ Ptx, (5.53)
and the secrecy rate maximization problem is written as
max
Qs
log2
(
1 +
1
σ2su
hHs qq
Hhs
)
− log2
(
1 +
1
σ2er
hHe qq
Hhe
)
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Fig. 5.6 The achieved SEE for different transmission schemes under the assumption of perfect
CSI: SEE maximization, power minimization and secrecy rate maximization.
s.t. (5.9b)-(5.9d), Qs ⪰ 0, tr(Qs) ≤ Ptx. (5.54)
In these simulation results, the maximum available transmit power and EH requirement are
assumed to be 20 dBW and −20 dBW, respectively. As expected, the proposed scheme for
SEEmaximization outperforms the other two schemes in terms of achieved SEE. Furthermore,
the achievable SEE remains constant in the secrecy rate maximization scheme with different
target secrecy rate values within its feasible region. This trend is due to the fact that the
secrecy rate maximization scheme always achieves a better constant secrecy rate than the
target secrecy rate in all cases with a feasible target secrecy rate. In other words, the target
secrecy rate constraint becomes inactive with the available transmit power, which is more
than the required to achieve the target secrecy rate. Furthermore, zero SEE means that it is
not feasible to achieve the target secrecy rate with the available transmit power.
Then the performance of the proposed scheme with statistical CSI on the channel of
ER is performed. Figure 5.7 shows the achieved SEE with different target secrecy rates
and EH requirements. The channel covariance matrix of ER is modelled as Ge = a2I.
The parameters α, β, and γ define the outage probabilities for SEE, secrecy rate and
EH requirement, respectively, and are assumed to be the same with all constraints, i.e.,
α = β = γ = 0.1. The parameter a2 is introduced to control the ER’s channel variance.
Furthermore, the performance of the scheme with the perfect CSI is also evaluated to draw
a performance comparison. As shown in Fig. 5.7, the scheme with perfect CSI achieves
the best performance and the optimal achievable SEE decreases as the target secrecy rate
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Fig. 5.7 The achieved SEE with different target secrecy rates, channel covariances a2 and EH
requirements with the assumption of statistical CSI of ER channel.
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Fig. 5.8 The achieved SEE with different schemes under the assumption of statistical CSI of
ER channel: SEE maximization, power minimization and secrecy rate maximization.
increases for all sets of the assumptions. Note that with a higher EH requirement and a2, the
proposed scheme achieves less SEE due to more required transmit power to meet the EH
constraints and deal with the channel variance.
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Fig. 5.9 The achieved SEE with different target secrecy rates, norm-error bounds and EH
requirements under the assumption of imperfect CSI.
The achieved SEE of different schemes is evaluated under the assumption of statistical
CSI on the ER’s channel. Figure 5.8 presents the achievable SEE of three schemes: SEE
maximization, power minimization and secrecy rate maximization. Here, it is assumed that
the maximum available transmit power and EH requirement are set to be 20 dBW and −20
dBW, respectively. The power minimization problem is defined as
min
Qs
tr(Qs)
s.t. (5.29b)-(5.29d), (5.55)
and the secrecy rate maximization problem is written as
max
Qs
log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−log2(1−
1
σ2su
tr(GeQs) lnα)
s.t. (5.29b)-(5.29d). (5.56)
As expected, the proposed SEE maximization scheme outperforms the other two schemes in
terms of the achieved SEE. Furthermore, the SEE performance obtained with the secrecy rate
maximization scheme is not affected by different target secrecy rates in its feasible secrecy
rate region. The reason is that in secrecy rate maximization scheme, all the available transmit
power is consumed to achieve the maximum secrecy rate. Thus, the achievable SEE would
remain a constant with a given available transmit power.
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Fig. 5.10 The achieved SEE with different schemes under the assumption imperfect CSI: SEE
maximization, power minimization and secrecy rate maximization.
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Fig. 5.11 The achieved SEE with different number of transmit antennas with perfect CSI,
statistical CSI on the ER channel and imperfect CSI assumptions.
Next the performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated under the assumption of
the norm-bounded channel uncertainties in section 5.5. Figure 5.9 illustrates the achieved
SEE with different target secrecy rates and EH requirements. The channel bounds of the
uncertainties are assumed to be the same, i.e., ϵs = ϵp = ϵe = ϵ. The maximum available
transmit power is set to be 20 dBW. As seen in Fig. 5.9, the optimal SEE decreases as the
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Fig. 5.12 The achieved SEE with different energy conversion ratio ζeh with perfect CSI,
statistical CSI on the ER channel and imperfect CSI assumptions.
target rate increases. The scheme with perfect CSI can be seen as a special case of the robust
SEE maximization (with a zero error bound on the channel uncertainties, i.e., ϵ = 0). Similar
to the previous results, zero SEE refers to an infeasible problem with a given target secrecy
rate constraint. Furthermore, the optimal SEE has a better performance with a smaller EH
requirement. Moreover, a better SEE can be realized for a feasible problem with a given
target secrecy rate constraint and with a smaller error bound ϵ. This is due to the fact that the
SU-Tx requires more transmit power to deal with a larger channel uncertainty bound and to
meet all set of constraints.
Then the performance comparison of the achieved SEE with different transmission
schemes under norm-error bounded channel uncertainties is provided in Fig. 5.10. Here, three
different schemes are considered: SEE maximization, secrecy rate maximization and power
minimization. Furthermore, the maximum available transmit power and the EH requirement
are set to be 20 dBW and −20 dBW, respectively. The power minimization problem for this
CSI assumption is defined in problem (5.52). The secrecy rate maximization problem is
written as
max
W,τ,ϱ
log2(ϱ)
s.t. (5.51c)− (5.51f), (5.48f),
ϑ2 ≥ 0, ϑ3 ≥ 0, ϑ4 ≥ 0, ϑ5 ≥ 0. (5.57)
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As seen, the proposed SEE maximization scheme outperforms the other two schemes in
terms of achieved SEE. Furthermore, the achievable SEE is not affected by the target secrecy
rates and remains constant. This is due to the fact that all available transmit power is used to
achieve the maximum secrecy rate in the secrecy maximization scheme, which is similar to
that of the previous simulation results of different schemes under perfect and statistical CSI
assumptions.
The achieved SEE with different number of transmit antennas for all CSI assumptions is
presented in Fig. 5.11. The system parameters for all the cases are set to be as follows: target
secrecy rate Rd = 0.5 bps/Hz, the transmit power consumption Ptx = 20 dBW and the EH
requirement ωs = −20 dBW. Furthermore, the channel variance of ER for the assumption of
statistical CSI on the ER’s channel is set to be a2 = 0.1 and the channel uncertainty bound is
assumed to be ϵ = 0.1 for the scheme with imperfect CSI, respectively. As shown in this
figure, larger number of antennas at the SU-Tx provides better performance in terms of the
SEE performance. This is due to the fact that larger number of transmit antennas brings more
degree of freedom, which results in higher achievable secrecy rate without any additional
transmit power consumption.
Finally, the SEE performance with different energy conversion ratio is provided for all
three CSI assumptions in Fig. 5.12. Here, the target secrecy rate Rd, the transmit power
consumption Ptx and the EH requirement ωs are set to be 0.5 bps/Hz, 20 dBW and -20 dBW,
respectively. Furthermore, the channel variance of ER for the scheme with statistical CSI on
the ER channel and the channel uncertainty bound for the scheme with imperfect CSI are
assumed to be a2 = 0.1 and ϵ = 0.1, respectively. As seen in Fig. 5.12, the achieved SEE
increases as the energy conversion ratio ζeh increases for all three CSI assumptions. The
reason is that the SU-Tx requires more power to meet the EH requirement at the ER with a
small energy conversion ratio ζeh (i.e., ζeh = 0.1).
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, the SEE maximization problems were considered for an underlay MISO
CR network in the presence of energy harvesting. First, a transmit beamforming design is
presented to meet the required secrecy rate at the SU-Rx while satisfying the interference
leakage constraint on the PU-Rx and the EH requirement on the ER. The original problem was
not convex due to the non-linear fractional objective function. To overcome this non-convexity
issue, the original problem was reformulated into a convex one by exploiting SDR, non-linear
fractional and DC programming. Then the beamforming design was extended to address
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the problems of imperfect CSI at the transmitter. In particular, two robust designs were
proposed with the assumptions of statistical CSI on the ER’s channel and error bounded
channel uncertainties, respectively. For the case of statistical CSI assumption, the outage
probability constraints were firstly presented in a closed-form expression. By exploiting
SDR, non-linear fractional and DC programming, the original problem was efficiently solved
through an iterative approach. Next, the robust design with bounded channel uncertainties
was formulated as a series of SDP by exploiting the same techniques as in the previous
robust design. Then, the S-Procedure was used to convert this problem into a convex one.
Simulation results were provided (1) to validate the convergence of the proposed algorithms,
(2) to show the impacts of different parameters on the achieved SEE, including the maximum
available transmit power, the EH requirement, the number of transmit antennas and the
energy conversion ratio, and (3) to demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed
SEE maximization scheme over power minimization and secrecy rate maximization schemes
available in the literature.
5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
LetQ∗s be the optimal solution of problem (5.9), and S be the set including all feasible
Qs under the constraints defined in (5.9b)-(5.9e). Then, one can derive
λ∗ =
Rs(Q
∗
s)
Pt(Q∗s)
≥ Rs(Qs)
Pt(Qs)
,∀Qs ∈ S. (5.58)
Hence,
Rs(Qs)− λ∗Pt(Qs) ≤ 0,∀Qs ∈ S, (5.59)
Rs(Q
∗
s)− λ∗Pt(Q∗s) = 0. (5.60)
From the inequality in (5.59)max
Qs
{Rs(Qs)−λ∗Pt(Qs)} = 0 can be derived, and from (5.60)
it is obvious that the maximum value is achieved withQ∗s. The sufficient condition has been
satisfied, which completes the first part of the proof.
Next, the second part of the proof with the necessary condition is considered. LetQ∗s be
the solution for max
Qs
{Rs(Qs)− λ∗Pt(Qs)} = 0 and Rs(Q∗s)− λ∗Pt(Q∗s) = 0. This implies
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the following:
Rs(Qs)− λ∗Pt(Qs) ≤ 0,∀Qs ∈ S, (5.61)
Rs(Q
∗
s)− λ∗Pt(Q∗s) = 0. (5.62)
From (5.61), it is obvious λ∗ ≥ Rs(Qs)
Pt(Qs)
for all Qs ∈ S, and λ∗ is the maximum objective
value of the problem defined in (5.9). This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1. ■
5.8.2 Proof of Proposition 5.1
First, the following Lagrangian function of the optimization problem defined in (5.19) is
considered:
L(Qs,Z, µ, ι, κ,ϖ)=−{log2(1 +
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−f(Qs,Qks)−λ[tr(Qs)+Pc]} − tr(ZQs)
+µ(tr(Qs)−Ptx)−ι[log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−log2(1+
1
σ2er
hHe Qshe)−Rd]−κ[ζeh(heQshe
+ σ2er)− ωs] +ϖ(hHp Qshp − Pf ), (5.63)
where Qs ∈ HNt+ , Z ∈ HNt+ , µ ∈ R+, ι ∈ R+, κ ∈ R+ and ϖ ∈ R+ are the Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the constraints in the problem defined in (5.19). Then, the
corresponding KKT conditions is derived as follows [152]:
∂L
∂Qs
= −(ι+ 1)
[ 1
σ2su
hsh
H
s
(1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs) ln 2
]
+ (λ+ µ)I+ ι
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Qshe) ln 2
]
−
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Q
k
she) ln 2
]
− κζehhehHe −ϖhphHp − Z = 0, (5.64)
ZQs = 0,Z ⪰ 0. (5.65)
Based on these KKT conditions, the following equality holds:
− (ι+ 1)
[ 1
σ2su
hsh
H
s
(1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs) ln 2
]
+ (λ+ µ)I−ϖhphHp + ι
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Qshe) ln 2
]
−
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1+ 1
σ2er
hHe Q
k
she) ln 2
]
− κζehhehHe = Z, (5.66)
⇒
{
− (ι+ 1)
[ 1
σ2su
hsh
H
s
(1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs) ln 2
]
+ (λ+ µ)I+ ι
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Qshe) ln 2
]
−
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[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Q
k
she) ln 2
]
− κζehhehHe −ϖhphHp
}
Qs = 0, (5.67)
⇒
{
(λ+ µ)I+ ι
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Qshe) ln 2
]
−
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Q
k
she) ln 2
]
− κζehhehHe
−ϖhphHp
}
Qs = (ι+ 1)
[ 1
σ2su
hsh
H
s
(1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs) ln 2
]
Qs, (5.68)
⇒Qs =
{
(ι+1)
[ 1
σ2su
hsh
H
s
(1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs) ln 2
]}{
(λ+ µ)I+ ι
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Qshe) ln 2
]
−
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Q
k
she) ln 2
]
− κζehhehHe −ϖhphHp
}−1
Qs. (5.69)
Hence, the following rank relation holds:
rank(Qs) = rank
{{
(ι+ 1)
[ 1
σ2su
hsh
H
s
(1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs) ln 2
]}{
ι
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Qshe) ln 2
]
−
[ 1
σ2er
heh
H
e
(1 + 1
σ2er
hHe Q
k
she) ln 2
]
− κζehhehHe −ϖhphHp + (λ+ µ)I
}−1
Qs
}
≤ rank
[ 1
σ2su
hsh
H
s
(1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs) ln 2
]
≤ 1. (5.70)
By eliminating the trivial solutionQs = 0, one can obtain rank(Qs) = 1, which completes
the proof of Proposition 5.1. ■
5.8.3 Proof of Proposition 5.2
The proof of Proposition 5.2 is similar to that of Proposition 5.1 provided in the
previous chapter. First, the following Lagrangian function of the problem defined in (5.34) is
considered:
L(Qs,Z, µ, ι, κ,ϖ) =−{log2(1+
1
σ2su
hHs Qshs)−fs(Qs,Qks)−λ[tr(Qs)+Pc]}−tr(ZQs)
+µ(tr(Qs)−Ptx)−ι[1+ 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs−2Rd+
2Rd
σ2er
tr(GeQs) ln β]+κ[ζeh(tr(GeQs) ln(1−γ)
− σ2er) + ωs] +ϖ(hHp Qshp − Pf ), (5.71)
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where Qs ∈ HNt+ , Z ∈ HNt+ , µ ∈ R+, ι ∈ R+, κ ∈ R+ and ϖ ∈ R+ are the Lagrangian
multipliers associated with problem (5.34). Then, the corresponding KKT conditions [152]
are derived as follows:
∂L
∂Qs
=−
[ 1
σ2su
hsh
H
s
(1+ 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs) ln 2
]
+ (λ+ µ)I−ϖhphHp +
[ − 1
σ2er
Ge lnα
(1− 1
σ2er
tr(GeQks) lnα) ln 2
]
+ κζehheh
H
e − ι
[
1
σ2su
hsh
H
s +
2Rd
σ2er
tr(Ge) ln β
]
− Z = 0
ZQs =0, Z ⪰ 0. (5.72)
Following the same set of mathematical manipulations in (5.66)-(5.69), the following
rank relation holds:
rank(Qs) = rank
{{[ 1
σ2su
hsh
H
s
(1+ 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs) ln 2
]}{
(λ+µ)I+
[ − 1
σ2er
Ge lnα
(1− 1
σ2er
tr(GeQks) lnα) ln 2
]
+ κζehheh
H
e −ϖhphHp − ι
[
1
σ2su
hsh
H
s +
2Rd
σ2er
tr(Ge) ln β
]}−1
Qs
}
≤ rank
[ 1
σ2su
hsh
H
s
(1 + 1
σ2su
hHs Qshs) ln 2
]
≤ 1. (5.73)
By eliminating the trivial solutionQs = 0, one can obtain rank(Qs) = 1, which completes
the proof of Proposition 5.2. ■
5.8.4 Proof of Proposition 5.3
First, suppose that the problem defined in (5.46) is solved with the optimal value Λ∗.
Now, the following power minimization problem is considered:
min
Qs,τ
tr(Qs)
s.t. 1 +
1
σ2su
(hˆs + eˆs)
HQs(hˆs + eˆs) ≥ τΛ∗,
(5.43a),(5.43b),(5.39c),(5.39d),
λ(tr(Qs) + Pc) ≤ ν, tr(Qs) ≤ Ptx,Qs ⪰ 0. (5.74)
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By applying the S-Procedure [47], the above problem can be transformed into the following
SDP problem:
min
Qs,τ
tr(Qs)
s.t. T1(Qs, χ1) ⪰ 0,T2(Qs, χ2) ⪰ 0,T3(Qs, χ3) ⪰ 0,
T4(Qs, χ4) ⪰ 0,T5(Qs, χ5) ⪰ 0,
λ(tr(Qs) + Pc) ≤ ν, tr(Qs) ≤ Ptx,Qs ⪰ 0, (5.75)
where
T1(Qs, χ1) =
[
χ1I+
1
σ2su
Qs
1
σ2su
Qshˆs
1
σ2su
hˆHs Qs
1
σ2su
hˆHs Qshˆs + 1− τΛ∗ − χ1ϵ2s
]
, (5.76)
T2(Qs, χ2) =
[
χ2I+
1
σ2su
Qs
1
σ2su
Qshˆs
1
σ2su
hˆHs Qs
1
σ2su
hˆHs Qshˆs + 1− τ2Rd − χ2ϵ2s
]
, (5.77)
T3(Qs, χ3) =
[
χ3I− 1σ2erQs −
1
σ2er
Qshˆe
− 1
σ2er
hˆHe Qs τ − 1− 1σ2er hˆ
H
e Qshˆe − χ3ϵ2e
]
, (5.78)
T4(Qs, χ4) =
[
χ4I+ ζehQs ζehQshˆe
ζehhˆ
H
e Qs ζehhˆ
H
e Qshˆe + ζehσ
2
er − ωs − χ4ϵ2e
]
, (5.79)
T5(Qs, χ5) =
[
χ5I−Qs −Qshˆp
−hˆHp Qs Pf − hˆHp Qshˆp − χ5ϵ2p
]
. (5.80)
Next, the Lagrangian function of the problem defined in (5.75) can be written as
L(X) =tr(Qs)− tr(QsZ)−
5∑
i=1
tr(Ti(Qs, χi)Ai)−
5∑
i=1
χimi, (5.81)
where X denotes the set of all primal and dual variables: X = {Q,Z, τ,A, χ,m} with
A = {Ai}5i=1, χ = [χ1, ..., χ5]T and m = [m1, ...,m5]T ; Ai ∈ HNt+1+ , Z ∈ HNt+ and
mi ∈ R+ are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the problem in (5.75). For simple
expressions, Ti(Qs, χi) is rewritten as
T1(Qs, χ1) = S1(Qs, χ1) +
1
σ2su
VHs QsVs, (5.82)
T2(Qs, χ2) = S2(Qs, χ2) +
1
σ2su
VHs QsVs, (5.83)
T3(Qs, χ3) = S3(Qs, χ3)− 1
σ2er
VHe QsVe, (5.84)
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T4(Qs, χ4) = S4(Qs, χ4) + ζehV
H
e QsVe, (5.85)
T5(Qs, χ5) = S5(Qs, χ5)−VHp QsVp, (5.86)
where
S1(Qs, χ1) =
[
χ1I 0
0 1τΛ∗ − χ1ϵ2s
]
,
S2(Qs, χ2) =
[
χ2I 0
0 1−τ2Rd−χ2ϵ2s
]
,
S3(Qs, χ3) =
[
χ3I 0
0 τ−1−χ3ϵ2e
]
,
S4(Qs, χ4) =
[
χ4I 0
0 ζehσ
2
er−ωs−χ4ϵ2e
]
,
S5(Qs, χ5) =
[
χ5I 0
0 Pf − χ5ϵ2p
]
,
Vs = [INT hˆs],Ve = [INT hˆe],Vp = [INT hˆp]. (5.87)
Substituting (5.82)-(5.86) into (5.81), a different expression for the Lagrangian function is
obtained as follows:
L(X)= tr(Qs)−tr(QsZ)−tr( 1
σ2su
QsVsA1V
H
s )−tr(
1
σ2su
QsVsA2V
H
s )
+ tr(
1
σ2er
QsVeA3V
H
e )− tr(ζehQsVeA4VHe ) + tr(QsVpA5VHp ) + φ(τ,A, χ,m),
(5.88)
where φ(τ,A, χ,m) collects all the terms that are not related to Qs and Z, which are
independent of this proof. Then, the KKT conditions [152] are defined as:
∂L
∂Qs
=I−Z− 1
σ2su
VsA1V
H
s −
1
σ2su
VsA2V
H
s +
1
σ2er
VeA3V
H
e −ζehVeA4VHe +VpA5VHp
=0, (5.89)
T1(Qs, χ1)A1 = 0, (5.90)
QsZ = 0,Z ⪰ 0,Ai ⪰ 0, i ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. (5.91)
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Premultiplying the two sides of (5.89) and using the fact thatQsZ = 0, one can obtain
Qs
1
σ2su
VsA1V
H
s =Qs
(
I− 1
σ2su
VsA2V
H
s +
1
σ2er
VeA3V
H
e − ζehVeA4VHe +VpA5VHp
)
.
(5.92)
The following rank relationship holds
rank(Qs) = rank
(
Qs
(
I− 1
σ2su
VsA2V
H
s +
1
σ2er
VeA3V
H
e − ζehVeA4VHe +VpA5VHp
))
= rank(Qs
1
σ2su
VsA1V
H
s ) ≤ min {rank(
1
σ2su
VsA1V
H
s ), rank(Qs)}. (5.93)
If it can be proven that rank( 1
σ2su
VsA1V
H
s ) = 1, then it is obvious that rank(Qs) ≤ 1. Hence,
in the remaining part of this proof, the rank of 1
σ2su
VsA1V
H
s is focused. By substituting
(5.82) into (5.90), the following equation can be obtained
S1(Qs, χ1)A1 +
1
σ2su
VHs QsVsA1 = 0. (5.94)
Furthermore, it follows by postmultiplying byVHs that
S1(Qs, χ1)A1V
H
s +
1
σ2su
VHs QsVsA1V
H
s = 0. (5.95)
One can easily verify that
[INT 0]S1(Qs, χ1) = χ1[INT 0] = χ1(Vs − [0NT hˆs]), [INT 0]VHs = INT . (5.96)
By premulitiplying both sides of (5.95) by [INT 0], the following relation can be obtained
χ1(Vs − [0NT hˆs])A1VHs +
1
σ2su
QsVsA1V
H
s = 0
⇔ (χ1INT +
1
σ2su
Qs)VsA1V
H
s = χ1[0NT hˆs]A1V
H
s . (5.97)
Lemma 5.4: ([200]): If a block Hermitian matrix
P =
[
P1 P2
P3 P4
]
⪰ 0,
then the main diagonal matrices P1 and P4 are always positive semidefinite matrices.
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Based on Lemma 5.4 andT1(Qs, χ1) ⪰ 0, it is obvious that χ1INT + 1σ2suQs is a positive
definite matrix. Since multiplying both sides by a non-singular matrix does not change the
rank of the original matrix, the following rank relationship holds:
rank(VsA1VHs ) = rank
(
(χ1INT +
1
σ2su
Qs)VsA1V
H
s
)
= rank(χ1[0NT hˆs]A1V
H
s )
= rank([0NT hˆs]) ≤ 1. (5.98)
Combining (5.93) and (5.98), the following inequality can be derived
rank(Qs) ≤ rank(VsA1VHs ) ≤ 1. (5.99)
Similar to the previous proofs, by eliminating the trivial solutionQs = 0, rank(Qs) = 1 can
be obtained, which completes the proof of Proposition 5.3. ■
Chapter 6
Exploiting Machine Learning for Secure
Transmission in an Underlay Cognitive
Radio Network
6.1 Introduction
In secure transmission designs, different optimization approaches with various approx-
imations techniques have been widely exploited to solve a numerous resource allocation
problems [83, 33, 55, 49, 201]. However, these techniques often have been developed
based on iterative approaches to yield either the optimal or the sub-optimal solutions. The
computational complexities associated with these conventional optimization techniques are
not affordable in low powered devices in IoT or not suitable for applications with the require-
ments of ultra reliability and low latency in future wireless networks. Furthermore, these
conventional optimization techniques pose different challenges in delay sensitive systems as
the dynamic nature of real-time parameters requires frequent updates in very short time [137].
This introduces different stringent delay requirements in updating those design parameters
which is impossible to meet by conventional optimization approaches.
In this chapter, a secure transmission in an underlay CR network is considered. This
secure network consists of one PU-Tx, one PU-Rx, one SU-Tx, one SU-Rx and one EVE. All
of these terminals are equipped with a single antenna. The aim is to enhance the quality of
secure communications between SU-Tx and SU-Rx in the presence of an EVE. In particular,
the optimal power allocation is determined to maximize the achievable secrecy rate under the
constraints of total transmit power of the SU-Tx and the interference leakage to the PU-Rx.
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Fig. 6.1 A CR network with one PU-Tx, one PU-Rx, one SU-Tx, one SU-Rx and one EVE.
All the terminals are equipped with a single antenna.
Then, a NN based framework is proposed to learn the relationship between the input and the
output parameters of this secure transmission system. It is showed that the proposed NN can
be utilized to solve different types of resource allocation problems. For example, the perfect
and imperfect CSI scenarios require different conventional convex optimization frameworks
to obtain the optimal solutions, however, the same NN model has the capability to handle
both robust and non-robust designs.
6.2 System Model
A CR network is considered with five terminals as shown in Fig. 6.1 : one PU-Tx,
one SU-Tx, one SU-Rx, one PU-Rx and one EVE. It is assumed that all of these terminals
are equipped with single antenna. The SU-Tx intends to send a confidential message to
the SU-Rx while ensuring the interference leakage to the PU-Rx is less than a predefined
threshold. At the same time the EVE attempts intercepting the information sent by the SU-Tx
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to the SU-Rx. The channels between the PU-Tx and the PU-Rx, the SU-Rx as well as the
EVE are represented by tp, ts and te, respectively, whereas the channels between the SU-Tx
and the PU-Rx, the SU-Rx, and the EVE are denoted by hp, hs and he, respectively. The
received signal at the SU-Rx and the EVE can be expressed, respectively, as
ys =
√
Pshsxs +
√
Pptsxp + ns, (6.1)
ye =
√
Pshexs +
√
Pptexp + ne, (6.2)
where xs(E{|xs|2} = 1) and xp(E{|xp|2} = 1) are the symbols that sent from the SU-Tx
to the SU-Rx and PU-Tx to the PU-Rx, respectively. The noise at the SU-Rx and the EVE
are denoted by ns(E{|ns|2} = σ2s) and ne(E{|ne|2} = σ2e), respectively. Furthermore, Ps
and Pp denote the transmit power of the SU-Tx and the PU-Tx, respectively. Based on these
system parameters, the SINR at the SU-Rx and the EVE are defined as
γs =
Ps|hs|2
Pp|ts|2 + σ2s
, (6.3)
γe =
Ps|he|2
Pp|te|2 + σ2e
. (6.4)
The achievable secrecy rate at the SU-Rx can be written as [11]
Rs = [log2(1 + γs)− log2(1 + γe)]+. (6.5)
The interference leakage to the PU-Rx can be expressed as
Pin = Ps|hp|2. (6.6)
With these definitions, the secrecy rate maximization problem can be formulated as
max
Ps
Rs
s.t. Ps|hp|2 ≤ q,
Ps ≤ Pt, Ps ≥ 0, (6.7)
where q is the maximum interference leakage to the PU-Rx, and Pt is the maximum transmit
power available at the SU-Tx. In the following sections, two approaches are presented to
solve this problem: Conventional optimization and NN based approach.
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6.3 Conventional Optimization based Design
In this section, conventional convex optimization approaches are presented to solve the
secrecy rate maximization problem defined in (6.7) by taking into account the scenarios of
having both perfect and imperfect CSI at the SU-Tx.
6.3.1 Design with Perfect CSI
In this subsection, the conventional convex optimization based approach is provided to
solve the problem defined in (6.7) with perfect CSI assumption. The original problem (6.7)
is not convex in its original form due to the non-convex objective function. Based on the
monotonicity of logarithmic functions, the original problem in (6.7) can be reformulated as
max
Ps
1 + Ps|hs|
2
Pp|ts|2+σ2s
1 + Ps|he|
2
Pp|te|2+σ2e
s.t. Ps|hp|2 ≤ q,
Ps ≤ Pt, Ps ≥ 0. (6.8)
The above problem still remains as non-convex due to the fractional objective function and
therefore it cannot be directly solved using existing convex optimization tools. To circumvent
this non-convexity issue, the original problem is converted into a two-level optimization
problem, namely, outer problem and inner problem. The outer problem can be written w.r.t.
a new scalar variable t as
max
t≥0
f(t)
1 + t
, (6.9)
whereas the inner problem can be expressed for a given t as
f(t) = max
Ps
1 +
Ps|hs|2
Pp|ts|2 + σ2s
s.t. Ps|hp|2 ≤ q,
Ps|he|2
Pp|te|2 + σ2e
≤ t,
Ps ≤ Pt, Ps ≥ 0. (6.10)
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The outer problem in (6.9) is convex for a given t and can be solved by using standard
interior-point methods. Since the inner problem in (6.10) is a convex problem, the outer
problem in (6.9) is a quasi-convex optimization problem w.r.t. variable t. Therefore, an one
dimensional search is employed to obtain the optimal t∗ [16]. The proposed one dimensional
search algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 One dimensional search based on bisection method
1: Initialize t ∈ [0, tmax], c = (
√
5− 1)/2, a = 0, b = tmax, t1 = (1− c)b, t2 = cb;
2: Compute f(t1), f(t2);
3: repeat
4: If 1+f(t1)
1+t1
> 1+f(t2)
1+t2
, b = t2, t2 = t1, f(t2) = f(t1), t1 = b − c(b − a) and update
f(t1);
5: Else, a = t1, t1 = t2, f(t1) = f(t2), t2 = a+ c(b− a), and update f(t2);
6: until |b− a| ≤ ϵ, where ϵ is a predefined threshold to terminate the algorithm.
6.3.2 Design with Imperfect CSI
In this subsection, a tractable approach is developed to solve the secrecy taremaximization
problem with imperfect CSI. This robust problem is reformulated into a tractable one by
exploiting Charnes-Cooper transformation [194] and S-Procedure [47]. The actual channel
coefficients can be modelled with corresponding channel uncertainties as follows:
hs = hˆs + es, he = hˆe + ee, hp = hˆp + ep, (6.11)
where hˆs, hˆe and hˆp are the channel coefficients estimated by the SU-Tx. Furthermore, the
symbols es, ee and ep represent the channel uncertainties. These channel uncertainties are
assumed to be bounded by a predefined ellipsoids as follows:
|es| = |hs − hˆs| ≤ ϵs, (6.12)
|ee| = |he − hˆe| ≤ ϵe, (6.13)
|ep| = |hp − hˆp| ≤ ϵp, (6.14)
where ϵs ≥ 0, ϵe ≥ 0 and ϵp ≥ 0 are the error bounds. Based on these bounded channel
uncertainties and the monotonicity of log functions, the robust secrecy rate maximization
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problem can be reformulated into the following robust optimization framework:
max
Ps
1 + Ps|hˆs+es|
2
Pp|ts|2+σ2s
1 + Ps|hˆe+ee|
2
Pp|te|2+σ2e
s.t. Ps|hˆp + ep|2 ≤ q,
Ps ≤ Pt, Ps ≥ 0. (6.15)
First, the Charnes-Cooper transformation is introduced [194] as
P s =
Ps
t
, (6.16)
to recast the problem defined in (6.15) as
max
P s, t
t+
P s|hˆs + es|2
Pp|ts|2 + σ2s
s.t. t+
P s|hˆe + ee|2
Pp|te|2 + σ2e
≤ 1,
P s|hˆp + ep|2 ≤ tq,
P s ≤ tPt, P s ≥ 0. (6.17)
The problem defined in (6.17) can be rewritten by introducing a new slack variable τ and
defining it in the epigraph form as
max
P s, t, τ
τ (6.18a)
s.t. t+
P s|hˆs + es|2
Pp|ts|2 + σ2s
≥ τ, (6.18b)
t+
P s|hˆe + ee|2
Pp|te|2 + σ2e
≤ 1, (6.18c)
P s|hˆp + ep|2 ≤ tq, (6.18d)
P s ≤ tPt, P s ≥ 0. (6.18e)
The above problem is still intractable due to the infinite number of the uncertainty sets in the
constraints (6.18b)-(6.18d). Hence, (6.12) and (6.18b) are rewritten as
|es|2 − ϵ2s ≤ 0, (6.19)
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τ − t− P s|hˆs + es|
2
Pp|ts|2 + σ2s
≤ 0. (6.20)
By considering S-Procedure [47], the constraint (6.18b) can be reformulated as the following
constraints: [
λ1 +
P s
Pp|ts|2+σ2s
P shˆs
Pp|ts|2+σ2s
P shˆs
Pp|ts|2+σ2s
P s|hˆs|2
Pp|ts|2+σ2s + t− τ − λ1ϵ
2
s
]
⪰ 0,
λ1 ≥ 0. (6.21)
Similarly, the constraints (6.18c) and (6.18d) can be recast respectively as[
λ2 − P sPp|te|2+σ2s −
P shˆe
Pp|te|2+σ2s
− P shˆe
Pp|te|2+σ2s 1−
P s|hˆs|2
Pp|te|2+σ2e − t− λ2ϵ
2
e
]
⪰ 0,
λ2 ≥ 0, (6.22)
and [
λ3 − P s −P shˆp
−P shˆp tq − P s|hˆp|2 + σ2s − λ3ϵ2p
]
⪰ 0,
λ3 ≥ 0. (6.23)
Therefore, the problem in (6.18) can be rewritten into the following equivalent form:
max
P s, t, τ
τ
s.t. (6.21)-(6.23),
P s ≤ tPt, P s ≥ 0. (6.24)
The above problem is convex and therefore it can be solved efficiently by convex optimization
tool box [152].
6.4 Power Allocation Framework based on NN
In this section, a NN based power allocation scheme is presented. In this approach, the
secrecy rate maximization problem is treated as an unknown non-linear mapping, and a NN is
trained to learn the relationship between the input and the output parameters. The motivation
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Fig. 6.2 The structure of the proposed NN.
is to utilize the high computational efficiency of the NN in its testing stage to design a time
and computation efficient real-time power allocation scheme which can be applied to solve
the power allocation problem with both perfect and imperfect CSI. As shown in Fig. 6.2, the
proposed NN consists of three layers: the input layer, multiple hidden layers and the output
layer. In particular, the |hˆs|, |hˆp|, |hˆe|, |ts|, |te|, ϵs, ϵe and ϵp as the inputs and P ∗s are chosen
as the output of the training data of the proposed NN, respectively. Note that the perfect
CSI scheme becomes as a special case of imperfect CSI scheme by setting the inputs for
perfect CSI scheme as to be |hˆs| = |hs|, |hˆp| = |hp|, |hˆe| = |he|, and ϵs = ϵe = ϵp = 0. The
mapping between the input and the output parameters can be expressed as
P ∗s = f(|hˆs|, |hˆp|, |hˆe|, |ts|, |te|, ϵs, ϵe, ϵp). (6.25)
Starting from the input and then passing them through the NN and calculating the actual
output straightforwardly, which is referred as feed-forward. Furthermore, the calculation flow
follows in the natural forward direction from the input layer to the hidden layers and finally to
the output layer. This process can be expressed mathematically as
z(l+1) =W(l)a(l) + b(l), (6.26)
a(l+1) = g(z(l+1)), (6.27)
where z(l+1) is the linear transformation of given inputs at the l+ 1-th layer, whereas a(l+1) is
output activation value of the l + 1-th layer. The g(z) denotes any activation function, in
this work, the ReLU function is chosen as the activation function, which can be expressed as
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g(x) = max{0, x}. TheW(l) and b(l) are the weight matrix and the bias vector for the l-th
layer, respectively. Suppose there is a N -layer NN, the mapping between the inputs and the
output parameters can be expressed as
y = f(S,W,b), (6.28)
where S = [|hˆs|, |hˆp|, |hˆe|, |ts|, |te|, ϵs, ϵe, ϵp]. The goal is to determine the weights W(=
[W(1), ...,W(N−1)]) and the bias b = [b(1), ...,b(N−1)]) such that both functions in (6.25)
and (6.28) yield a similar output for the same set of inputs.
Proposition 6.1: In order to have a similar outputs from both (6.25) and (6.28), the
following normalized loss function should be minimized:
J(W,b) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
(ym − P ∗s,m)2, (6.29)
whereM is the number of training data set, ym and P ∗s,m are them-th output of the NN and
the optimal transmit power obtained by conventional optimization scheme, respectively.
Proof : Please refer to Section 6.7.1. ■
The back-propagation based gradient descent algorithm can be iteratively used to update
the weights matricesW and the bias vectors b.
Proposition 6.2: Based on back-propagation and gradient descent algorithm, the weight
matrix and the bias vector for the l-th layerW(l) and b(l) can be updated respectively by
W(l) =W(l) − α
M
M∑
m=1
[δ(l+1)m (a
(l)
m )
T ], (6.30)
b(l) = b(l) − α
M
M∑
m=1
δ(l+1)m , (6.31)
where α is the learning rate and δ(l+1)m is defined as δ(l+1)m = ∂J(W,b)
∂z
(l+1)
m
.
Proof : Please refer to Section 6.7.2. ■
In a NN, over-fitting is the result of a model that is very closely to or precisely aligned
with a specific set of data [202], which occurs when the model learns the training data set
along with noises [203]. Over-fitting leads the model not to be able to fit additional data
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or reliably predict future observations [202]. Regularization is an approach to reduce the
well-known over-fitting problem of any types of machine learning model [204, 205]. To
overcome this over-fitting problems, the L1 and L2 regularizations are most widely utilized
techniques in the literature [206, 207].
The regularization term is added to the loss function to reduce the sum of absolute value
of the weights in L1 regularization method, where the loss function can be written as
J(W,b)=
1
M
M∑
m=1
(ym − P ∗s,m)2 +
λ
2M
N−1∑
l=1
||W(l)||1, (6.32)
where λ is the regularization parameter. Following the similar derivation of Proposition 2,
the weights for L1 regularization can be updated as
W(l)=W(l)− α
M
M∑
m=1
[δ(l+1)m (a
(l)
m )
T ]− αλ
M
sgn(W(l)), (6.33)
The bias b(l) can be updated by using the same equation provided in (6.31).
In L2 regularization method, the sum of squares of the weights are reduced by adding
the regularization term to the loss function, which can be mathematically expressed as
J(W,b)=
1
M
M∑
m=1
(ym − P ∗s,m)2 +
λ
2M
N−1∑
l=1
||W(l)||22, (6.34)
where λ is the regularization parameter. Following the similar derivation of Proposition 2,
the weights for L1 regularization can be updated as
W(l)=(1− αλ
M
)W(l)− α
M
M∑
m=1
[δ(l+1)m (a
(l)
m )
T ], (6.35)
The bias b(l) for L2 regularization can be updated by using the equation provided in (6.31).
The development of the proposed NN scheme can be divided into three steps: (1)
Obtaining the training data set by solving the secrecy rate maximization problem through an
one dimensional search based conventional optimization approach; (2) developing a NN based
algorithm to learn the relationship between the input and output parameters of this secure
transmission system; (3) after completing the training process, evaluating the performance of
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the trained NN over the conventional optimization algorithm. The details of these steps are
provided in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 The NN approach
Preparing process:
1: Obtain the training data set by utilizing the conventional approaches in Section 6.3: The optimal
transmit power P ∗s for corresponding channel coefficients |hˆs|, |hˆp|, |hˆe|, |ts|, |te| and channel
error bounds ϵs, ϵe, ϵp;
Training process:
1: Initialize the weights matricesW, the bias vectors b and the learning rate α;
2: Divide the training data set into I mini-batches, the size of each mini-batch isM ;
3: For each batch: Input the training set S = [S1, ...,SM ] and y = [y1, ..., yM ], where Sm =
[|hˆs,m|, |hˆp,m|, |hˆe,m|, |ts,m|, |te,m|, ϵs,m, ϵe,m, ϵp,m];
4: For NN without any regularization, update the weights matricesW, and the bias vectors b by
minimizing the loss function defined in (6.29) using the back-propagation based gradient descent
method that provided in (6.30) and (6.31);
5: For NN with L1 regularization, update the weights matricesW, and the bias vectors b by utilizing
the back-propagation based gradient descent method that provided in (6.33) and (6.31), which are
based on minimizing the loss function defined in (6.32) ;
6: For NN with L2 regularization, update the weights matrices W, and the bias vectors b by
minimizing the loss function defined in (6.34) using the back-propagation based gradient descent
method that provided in (6.35) and (6.31);
7: End for;
8: Save the trained NN;
Testing process:
1: Generate the channel coefficients for the test data set Stest;
2: Feed Stest as the input parameters and determine the output results based on the trained NN;
6.5 Simulation Results
In this section, numerical results are presented to demonstrate the superior performance
of the proposed NN schemes. The training and test processes are performed by using a
computer with Intel Core i7-9750H processor and 16GB random access memory. The
training data set is obtained by utilizing the conventional optimization scheme provided
in Section 6.3 with 6 × 105 different random channel realizations. The training data set
is split into two subsets of data: 5 × 105 for training data set and 105 for validation data
set. In the training process, the mini-batch gradient descent algorithm is employed, where
the batch size is chosen to be 10. Furthermore, the test data set is obtained by using 3000
channel realizations. The maximum available transmit power of SU-Tx is set to 100 mW.
The transmit power of PU-Tx is assumed to be 60 mW, whereas all the noise power are set to
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Fig. 6.3 The mean square error between the power allocations obtained by the conventional
scheme and NN approach without regularization against different number of training steps.
be 0.001. The channels hˆs, hˆp, hˆe, ts and te are all generated by hˆi = χi
√
d−Φ2i , i = s, e, p
and tj = χj
√
c−Φ2j , j = s, e, where χi ∼ CN (0, 1), χj ∼ CN (0, 1), di is the distance
between the SU-Tx and the i-th user and cj denotes distance between the PU-Tx and the
i-th user. The parameter Φ2 = 1.7 denotes the path loss exponent. The distances between
the transmitters and the corresponding receivers are assumed to be ds = 10m, de = 20m,
dp = 10m, cs = 20m and ce = 20m. Furthermore, it is assumed that the NN has two hidden
layers with one hundred neurons in each layer. The learning rate α is set to be 10−4 and the
regularization parameter λ is assumed to be 5× 10−4.
First, the mean square error obtained by NN schemes without regularization, with
L1 regularization and L2 regularization against the number of training steps are showed,
respectively, in Figs. 6.3-6.5. For a better presentation, samples are taken for every 100
points from the whole training steps. It is obvious that the mean square error decreases and
approaches to almost zero as the number of iterations increases. This is due to the fact that the
weightsW and the bias b of the proposed NN are iteratively updated by using the mini-batch
gradient descent algorithm. Furthermore, the mean square error of the validation data set for
the three schemes are also provided, respectively, in Figs. 6.3-6.5. As seen in these figures,
the mean square errors first decreases and then remain constant, which confirms that training
process does not over-fit the NN for all three different regularization cases.
Next, Fig. 6.6 presents the performance comparison in terms of optimal transmit power
obtained by using the conventional optimization scheme and the proposed NN scheme against
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Fig. 6.4 The mean square error between the power allocations obtained by the conventional
scheme and NN approach with L1 regularization against different number of training steps.
different number of training steps. Similar to Figs. 6.3-6.5, the results are obtained by
sampling the results from every 100 points of the whole training steps. As seen in this figure,
the output transmit power of the proposed NN scheme is increasingly getting close to the
optimal transmit power obtained from the conventional scheme with the growth of training
steps. The reason is that the weightsW and the bias b of the proposed NN are continuously
updated in the training process to achieve the a better minimum mean square error. Note that
the output power of the proposed NN may be negative or larger than the available transmit
power, since the training errors between the NN output power and the optimal power obtained
by conventional optimization scheme cannot be completely eliminated. In order to incorporate
the power constraints (0 ≤ Ps ≤ Pt), we choose PNNs = min(max(POUTs , 0), Pt) as the
SU-Tx transmit power of the proposed NN scheme in the following simulation results.
Next, Fig. 6.7 presents the achievable secrecy rates of the SU-Rx versus the interference
leakage tolerance of the PU-Rx obtained by both conventional optimization and the proposed
NN schemes with perfect CSI assumption. The maximum available transmit power of the
SU-Tx is assumed to be 100 mW. It can be seen that the achievable secrecy rate increases
with the interference leakage tolerance for all schemes. In addition, all the three different
regularization based NN schemes can achieve a similar performance with the conventional
optimization approach. Note that there is a performance gap between the conventional scheme
and the three NN schemes, and this is due to the training errors between the output power
and the desired optimal power.
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Fig. 6.5 The mean square error between the power allocations obtained by the conventional
scheme and NN approach with L2 regularization against different number of training steps.
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Fig. 6.6 The performance comparison in terms of the optimal transmit power obtained by
using the conventional optimization scheme and the proposed NN based scheme against
different number of training steps.
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Fig. 6.7 The achievable secrecy rates against different interference tolerance of the PU-Rx
obtained by both conventional optimization approach and the proposed NN framework under
the perfect CSI assumption.
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Fig. 6.8 The achievable secrecy rates against different maximum transmit power of the SU-Tx
obtained by conventional optimization scheme and the proposed NN framework under the
perfect CSI assumption.
Next the achievable secrecy rates of conventional optimization and proposed NN schemes
against different available transmit power with perfect CSI are evaluated. Fig. 6.8 presents
the achievable secrecy rates of SU-Rx of both conventional optimization and the proposed
NN schemes. The interference leakage tolerance is set to be 6 mW. It can be seen that the
achievable secrecy rate increases as the transmit power increases for all schemes. Similar to
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Fig. 6.9 The achievable secrecy rates against different interference tolerance of the PU-Rx
obtained by both conventional optimization approach and the proposed NN framework under
the imperfect CSI assumption.
Fig. 6.7, the proposed NN schemes also shows a similar performance as the conventional
optimization approach.
Next, Fig. 6.9 presents the achievable secrecy rates versus different interference leakage
tolerances at the PU-Rx obtained by both conventional optimization and the proposed NN
schemes under imperfect CSI assumption. The channel error bound is assumed to be
ϵs = ϵe = ϵp = 0.1. The maximum available transmit power of SU-Tx is assumed to be 100
mW. As seen in Fig. 6.9, the achievable secrecy rate increases as the interference leakage
tolerance increase for all schemes. Furthermore, all the three different regularization based
NN schemes show similar performances compared to that of the conventional optimization
approach.
Next the achievable secrecy rates of conventional optimization and the proposed NN
schemes with different available transmit power at SU-Tx. Fig. 6.10 presents the achievable
secrecy rates of SU-Rx of both schemes. The interference leakage tolerance is set to be 6
mW. As seen in Fig. 6.10, the achievable secrecy rate increases with the interference leakage
tolerance increasing. Similar to previous results, the proposed NN schemes also provide a
similar performance as the conventional convex optimization approach.
The achievable secrecy rates of conventional optimization and proposed NN schemes
with different channel error bounds is provided in Fig. 6.11. The maximum available transmit
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Fig. 6.10 The achievable secrecy rates against different maximum transmit power of the
SU-Tx obtained by conventional optimization scheme and the proposed NN framework under
the imperfect CSI assumption.
power at SU-Tx is set to be 100 mW and the interference leakage tolerance at PU-Rx is
assumed to be 6 mW. All the channel error bounds are assumed to be the same for each point
in this figure, i.e., ϵs = ϵe = ϵp. As seen in this figure, the achieved secrecy rate decreases as
the channel error bound increases for all the schemes. Furthermore, as observed in previous
set of simulation results that proposed NN scheme can achieve the similar performances in
comparison with conventional convex optimization scheme.
In Fig. 6.12, the achieved secrecy rate (left axis) and computation time (right axis)
against different number of hidden layers for the NN scheme without any regularization
are presented. The maximum available transmit power at the SU-Tx and the interference
leakage tolerance at the PU-Rx are assumed to be 100 mW and 9 mW, respectively. All
the channel error bounds are set to be 0 to represent the perfect CSI scenarios. As shown
in this figure, the differences of performances among different number of hidden layers are
within a range of 1%. However, the computation time for the testing set increases as the
number of hidden layers increase. In other words, introducing more hidden layers cannot lead
to much performance improvement, and these additional layers will introduce much more
computation complexity to the NN.
Next the statistical results are presented in Figs. 6.13 and 6.14 to evaluate the interference
leakage tolerance satisfaction at the PU-Rx of the proposed NN scheme. These statistical
results are calculated by combing the results of test data of both perfect and imperfect CSI
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Fig. 6.11 The achievable secrecy rates against different channel error bounds obtained by
conventional optimization scheme and the proposed NN framework.
scenarios. In Fig. 6.13, the interference leakage tolerance is set to 6 mW, while the maximum
available transmit power at the SU-Tx is assumed to be 100 mW in Fig. 6.14. Fig. 6.13
provides the interference leakage tolerance satisfaction against different maximum transmit
power, whereas Fig. 6.14 presents that against different interference leakage tolerances. As
shown in these figures, more than 93% of the test results can meet the interference leakage
constraint at the PU-Rx.
Table 6.1 The achieved secrecy rates of both schemes against interference leakage tolerances.
Perfect CSI:
Interference leakage NN scheme without NN scheme with NN scheme with Conventional scheme Minimum ratio
tolerance regularization L1 regularization L2 regularization (bps/Hz) (%)
(mW) (bps/Hz) (bps/Hz) (bps/Hz)
1 0.5636 0.5618 0.5642 0.5679 98.93
2 0.7438 0.7393 0.7355 0.7486 98.25
3 0.846 0.8377 0.8414 0.8523 98.29
Imperfect CSI:
Interference leakage NN scheme without NN scheme with NN scheme with Conventional scheme Minimum ratio
tolerance regularization L1 regularization L2 regularization (bps/Hz) (%)
(mW) (bps/Hz) (bps/Hz) (bps/Hz)
1 0.2202 0.2256 0.2216 0.2320 94.91
2 0.3357 0.3427 0.3431 0.3474 96.63
3 0.4056 0.4138 0.4186 0.4235 95.77
Table 6.1 provides the secrecy rate performance of all the schemes with perfect and
imperfect CSI against different interference leakage tolerances, similar to the results presented
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Fig. 6.12 The achievable secrecy rates (left axis) and computation time for the training set
(right axis) against different number of hidden layers.
Table 6.2 The required computational time for both schemes against interference leakage
tolerances.
Perfect CSI:
Interference leakage NN scheme without NN scheme with NN scheme with Conventional scheme Maximum ratio
tolerance regularization L1 regularization L2 regularization (s) (%)
(mW) (s) (s) (s)
1 3.59 4.40 4.38 558.71 0.79
2 3.69 4.58 4.47 584.68 0.78
3 3.77 4.45 4.46 573.38 0.78
Imperfect CSI:
Interference leakage NN scheme without NN scheme with NN scheme with Conventional scheme Maximum ratio
tolerance regularization L1 regularization L2 regularization (s) (%)
(mW) (s) (s) (s)
1 3.72 4.67 4.22 651.18 0.65
2 3.71 4.79 4.39 639.32 0.75
3 3.62 4.74 4.29 647.28 0.73
in Figs. 6.7 and 6.9. Table 6.2 presents the comparison of the required computation time
of the four schemes against different interference leakage tolerances. Similarly, Table 6.3
presents the achieved the secrecy rate performance of all schemes against different available
transmit power. Table 6.4 provides the required computation time of all schemes against
different maximum transmit power. To draw a performance comparison of achieved secrecy
rate, the minimum ratio is calculated, which is determined by dividing the minimum achieved
secrecy rate among the three NN schemes by that of the conventional scheme. Similarly,
for the comparison of computational time, the maximum ratio is calculated, which can be
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Fig. 6.13 Distributions of the interference leakage satisfactions against different maximum
available transmit power at SU-Tx.
Table 6.3 The achieved secrecy rates of both schemes against maximum transmit power.
Perfect CSI:
Maximum available NN scheme without NN scheme with NN scheme with Conventional scheme Minimum ratio
transmit power regularization L1 regularization L2 regularization (bps/Hz) (%)
(mW) (bps/Hz) (bps/Hz) (bps/Hz)
10 0.5636 0.5618 0.5642 0.5679 98.93
20 0.7438 0.7393 0.7355 0.7486 98.25
30 0.846 0.8377 0.8414 0.8523 98.29
Imperfect CSI:
Maximum available NN scheme without NN scheme with NN scheme with Conventional scheme Minimum ratio
transmit power regularization L1 regularization L2 regularization (bps/Hz) (%)
(mW) (bps/Hz) (bps/Hz) (bps/Hz)
10 0.2123 0.2138 0.2127 0.2224 95.46
20 0.3338 0.3258 0.3351 0.3400 95.82
30 0.4033 0.3954 0.4019 0.4108 96.25
obtained by dividing the maximum computation of the three NN schemes by that of the
conventional scheme. Note that the testing process for all schemes are performed on the
same computer. In all the results provided in these tables, the achievable secrecy rates
are obtained by averaging the results over test data set with 3000 channel realizations,
while the computational time is the total computation time of 3000 channel realizations.
From these results, it is obvious that the proposed NN schemes achieve at least 94% of the
optimal performance of the conventional scheme, while significantly reducing the required
computation time. In particular, the proposed NN based schemes require only less than 1%
of the time that required for the conventional optimization scheme. This is due to the fact that
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Fig. 6.14 Distributions of the interference leakage satisfactions against different interference
leakages at PU-Rx.
Table 6.4 The required computational time for both schemes against maximum transmit
power.
Perfect CSI:
Maximum available NN scheme without NN scheme with NN scheme with Conventional scheme Minimum ratio
transmit power regularization L1 regularization L2 regularization (s) (%)
(mW) (s) (s (s)
10 4.21 5.03 5.34 578.06 0.92
20 3.90 4.65 4.77 574.38 0.83
30 3.63 4.39 4.58 566.87 0.81
Imperfect CSI:
Maximum available NN scheme without NN scheme with NN scheme with Conventional scheme Minimum ratio
transmit power regularization L1 regularization L2 regularization (s) (%)
(mW) (s) (s) (s)
10 3.87 4.62 4.76 658.36 0.72
20 4.07 4.52 4.44 654.87 0.69
30 3.93 4.82 4.68 661.43 0.73
the conventional optimization based solutions of the perfect CSI assumption are obtained
through an iterative approach and sub-gradient algorithms, while the conventional scheme for
the imperfect CSI assumption only require sub-gradient algorithms. These algorithms and
approach would requires a much higher computation time. In the NN based schemes, once
the weights are determined, it is should be able to compute the solution with a reasonable
complexity within a short time compared to that of the conventional approach.
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6.6 Summary
In this chapter, a NN based approach for the power allocation design is proposed to
maximize the secrecy rate in a CR network under transmit power and interference leakage
constraints. It is showed that the developed NN algorithm has the capability to solve the
power allocation problem with both perfect and imperfect CSI whereas it required to develop
both robust and non-robust optimization frameworks in the conventional approaches. First,
the conventional optimization scheme for perfect CSI scenario was developed based on a
one dimensional search, while that for the imperfect assumption was developed based on
Charnes-Cooper transformation and S-Procedure approach. Then, the NN based scheme
was proposed where a relationship between the input and output parameters is established
by determining an approximated function. The training set to establish the relationship
between inputs and output was obtained through the conventional optimization approaches
and the NN has been trained to determine the weights of the connections in the network.
When the NN has been trained, the performance was evaluated with a test set in terms of
achieved secrecy rates and required computational time. Numeric results demonstrated
that the proposed NN scheme can achieve more than 94% of the secrecy rate performance
with less than 1% computation time and more than 93% satisfaction of interference leakage
constraints compared those of the conventional approaches. Simulation results were provided
to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed NN based approach over the bench mark
conventional optimization schemes.
6.7 Appendix
6.7.1 Proof of Proposition 6.1
In order to achieve a similar performance through the functions provided in (6.25) and
(6.28), we should maximize the following likelihood function:
L(W,b) =
M∏
m=1
pm(y|x;W,b) =
M∏
m=1
exp
(
− (fm(S,W,b)− P
∗
s,m)
2
2σ2
)
. (6.36)
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By utilizing the monotonicity of logarithmic function, the logarithmic likelihood function
can be expressed as
logL(W,b) = log
M∏
m=1
exp
(
− (fm(S,W,b)−P
∗
s,m)
2
2σ2
)
=M log
(
1√
2πσ
)
− 1
2σ2
M∑
m=1
(fm(S,W,b)− P ∗s,m)2. (6.37)
SinceM log 1√
2πσ
and 1
2σ2
are constants, maximizing the likelihood function is equivalent to
minimizing the following loss function:
J(W,b) =
M∑
m=1
(ym − P ∗s,m)2. (6.38)
Furthermore, this loss function can be normalized without loss of generality as follows:
J(W,b) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
(ym − P ∗s,m)2, (6.39)
which completes the proof of Proposition 6.1. ■
6.7.2 Proof of Proposition 6.2
First, we provide the following basic chain rule:
∂h(g)
∂z
=
∂h
∂g
∂g
∂z
. (6.40)
From the feed-forward process, we have
z(l+1) =W(l)a(l) + b(l), (6.41)
a(l+1) = g(z(l+1)), (6.42)
where z(l+1) is the linear transformation of a given set of input parameters at the l + 1-th
layer, whereas a(l+1) is the output activation value of the l + 1-th layer. The function g(z)
represents any activation function. By assuming that J(W,b) is the loss function of the NN,
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we have the following based on the chain rule defined in (6.40):
∂J(W,b)
∂W(l)
=
∂J(W,b)
∂z(l+1)
∂z(l+1)
∂W(l)
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
δ(l+1)m (a
(l)
m )
T , (6.43)
∂J(W,b)
∂b(l)
=
∂J(W,b)
∂z(l+1)
∂z(l+1)
∂b(l)
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
δ(l+1)m . (6.44)
Since we can calculate a(l)m from feed-forward process, then, the δ(l)m can be derived as follows.
Based on the chain rule, we have
δ(l)m =
∂J(W,b)
∂z
(l)
m
=
∂J(W,b)
∂z
(l+1)
m
∂z
(l+1)
m
∂a
(l)
m
∂a
(l)
m
∂z
(l)
m
= [(W(l))Tδ(l+1)m ] · g′(z(l)m ). (6.45)
Starting from the output layer, we can calculate δ(l) back forward layer by layer until the input
layer. Finally, considering the gradient descent method, the weights matrixW(l) and the bias
vector b(l) for the l-th layer can be updated respectively as follows:
W(l) =W(l) − α
M
M∑
m=1
[δ(l+1)m (a
(l)
m )
T ], (6.46)
b(l) = b(l) − α
M
M∑
m=1
δ(l+1)m , (6.47)
which completes the proof of of Proposition 6.2. ■
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
The exponential growth of mobile services and applications has brought increasing
demands and major challenges in terms of security in wireless information transmission.
The conventional security approaches are implemented in upper layers, which mainly rely
on the complexity of some intractable mathematical problems. Although these techniques
are proven to be uncrackable, there still exists potential risks in the processes of secret key
management and distribution. As a promising solution to tackle these issues and further
improve the security in mobile communications, physical layer security has been recently
recognized as a promising new design paradigm to provide security in wireless networks in
addition to the existing conventional cryptographic methods, where physical layer dynamics
of fading channels are exploited to establish secured wireless links. On the perspective of
physical layer security, confidential transmission can be guaranteed if the SNR or SINR of
the legitimate channel is larger than that of the channel of the EVEs. In order to further
improve the performance of physical layer security, AN was employed to mask the secret
information between the legitimate terminals and confuse the EVEs. Furthermore, the
computational complexities associated with convex optimization techniques are not affordable
in low power devices or not suitable for ultra low latency future wireless networks. Hence,
machine learning techniques have received a huge research interests for physical layer security
wireless communications in recent years, which have the capability to deal with the real-time
parameters that require frequent updates in very short time frame.
The unprecedented growth inmobile data traffic in recent years brings different challenges
on the aspects surrounding the energy consumption in wireless networks. The energy
consumption, regardless of the underpinning technologies, has a knock-on effect on the
environment we live in, carbon footprint, global warming, and thus unanticipated financial
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consequences. Wireless EH is an emerging technology, which facilitates the mobile devices
to collect energy from external energy sources without any wired connections. In general,
conventional EH methods harvest energy from natural sources, such as wind, solar and waves,
such an extended approach is impractical for at least two reasons. First, these external energy
sources are unreliable and heavily correlated to the environments conditions. Secondly,
practically it is infeasible to exploit them to the mobile devices, owing to the size limitations of
harvesting devices and the unstable power output caused by different geographical conditions.
As such, wireless EH facilitates practical design and implementation especially in mobile
devices.
This thesis has developed different secure transmission techniques based on the concepts
of physical layer security for different communication scenarios. Various techniques have
been employed, such as convex optimization, AN, PS, SWIPT and machine learning, for the
purposes of improving security performance, extending the battery lifetime and dealing with
the real-time processing.
Chapter 4 has investigated a beamforming design for downlink transmission of a MISO
system in the presence of purely unknown EVEs, where each legitimate user employs a PS
based SWIPT technique. Since the transmitter did not have any knowledge of the CSI of
the EVEs, the AN approach was employed to establishing secure communication. Based
on the assumption of imperfect CSI of legitimate users at the transmitter, two robust design
approaches for the joint beamforming and PS ratio have been proposed to maximize the
AN power under both energy EH and SINR requirements at each legitimate user. These
two problems have been transformed into two convex forms and solved by using convex
optimization software. The performance of the proposed designs were evaluated in terms
of the maximum SINR among EVEs. Simulation results were provided to demonstrate the
effectiveness and superior performance of the proposed robust designs while comparing with
that of no AN aided designs, and to presented that AN technique can be utilized to mask
the confidential information and significantly reduce the achieved SINR at EVEs. Then, it
was showed that the achieved SINR at EVEs can be reduced by introducing more transmit
antennas. This is due to the fact that introducing larger number of transmit antennas providing
additional degrees of freedom in the beamforming design. Furthermore, the performance
comparisons between linear and non-linear EH model were provided, which indicated that
non-linear EH model is more accurate under the scenario of continuous EH requirements.
Then, in order to achieve energy efficient secure transmission, different SEE optimization
problems were studied in Chapter 5 for a MISO underlay CR network, in the presence of
an ER. These energy efficient designs were developed with different assumptions of CSI
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at the transmitter, namely perfect CSI, statistical CSI and imperfect CSI with bounded
channel uncertainties. The beamforming was designed to maximize the SEE while satisfying
all relevant constraints. The original problems were non-convex and their solutions are
intractable. To overcome this non-convexity issue, the original problem into was reformulated
into a convex one by exploiting SDR, non-linear fractional and DC programming. The
beamforming design is then extended to address the problems of imperfect CSI at the
transmitter. In particular, two robust designs were proposed with the assumptions of statistical
CSI on the ER’s channel and error bounded channel uncertainties, respectively. For the
case of statistical CSI assumption, the outage probability constraints was first expressed in
closed form expressions. By exploiting SDR, non-linear fractional and DC programming,
this problem was efficiently solved through an iterative approach. Next, the robust design
with bounded channel uncertainties is studied. By exploiting the same techniques as in the
previous robust design, the problem is reformulated into a series of SDP. Then, S-procedure
is utilized to convert this problem into a convex one. The performance of the proposed
designs were evaluated in terms of the achieved SEE. Numerical results, when compared
with those obtained with existing techniques in the literature, showed the proposed SEE
maximization designs outperform the secrecy rate maximization and power minimization
schemes. These results also validated the convergence of the proposed iterative algorithms
and demonstrated the impacts of different parameters on the achieved SEE. Furthermore,
the methods to construct rank-one optimal covariance matrices for all the three designs
were provided, which confirmed the optimality of the proposed SEE maximization based
beamforming designs.
The algorithms developed based on the conventional optimization approaches often
require iterative techniques with a considerable number of iterations, which poses challenges
for real-time applications with stringent delay requirements in future wireless networks. To
meet the unprecedented requirements of future ultra-reliable low-latency networks, Chapter
6 has studied two different approaches to maximize the secrecy rate of the SU-Rx under
the constraints of total transmit power of SU-Tx and the interference leakage of the PU-Rx,
namely, conventional optimization framework and NN based algorithm. It was showed that
the developed NN algorithm has the capability to solve the power allocation problem with
both perfect and imperfect CSI whereas it required to develop both robust and non-robust
optimization frameworks in the conventional approaches. First, the conventional optimization
scheme for perfect CSI scenario was developed based on a one dimensional search, while
that for the imperfect assumption was developed based on Charnes-Cooper transformation
and S-Procedure approach. Then, the NN based scheme was proposed where a relationship
between the input and output parameters is established by determining an approximated
7.1 Future Work 125
function. The performance of the proposed NN based scheme was evaluated with a test
data set in terms of achieved secrecy rates and required computational times. Simulation
results were provided to demonstrate that the proposed NN was able to achieve more than
94% secrecy rate performance and less than 1% computation time in comparing with the
bench mark conventional optimization scheme. The results also showed that at least 93%
CSI combinations among the testing data set in the NN scheme could satisfy the interference
leakage tolerance constraints. Furthermore, the significant reduction in computational time
confirmed its suitability to employ in future real-time wireless applications.
7.1 Future Work
In this thesis, the research work of employing different techniques for physical layer
security has been presented. However, several limitations of the research work in this
thesis have been recognized: (1) The cooperative jamming has not been considered for
secure transmission in the presence of unknown EVEs; (2) The SEE designs in this thesis
only considered single user scenario; (3) The computational complexities associated with
conventional optimization techniques are not affordable in low powered devices in IoT or not
suitable for applications with ultra reliability and low latency in future wireless networks;
(4) Conventionally, NNs work in real domain [208], which introduces to handle resource
allocation problems for multiple-antenna systems. Therefore, the potential extensions of the
research in this thesis are presented in following subsections.
7.1.1 Cooperative Jamming embedded Designs
Cooperative jamming also has the capability to mask the confidential information and
reduce the SINR of unknown EVEs. The fundamental idea of this approach is introducing a
cooperative jammer to the system, which can send jamming signals to confuse the unknown
EVEs.Therefore, the potential extension direction of the work in Chapter 4 will be cooperative
jamming based robust designs with unknown EVEs. Furthermore, combing AN and
cooperative jamming is also an interesting topic in future work. However, the problems will
be more complicated when utilizing cooperative jamming technique. Hence, it is emerging
to find effective ways to solve these problems.
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Fig. 7.1 The NN model for multiple antenna wireless communication systems.
7.1.2 SEE Designs
In this thesis, SEE maximization designs have been studied, where it is assumed that
there only exists one user of each user group (i.e., PU-Rx, SU-Tx and ER). However, this
assumption might not always happen in practical scenarios. The future extension direction of
the work in Chapter 5 will focus on maximize SEE in multiple user CR networks. Therefore,
it is important to study effective algorithms to deal with the more complex SEE maximization
problems. Furthermore, the SEE another possible future work will be focused on SEE designs
for other wireless communication scenarios, i.e., relay assisted networks and unmanned aerial
vehicle based networks.
7.1.3 Machine Leaning based Resource Allocation
Another potential area of future research work will be paid attention to machine
leaning based resource allocation for physical layer security. Conventional NNs employ real
derivations to determine their weights and bias through minimizing loss functions. However,
there might arise a problem that the complex derivations exist if and only if they satisfy the
Cauchy-Riemann equations. In the complex domain, the functions that satisfy these equations
are called holomorphic functions, otherwise, they are called non-holomorphic functions
[209]. This stringent condition brings challenges for employing NNs to learn to optimize in
multiple antenna wireless communication scenarios, since NNs need to deal with different
parameters in complex domains for these scenarios. There exist two potential solutions for
utilizing NNs in multiple antenna wireless communication systems.
The first method is to separate both complex input and output parameters into two
parts: the real part and imaginary part [208]. As shown in Fig. 7.1, both parts of the
input channel coefficients and output beamforming of the NN are connected to the real and
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imaginary components of the corresponding complex parameters. Then, the NN can perform
its calculations in real domain. The performance of the NN based approach will be evaluated
with a test data set once the NN is trained with appropriate training data set. For the test
procedure, one more step needs to be performed: constructing the complex beamforming
vector by appropriately combining the imaginary part of the output and the corresponding
real part of the output.
The second approach to handle the complex parameters is to employ the Wirtinger
calculus to deal with non-holomorphic functions in complex domain [209]. The basic idea of
Wirtinger calculus is to perform the differentiable mapping for non-holomorphic functions
in complex domain by introducing conjugate coordinates. In other words, this mapping is
viewed from pseudo-real perspective in terms of conjugate coordinates. The back propagation
based complex gradient descent algorithm for NNs has been investigated in [209], which
enables NNs to handle all computations directly on complex variables without separating the
data into two parts.
Another interesting machine learning technique that can be utilized in wireless com-
munications is reinforcement learning, which is implemented based on the Markov decision
processes. Recently, applications of reinforcement learning in wireless communication has
attracted significant research interests [34, 210, 211]. Several designs have been proposed by
applying reinforcement learning to solve various problems in wireless communications, in-
cluding resource allocation problems in V2V communications [138], IoT networks [212, 213],
CR networks [214] and heterogeneous networks [215]. Moreover, Q-learning, which is a
special form of reinforcement learning also received much research attentions [34]. The main
idea of Q-learning is to determine the optimal action in an unknown system [34]. In other
words, Q-learning is a model free learning method. Furthermore, Q-learning can be applied
in heterogeneous networks to solve both power allocation and interference control problems
in femto/small cells [216]. Reinforcement learning approaches, including Q-learning, can
be exploited for resource allocation problems for physical layer security. For example, the
objective secrecy rate function can be chosen as the rewards, the constraints can be assumed
to be the states and thus the feasible region of the constraints are the actions. Then, the some
iterative computations are performed to determined the optimal actions that maximize the
rewards.
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